BEHAVIOURISM
SPECIFICATION
3.4.3 Physicalist theories
Physicalism
Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes
properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).
Philosophical behaviourism:
'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be
reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use
the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements
(including Carl Hempel).
'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states
are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that
use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle).
ISSUES:
dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism
the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary
Putnam's 'Super-Spartans' and perfect actors)
issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and
(b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour
the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other
people’s mental states.
= we can analyse the mind in terms of behaviour
-> the meaning of words is used to describe mental states, e.g. behavioural dispositions
-> e.g. pain = wince, say ouch, get away, elevated heart rate - inner sensations (qualia) are irrelevant
(all about external observations)
SPECIFICATION
3.4.3 Physicalist theories
Physicalism
Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes
properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).
Philosophical behaviourism:
'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be
reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use
the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements
(including Carl Hempel).
'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states
are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that
use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle).
ISSUES:
dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism
the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary
Putnam's 'Super-Spartans' and perfect actors)
issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and
(b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour
the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other
people’s mental states.
= we can analyse the mind in terms of behaviour
-> the meaning of words is used to describe mental states, e.g. behavioural dispositions
-> e.g. pain = wince, say ouch, get away, elevated heart rate - inner sensations (qualia) are irrelevant
(all about external observations)
