LCR4803
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 1 2026
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: 2026
, Media Law - LCR4803
Question 1: PAIA and Judicial Access Rights
In Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC), the
Constitutional Court of South Africa was required to reconcile the constitutional right
of access to information under section 32 of the Constitution with the procedural
limitations contained in the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA).
The Court recognised that PAIA gives effect to section 32, but emphasised that
procedural mechanisms may not unjustifiably limit the core right. A central issue
was PAIA’s failure to provide mandatory internal appeal timeframes, which resulted
in unreasonable delays that effectively denied access to information. The Court held
that time is intrinsic to the right, particularly where information is required to vindicate
other rights.
Applying the section 36 limitation analysis, the Court found that PAIA’s procedural
gaps were not reasonable or justifiable in an open and democratic society. It stressed
that administrative convenience cannot outweigh a fundamental right. Importantly, the
Court rejected a formalistic interpretation of PAIA, adopting instead a purposive and
rights-enhancing approach consistent with constitutional supremacy.
The Court reconciled section 32 and PAIA by affirming PAIA’s constitutionality only to
the extent that it is interpreted and applied in a manner that facilitates prompt
access. Where PAIA procedures undermine the substance of the right, courts are
empowered to intervene. The judgment therefore strengthened judicial access rights by
confirming that procedural compliance cannot be used to defeat constitutional
entitlements.
Question 2: ICASA Council Accountability
ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 1 2026
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: 2026
, Media Law - LCR4803
Question 1: PAIA and Judicial Access Rights
In Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC), the
Constitutional Court of South Africa was required to reconcile the constitutional right
of access to information under section 32 of the Constitution with the procedural
limitations contained in the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA).
The Court recognised that PAIA gives effect to section 32, but emphasised that
procedural mechanisms may not unjustifiably limit the core right. A central issue
was PAIA’s failure to provide mandatory internal appeal timeframes, which resulted
in unreasonable delays that effectively denied access to information. The Court held
that time is intrinsic to the right, particularly where information is required to vindicate
other rights.
Applying the section 36 limitation analysis, the Court found that PAIA’s procedural
gaps were not reasonable or justifiable in an open and democratic society. It stressed
that administrative convenience cannot outweigh a fundamental right. Importantly, the
Court rejected a formalistic interpretation of PAIA, adopting instead a purposive and
rights-enhancing approach consistent with constitutional supremacy.
The Court reconciled section 32 and PAIA by affirming PAIA’s constitutionality only to
the extent that it is interpreted and applied in a manner that facilitates prompt
access. Where PAIA procedures undermine the substance of the right, courts are
empowered to intervene. The judgment therefore strengthened judicial access rights by
confirming that procedural compliance cannot be used to defeat constitutional
entitlements.
Question 2: ICASA Council Accountability
