Question 2: Should international human rights law recognise us as persons at birth, at
conception or at some other point in our biological development? Provide a justification for
your position.
International human rights law should recognises us as persons with all relevant inalienable human
rights attached to their being at birth. Disagreement and uncertainty surrounding the moment in
which human rights should attach to a being pervades public discourse, with perhaps the most
contentious issue fuelling debate is the conflict arising between a woman’s rights to life and bodily
autonomy against the proposed right of an unborn person to life.1 By examining the current status of
international documents concerning life, the effect of international human rights laws recognising a
person with rights prior to birth on the human rights of others as well as the instability of arguments
for foetal viability as a marker for the recognition of personhood, the need for international human
rights law to recognise the conception of human rights at birth can be better understood.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not appear to attach human rights to an unborn
person:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.2
Correspondingly, other international human rights treaties through their interpretation or drafting
reject claims that humans rights should apply from conception or any other point in a human’s
biological development prior to birth.3 The travaux préparatories for the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) indicate that amendments to attach the right to life from the
1The right to life debate centres around moral and ethical discussion as to when life beings, however, for the purposes
of this essay an examination of solely when human rights, including rights other than merely a right to life, should
attach to a being will be made.
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 1.
3 Rhonda Copelon, Christina Zampas, Elizabeth Brusie & Jacqueline deVore, ‘Human Rights Begin at Birth:
International Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights’ (2005) 13(26) Reproductive Health Matters.
, moment of conception were introduced and later rejected.4 The Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) further rejects the notions of human rights manifesting prior to birth.5 The rationale for
these documents identifying that human rights will attach to a person at birth is due to the
recognition that if human rights were to attach prior to birth such rights can diminish or strip what
are supposed to be the inalienable human rights of born women.
The presence of a foetus in a pregnant woman’s body entails claims of conflicting rights and for
such reasons, for the purposes on international human rights law, a person should solely be
identified as an individual with rights upon birth. A woman’s right to life as well as other human
rights relating to autonomy and health cannot be superseded by the purported right of a foetus to
life, particularly when a foetus requires the compromise of a woman’s bodily autonomy and health
in order for it to sustain its ‘life’.6 Thompson argues that regardless of whether a foetus possess a
right to life, it cannot utilise a woman’s body against her will. 7 A woman terminating a pregnancy
is no more immoral than an individual refusing to donate an organ to another in need,8 even if this
refusal would result in the death of the person in need. The stark difference in the scenario is
perception, in that, the woman is perceived to be stripping an individual of the right to life and is
4 The Human Rights Committee when interpreting the ICCPR and monitoring compliance has consistently emphasised
women’s lives and human rights are threatened by prohibitions on abortion on the basis that an unborn foetus has a right
to life; Copelon (n 31) 122.
5 Arguments to the contrary are erroneously based upon the Preamble which requires safeguards for a child before and
after birth, however, this statement merely identifies the need to assist, through the promotion of the women’s right to
health care, a child’s strength to survive labour. The travaux préparatories of the CRC identifies that this duty must not
affect a woman’s right to bodily autonomy and that whilst the words ‘before and after birth’ were inserted, it was not
make the interpretation of Article 1 of the CRC inconsistent with Article 1 of the UDHR. The reference to children as
‘human’ in Article 1 of the CRC is intended to be interpreted with reference to Article 1 of the UDHR in that the term
‘human’ refers solely to born persons.
6No individual should have the right to subordinate another in the manner in which an unwanted pregnancy
subordinates a woman by forcing her to risk, and forfeit her right to, her health, privacy and bodily autonomy in order to
birth a child; Copelon (n 31).
7This purported right to life cannot not outweigh the pregnant woman’s right to personal bodily autonomy and the
foetus cannot use the woman’s body even if it needs it for life itself; Judith Thompson, A Defense of Abortion
(Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1971); Francis J. Beckwith, ‘Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and Unplugging the
Violinist’ (1992) 3(1) International Philosophical Quarterly.
