PROPERTY DUALISM
SPECIFICATION
Property dualism
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to
nor supervenient upon physical properties.
The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David
Chalmers).
Responses including:
a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable
what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual
world.
The ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson).
Responses including:
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain
ability knowledge (the 'ability knowledge' response).
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain
acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response).
Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of
physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New
Knowledge / Old Fact’ response).
ISSUES:
the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as
involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-
physical)
the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.
WHAT IS PROPERTY DUALISM?
, Mental states depend upon the brain but are not reducible to brain states
Brains have two types of property: physical (extension, shape, motion) and mental (qualia,
consciousness, thoughts)
Mental states (qualia, intentionality) are non-physical states of a physical substances
=> solves problems with substance dualism:
It accepts that minds (or mental properties) are distinct from physical ones but argues there is
only one substance: the physical - bridges gap between physicalism and substance dualism
Qualia = Intrinsic (identified as what its like to experience something), phenomenal properties that are
introspectively accessible. The non-intentional experiential quality of sense-data
Supervenience = a relationship between two kinds of thing. X supervenes on Y if a change in Y is
necessary for a change in X. (X is dependent on Y)
-> physicalism claims that everything (including mind and mental states) is physical or supervenes on
the physical (two physically identical things must be the same in every way - impossible to be mentally
different)
BUT
-> property dualism claims it is possible for two physically identical things to be different in some
way/have different mental properties - qualia
-> qualia are neither physical nor supervene on the physical
(from substance dualism) Interactionism: the mind can interact with the physical and the physical
world can interact with the mind
E.g. mental -> physical: mental state of hunger causes you to go and get food
E.g. physical -> mental: getting hit in the head can cause mental state of pain
(from property dualism) Epiphenomenalist: something we can observe happening that doesn't have
any causal impact
-> non-physical mental states are causally impotent
-> physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause change in physical world -
causal interaction is one way
E.g. physical -> mental: getting hit in the head can cause mental state of pain
E.g. mental states -> don’t cause anything: going to get food is explained by physical brain state, not
mental state
-> e.g. physical (brain) causes consciousness = train
consciousness doesn't cause anything = steam (effacious)
SO…most property dualists believe that qualia are caused by physical things but qualia doesn’t cause
everything itself
-> avoids problems of interaction as it doesn’t have to explain how mental can cause changes in
physical
PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIES ARGUMENT (DAVID CHALMERS):
(Chalmer's explanatory argument)
P1. Physical accounts explain at most structure and function (the 'easy' problem)
P2. Explaining structure and function is not sufficient to explain consciousness (i.e. it doesn’t explain
the 'hard' problem)
C1. Therefore, no physical account can explain consciousness
If you can account for every physical property but you’ve got consciousness, there
must be something else (qualia)
SPECIFICATION
Property dualism
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to
nor supervenient upon physical properties.
The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David
Chalmers).
Responses including:
a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable
what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual
world.
The ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson).
Responses including:
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain
ability knowledge (the 'ability knowledge' response).
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain
acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response).
Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of
physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New
Knowledge / Old Fact’ response).
ISSUES:
the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as
involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-
physical)
the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.
WHAT IS PROPERTY DUALISM?
, Mental states depend upon the brain but are not reducible to brain states
Brains have two types of property: physical (extension, shape, motion) and mental (qualia,
consciousness, thoughts)
Mental states (qualia, intentionality) are non-physical states of a physical substances
=> solves problems with substance dualism:
It accepts that minds (or mental properties) are distinct from physical ones but argues there is
only one substance: the physical - bridges gap between physicalism and substance dualism
Qualia = Intrinsic (identified as what its like to experience something), phenomenal properties that are
introspectively accessible. The non-intentional experiential quality of sense-data
Supervenience = a relationship between two kinds of thing. X supervenes on Y if a change in Y is
necessary for a change in X. (X is dependent on Y)
-> physicalism claims that everything (including mind and mental states) is physical or supervenes on
the physical (two physically identical things must be the same in every way - impossible to be mentally
different)
BUT
-> property dualism claims it is possible for two physically identical things to be different in some
way/have different mental properties - qualia
-> qualia are neither physical nor supervene on the physical
(from substance dualism) Interactionism: the mind can interact with the physical and the physical
world can interact with the mind
E.g. mental -> physical: mental state of hunger causes you to go and get food
E.g. physical -> mental: getting hit in the head can cause mental state of pain
(from property dualism) Epiphenomenalist: something we can observe happening that doesn't have
any causal impact
-> non-physical mental states are causally impotent
-> physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause change in physical world -
causal interaction is one way
E.g. physical -> mental: getting hit in the head can cause mental state of pain
E.g. mental states -> don’t cause anything: going to get food is explained by physical brain state, not
mental state
-> e.g. physical (brain) causes consciousness = train
consciousness doesn't cause anything = steam (effacious)
SO…most property dualists believe that qualia are caused by physical things but qualia doesn’t cause
everything itself
-> avoids problems of interaction as it doesn’t have to explain how mental can cause changes in
physical
PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIES ARGUMENT (DAVID CHALMERS):
(Chalmer's explanatory argument)
P1. Physical accounts explain at most structure and function (the 'easy' problem)
P2. Explaining structure and function is not sufficient to explain consciousness (i.e. it doesn’t explain
the 'hard' problem)
C1. Therefore, no physical account can explain consciousness
If you can account for every physical property but you’ve got consciousness, there
must be something else (qualia)
