Part 1: Describe some research studies which have addressed the issue of whether non-
human animals have a 'theory of mind', and explain what these studies have allowed psy-
chologists to conclude in answer to this issue.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) suggested that "an individual has a theory of mind if he im-
putes mental states to himself and others" (p.525, cited p.86), including recognising that
this mental state may differ to ones own. The idea of theory of mind (ToM) being present in
non-human animals is controversial with many such as Hayes (1998) arguing that the abil-
ity for animals to 'mind-read' is more a simple learning process and the ability to behaviour
read. In this essay the research of Premack and Woodruff (1978), Hare et al (2000) com-
petitive feeding paradigm, and the rational imitation paradigm by Buttelmann et al (2007)
with be considered to explore how psychologists have addressed the hypothesis of ToM in
animals, and whether it is possible to conclude that animals do posses ToM to some de-
gree.
Premack and Woodruff (p.86) took chimpanzees that had been raised by humans and
showed them a series of video’s of humans attempting to solve a range of simple to com-
plex problems involving struggling to reach food. The simplest problem only involved mov-
ing a nearby box in order to stand on it, whilst the complex problem showed concrete
blocks on top of the box that would need to be moved first. In each example the tapes
were stopped just before the solution was revealed and the chimpanzee’s were presented
with a series of photographs, only one showing the correct solution to the problem. Consis-
tently the chimpanzees would solve the problem, indicating that they were capable of
recognising the issue faced by the human, understood the goals and intentions, and were
able to pick a method to solve that problem (p.87). Premack and Woodruff concluded that
this ability to recognise another mental state was evidence of a level of ToM.
, In 1998 Heyes published a review of Premack and Woodruff’s work arguing that the re-
sults were ambiguous of ToM and suggesting that the chimpanzees, who had all been
reared by humans, had learned the behaviour from interacting with their human keepers
(p.89). Alternatively in 2008 Call and Tomasello looked at a range of studies and con-
cluded that chimpanzees have at least some understanding of others’ mental states and
therefore posses ToM (p.89).
One piece of research that they looked at was a study investigating whether chimpanzees
could rationalise behaviour performed by others. Buttelmann et al. (2007, cited p.89-90)
used the rational imitation paradigm to study behaviour copying in human-raised chim-
panzees. First the chimpanzees would observe a human operating a device with their foot.
In one condition the humans’ hands would be occupied and in the second condition they
would be free. Next the chimpanzee would operate the device themselves. The results
showed that in condition one chimpanzees would use their hands as normal, but in condi-
tion two they would use their feet. The argument Call and Tommasello put forward was
that the chimpanzees understood the goal and the reasoning behind why the human was
carrying out the actions in a certain way (p.91). This rationality suggested that chim-
panzees were able to show an understanding of others minds and ToM.
Another part of ToM is the ability to understand that another person’s perspective may dif-
fer from our own. Hare et al. (2000) presented strong evidence that this is something that
chimpanzees also posses. The food competition paradigm, originally introduced by Hare et
al and later adapted by Call and Tomasello (2008, cited p.93-94), involved a dominant and
subordinate chimpanzee competing for food. They were placed in rooms on opposite sides
of a middle room with guillotine doors leading in. These doors could be partially raised to
allow the chimpanzees to see the middle room and each other. Food would be placed in
human animals have a 'theory of mind', and explain what these studies have allowed psy-
chologists to conclude in answer to this issue.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) suggested that "an individual has a theory of mind if he im-
putes mental states to himself and others" (p.525, cited p.86), including recognising that
this mental state may differ to ones own. The idea of theory of mind (ToM) being present in
non-human animals is controversial with many such as Hayes (1998) arguing that the abil-
ity for animals to 'mind-read' is more a simple learning process and the ability to behaviour
read. In this essay the research of Premack and Woodruff (1978), Hare et al (2000) com-
petitive feeding paradigm, and the rational imitation paradigm by Buttelmann et al (2007)
with be considered to explore how psychologists have addressed the hypothesis of ToM in
animals, and whether it is possible to conclude that animals do posses ToM to some de-
gree.
Premack and Woodruff (p.86) took chimpanzees that had been raised by humans and
showed them a series of video’s of humans attempting to solve a range of simple to com-
plex problems involving struggling to reach food. The simplest problem only involved mov-
ing a nearby box in order to stand on it, whilst the complex problem showed concrete
blocks on top of the box that would need to be moved first. In each example the tapes
were stopped just before the solution was revealed and the chimpanzee’s were presented
with a series of photographs, only one showing the correct solution to the problem. Consis-
tently the chimpanzees would solve the problem, indicating that they were capable of
recognising the issue faced by the human, understood the goals and intentions, and were
able to pick a method to solve that problem (p.87). Premack and Woodruff concluded that
this ability to recognise another mental state was evidence of a level of ToM.
, In 1998 Heyes published a review of Premack and Woodruff’s work arguing that the re-
sults were ambiguous of ToM and suggesting that the chimpanzees, who had all been
reared by humans, had learned the behaviour from interacting with their human keepers
(p.89). Alternatively in 2008 Call and Tomasello looked at a range of studies and con-
cluded that chimpanzees have at least some understanding of others’ mental states and
therefore posses ToM (p.89).
One piece of research that they looked at was a study investigating whether chimpanzees
could rationalise behaviour performed by others. Buttelmann et al. (2007, cited p.89-90)
used the rational imitation paradigm to study behaviour copying in human-raised chim-
panzees. First the chimpanzees would observe a human operating a device with their foot.
In one condition the humans’ hands would be occupied and in the second condition they
would be free. Next the chimpanzee would operate the device themselves. The results
showed that in condition one chimpanzees would use their hands as normal, but in condi-
tion two they would use their feet. The argument Call and Tommasello put forward was
that the chimpanzees understood the goal and the reasoning behind why the human was
carrying out the actions in a certain way (p.91). This rationality suggested that chim-
panzees were able to show an understanding of others minds and ToM.
Another part of ToM is the ability to understand that another person’s perspective may dif-
fer from our own. Hare et al. (2000) presented strong evidence that this is something that
chimpanzees also posses. The food competition paradigm, originally introduced by Hare et
al and later adapted by Call and Tomasello (2008, cited p.93-94), involved a dominant and
subordinate chimpanzee competing for food. They were placed in rooms on opposite sides
of a middle room with guillotine doors leading in. These doors could be partially raised to
allow the chimpanzees to see the middle room and each other. Food would be placed in