8In a situation where that individual is the only person capable of providing the life saving organ and donating their
organ would not kill them.
conception or at some other point in our biological development? Provide a justification for
your position.
International human rights law should recognises us as persons with all relevant inalienable human
rights attached to their being at birth. Disagreement and uncertainty surrounding the moment in
which human rights should attach to a being pervades public discourse, with perhaps the most
contentious issue fuelling debate is the conflict arising between a woman’s rights to life and bodily
autonomy against the proposed right of an unborn person to life.1 By examining the current status of
international documents concerning life, the effect of international human rights laws recognising a
person with rights prior to birth on the human rights of others as well as the instability of arguments
for foetal viability as a marker for the recognition of personhood, the need for international human
rights law to recognise the conception of human rights at birth can be better understood.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not appear to attach human rights to an unborn
person:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.2
Correspondingly, other international human rights treaties through their interpretation or drafting
reject claims that humans rights should apply from conception or any other point in a human’s
biological development prior to birth.3 The travaux préparatories for the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) indicate that amendments to attach the right to life from the
1The right to life debate centres around moral and ethical discussion as to when life beings, however, for the purposes
of this essay an examination of solely when human rights, including rights other than merely a right to life, should
attach to a being will be made.
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 1.
3 Rhonda Copelon, Christina Zampas, Elizabeth Brusie & Jacqueline deVore, ‘Human Rights Begin at Birth:
International Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights’ (2005) 13(26) Reproductive Health Matters.
, moment of conception were introduced and later rejected.4 The Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) further rejects the notions of human rights manifesting prior to birth.5 The rationale for
these documents identifying that human rights will attach to a person at birth is due to the
recognition that if human rights were to attach prior to birth such rights can diminish or strip what
are supposed to be the inalienable human rights of born women.
The presence of a foetus in a pregnant woman’s body entails claims of conflicting rights and for
such reasons, for the purposes on international human rights law, a person should solely be
identified as an individual with rights upon birth. A woman’s right to life as well as other human
rights relating to autonomy and health cannot be superseded by the purported right of a foetus to
life, particularly when a foetus requires the compromise of a woman’s bodily autonomy and health
in order for it to sustain its ‘life’.6 Thompson argues that regardless of whether a foetus possess a
right to life, it cannot utilise a woman’s body against her will. 7 A woman terminating a pregnancy
is no more immoral than an individual refusing to donate an organ to another in need,8 even if this
refusal would result in the death of the person in need. The stark difference in the scenario is
perception, in that, the woman is perceived to be stripping an individual of the right to life and is
4 The Human Rights Committee when interpreting the ICCPR and monitoring compliance has consistently emphasised
women’s lives and human rights are threatened by prohibitions on abortion on the basis that an unborn foetus has a right
to life; Copelon (n 31) 122.
5 Arguments to the contrary are erroneously based upon the Preamble which requires safeguards for a child before and
after birth, however, this statement merely identifies the need to assist, through the promotion of the women’s right to
health care, a child’s strength to survive labour. The travaux préparatories of the CRC identifies that this duty must not
affect a woman’s right to bodily autonomy and that whilst the words ‘before and after birth’ were inserted, it was not
make the interpretation of Article 1 of the CRC inconsistent with Article 1 of the UDHR. The reference to children as
‘human’ in Article 1 of the CRC is intended to be interpreted with reference to Article 1 of the UDHR in that the term
‘human’ refers solely to born persons.
6No individual should have the right to subordinate another in the manner in which an unwanted pregnancy
subordinates a woman by forcing her to risk, and forfeit her right to, her health, privacy and bodily autonomy in order to
birth a child; Copelon (n 31).
7This purported right to life cannot not outweigh the pregnant woman’s right to personal bodily autonomy and the
foetus cannot use the woman’s body even if it needs it for life itself; Judith Thompson, A Defense of Abortion
(Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1971); Francis J. Beckwith, ‘Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and Unplugging the
Violinist’ (1992) 3(1) International Philosophical Quarterly.
8In a situation where that individual is the only person capable of providing the life saving organ and donating their
organ would not kill them.
