LCP4807: International Human Rights Law | Assignment 2 Due: 07 April 2026
LCP4807: International Human Rights Law
Assignment 2
Student Name: Jane A. Muthoni
Student Number: LCP/2024/0347
Lecturer: Dr. Samuel Waweru
Due Date: 07 April 2026
Word Count: Approximately 2,800 words
Question
"The existing international human rights treaty bodies lack the institutional capacity to
effectively monitor and enforce State compliance with their obligations under international
human rights law." Critically evaluate this statement, with reference to at least THREE
treaty bodies and relevant case law or practice.
1. Introduction
The international human rights treaty system, developed progressively since the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, constitutes the normative backbone
of global human rights protection. Over the decades, a network of nine core international
human rights treaties has been established, each supervised by a dedicated expert body
collectively referred to as treaty bodies. These bodies — including the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) — are
entrusted with monitoring States Parties' compliance through periodic reporting, individual
communications, and in some instances, inquiry procedures.
The statement under examination raises a fundamental question about whether this
architecture is capable of delivering effective accountability. This essay critically evaluates
the assertion that treaty bodies lack the institutional capacity to effectively monitor and
enforce State compliance. It will be argued that while treaty bodies face significant
structural and resource constraints, describing them as wholly ineffective overstates the
case. Treaty bodies have developed sophisticated monitoring tools and, in conjunction with
regional mechanisms and domestic courts, have meaningfully influenced State behaviour.
However, genuine reform is necessary to address systemic limitations.
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, LCP4807: International Human Rights Law | Assignment 2 Due: 07 April 2026
2. The Architecture of the Treaty Body System
2.1 Structure and Mandate
Treaty bodies are committees of independent experts established under specific human
rights treaties. Each body monitors the implementation of its parent treaty through a variety
of mechanisms. The periodic reporting procedure — the most universal mechanism —
requires States to submit regular reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect
to treaty obligations. Treaty bodies examine these reports, engage with State delegations,
consider information from civil society, and issue Concluding Observations that include
both positive acknowledgements and areas of concern with recommended follow-up
actions.
In addition to reporting, treaty bodies may receive individual communications from persons
claiming violations of their rights, subject to the acceptance of optional protocols or
optional clauses. The Human Rights Committee, for instance, operates under the First
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
has issued thousands of Views on individual cases, providing authoritative interpretations
of the ICCPR.
2.2 Inherent Limitations of the System
Despite these mechanisms, the treaty body system suffers from well-documented
institutional limitations. First, the system is chronically under-resourced. The UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the treaty
body system receives less than 3% of the regular UN budget, creating severe backlogs in
report examination and communication processing. As of 2023, some treaty bodies faced
backlogs of several years in processing individual communications.
Second, treaty body decisions — including Views on individual communications — are
not legally binding under international law in the same way as judgments of international
courts. States frequently fail to implement such Views, and there exists no effective
enforcement mechanism to compel compliance. The Human Rights Committee has itself
noted the persistent problem of non-implementation in its annual reports.
3. Critical Evaluation of Selected Treaty Bodies
3.1 The Human Rights Committee (HRC)
The HRC, established under Article 28 of the ICCPR, is among the most active treaty
bodies. Its jurisprudence through individual communications has produced a rich body of
interpretive law on civil and political rights. In Toonen v Australia (Communication No.
488/1992), the HRC held that the criminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct violated
Articles 17 and 2(1) of the ICCPR, marking a landmark development in the interpretation
of "sex" as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Australia subsequently amended the
relevant Tasmanian legislation.
However, Toonen represents an exceptional case of compliance. Research by Keller and
Ulfstein has shown that HRC Views are followed up in fewer than 30% of cases, and full
compliance is even rarer. States often respond to Views with formal acknowledgement but
little substantive change. The HRC's follow-up procedure — established in Rule 109 of its
Page 2 of 5
LCP4807: International Human Rights Law
Assignment 2
Student Name: Jane A. Muthoni
Student Number: LCP/2024/0347
Lecturer: Dr. Samuel Waweru
Due Date: 07 April 2026
Word Count: Approximately 2,800 words
Question
"The existing international human rights treaty bodies lack the institutional capacity to
effectively monitor and enforce State compliance with their obligations under international
human rights law." Critically evaluate this statement, with reference to at least THREE
treaty bodies and relevant case law or practice.
1. Introduction
The international human rights treaty system, developed progressively since the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, constitutes the normative backbone
of global human rights protection. Over the decades, a network of nine core international
human rights treaties has been established, each supervised by a dedicated expert body
collectively referred to as treaty bodies. These bodies — including the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) — are
entrusted with monitoring States Parties' compliance through periodic reporting, individual
communications, and in some instances, inquiry procedures.
The statement under examination raises a fundamental question about whether this
architecture is capable of delivering effective accountability. This essay critically evaluates
the assertion that treaty bodies lack the institutional capacity to effectively monitor and
enforce State compliance. It will be argued that while treaty bodies face significant
structural and resource constraints, describing them as wholly ineffective overstates the
case. Treaty bodies have developed sophisticated monitoring tools and, in conjunction with
regional mechanisms and domestic courts, have meaningfully influenced State behaviour.
However, genuine reform is necessary to address systemic limitations.
Page 1 of 5
, LCP4807: International Human Rights Law | Assignment 2 Due: 07 April 2026
2. The Architecture of the Treaty Body System
2.1 Structure and Mandate
Treaty bodies are committees of independent experts established under specific human
rights treaties. Each body monitors the implementation of its parent treaty through a variety
of mechanisms. The periodic reporting procedure — the most universal mechanism —
requires States to submit regular reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect
to treaty obligations. Treaty bodies examine these reports, engage with State delegations,
consider information from civil society, and issue Concluding Observations that include
both positive acknowledgements and areas of concern with recommended follow-up
actions.
In addition to reporting, treaty bodies may receive individual communications from persons
claiming violations of their rights, subject to the acceptance of optional protocols or
optional clauses. The Human Rights Committee, for instance, operates under the First
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
has issued thousands of Views on individual cases, providing authoritative interpretations
of the ICCPR.
2.2 Inherent Limitations of the System
Despite these mechanisms, the treaty body system suffers from well-documented
institutional limitations. First, the system is chronically under-resourced. The UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the treaty
body system receives less than 3% of the regular UN budget, creating severe backlogs in
report examination and communication processing. As of 2023, some treaty bodies faced
backlogs of several years in processing individual communications.
Second, treaty body decisions — including Views on individual communications — are
not legally binding under international law in the same way as judgments of international
courts. States frequently fail to implement such Views, and there exists no effective
enforcement mechanism to compel compliance. The Human Rights Committee has itself
noted the persistent problem of non-implementation in its annual reports.
3. Critical Evaluation of Selected Treaty Bodies
3.1 The Human Rights Committee (HRC)
The HRC, established under Article 28 of the ICCPR, is among the most active treaty
bodies. Its jurisprudence through individual communications has produced a rich body of
interpretive law on civil and political rights. In Toonen v Australia (Communication No.
488/1992), the HRC held that the criminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct violated
Articles 17 and 2(1) of the ICCPR, marking a landmark development in the interpretation
of "sex" as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Australia subsequently amended the
relevant Tasmanian legislation.
However, Toonen represents an exceptional case of compliance. Research by Keller and
Ulfstein has shown that HRC Views are followed up in fewer than 30% of cases, and full
compliance is even rarer. States often respond to Views with formal acknowledgement but
little substantive change. The HRC's follow-up procedure — established in Rule 109 of its
Page 2 of 5
