Assignment 1 Semester 1 2026
Unique number:
Due Date: March 2026
Detailed solutions, explanations, workings
and references.
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, QUESTION 1: PAIA AND JUDICIAL ACCESS RIGHTS (2 ANSWERS PROVIDED)
The decision in Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others represents a
significant constitutional intervention in the enforcement of access to information
rights under section 32 of the Constitution.1 The Constitutional Court was required to
determine whether the 30-day period in section 78(2) of the Promotion of Access to
Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) unjustifiably limited the right of access to
information and the right of access to courts under section 34.2 The judgment
demonstrates how the Court reconciled the constitutional imperative of openness
with procedural discipline in litigation.
The Constitutional Framework
Section 32 of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right of access to information
held by the state.3 This right is foundational to South Africa’s constitutional
democracy, which is premised on accountability, responsiveness and openness.4
Access to information enables citizens and the media to scrutinise state conduct and
ensures transparency in public administration.
Section 34 guarantees the right of access to courts.5 This right ensures that
constitutional rights, including section 32 rights, can be effectively vindicated.
Without meaningful access to judicial remedies, constitutional rights risk becoming
hollow.
PAIA was enacted to give effect to section 32.6 However, section 78(2) required an
unsuccessful requester to approach a court “within 30 days” after an internal appeal
had failed.7 The issue in Brümmer was whether this time limit was constitutionally
permissible.
The Procedural Limitation under PAIA
1
Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC).
2
ibid paras 21–24.
3
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 32.
4
Constitution s 1(d).
5
Constitution s 34.
6
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA).
7
PAIA s 78(2).
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, The applicant, a journalist, sought access to records relating to a government
tender.8 After internal appeal procedures failed, he launched review proceedings
outside the 30-day period and sought condonation. The High Court declared section
78(2) unconstitutional, and the matter came before the Constitutional Court for
confirmation.9
The respondents argued that the 30-day limit was necessary to prevent delays and
administrative burdens and that the availability of condonation mitigated any
harshness.10 The Court rejected this reasoning.
The Court’s Reconciliation of Rights and Procedure
The Court accepted that time limits serve legitimate purposes. They promote legal
certainty, prevent stale claims and protect the interests of justice.11 However, not all
time bars are constitutionally compliant. The Court reiterated that a time limit must
afford a litigant an “adequate and fair opportunity” to seek judicial redress.12
In evaluating adequacy, the Court adopted a contextual approach. It recognised that
challenging a refusal under PAIA requires a requester to obtain legal advice, secure
funding and prepare litigation.13 For NGOs and ordinary individuals, these practical
steps often exceed 30 days. The evidence from the South African History Archives
Trust showed that compliance within 30 days was almost impossible in practice.14
The Court concluded that section 78(2) imposed a dual limitation: it limited both
section 34 (access to courts) and section 32 (access to information).15 Because
judicial review is the enforcement mechanism for access to information, restricting
court access undermines the substantive right itself.
Section 36 Justification Analysis
8
Brümmer (n 1) paras 6–8.
9
ibid paras 12–14.
10
ibid paras 55–57.
11
ibid para 61.
12
ibid para 62.
13
ibid paras 63–64.
14
ibid para 66.
15
ibid paras 67–69.
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