FUNCTIONALISM
SPECIFICATION
Functionalism:
= all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles
which can be multiply realised.
ISSUES:
the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted
qualia)
the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned
Block’s China thought experiment)
the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts
(no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia)
FUNCTIONALISM:
Defines mental states as functional states within an organism
-> not to be analysed in terms of ontology (what they are made of) but the functional role they play
within a system of inputs and outputs
, E.g. functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation that causes one to get away from the thing that’s
causing it harm
- Part of the function of e.g. pain is to cause other mental states - such as a belief you are in pain/the
desire for it to stop
> Functional definition = clocks, eyes, poison
-> we define something as a clock if it fulfils the function as one, we don’t care what it is made of
> Compositional definition (MBIT) = diamonds, water, sunflowers
-> a diamond is only a diamond if it is made from pure carbon that has formed specific bonds
-> it is not enough for it to function like a diamond (e.g. shiny, in jewellery), it has to be made of
exactly the right stuff
=> difference between MBIT and functionalism definitions of the mind:
MBIT: compositional - mind defined by what it is - could conclude mind is physical states
Functionalist: not making any claim about what the mind is but what it does
=> are functionalists dualist or physicalist:
Many are physicalists and claim only something physical could realise a mental state or could
play any kind of functional role at all
HILARY PUTNAM:
Mental states can be understood using a machine table - lists all possible inputs + outputs of a
system
"computational functionalism" or "machine state functionalism"
-> definition: mental states are machine states specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations
to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table. The mind is like a program
which runs on the hardware of the brain
- Certain inputs cause mental states/behaviour relating to e.g. pain
- Anything that is capable of receiving those inputs and giving certain outputs is (functionally) a mind
==> how does the machine table work?
- Lists every possible combination of state + input and assigns each combination an output
- Describe operation of software which can be implemented into different systems
- Have different physical constructions + different hardware (so different systems)
"THEY'RE MADE OF MEAT - SHORT STORY"
- Aliens try to make sense as to how life forms made of meat can have consciousness/minds
- They conclude meat can't give rise to consciousness
- Are we guilty of the opposite assumption? That objects unlike us can't have minds?
=> how does functionalism deal with carbon chauvinism?
= the view that only carbon based life-forms such as humans can have minds
- If we define a mind by what it does, then minds are not limited to carbon life forms, but could be
found in e.g. computers
ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONALISM:
1. Multiple realisability - Putnam
Objects to MBIT but supports functionalism
=> issue for MBIT: says mental states can only be realised by specific physical structures/properties -
denies animals with different brain structures to humans could have minds or that non-carbon life
forms could have minds (carbon chauvinism)
=> how functionalism avoids it: doesn’t make any claims as to what constitutes a mind, only that it
functions as a mind. In that sense, minds can be realised in any object that fulfils the functional role of
a mind, e.g. an alien can experience pain and hold beliefs if its brain instantiates the relevant functional
states. (The opposite of chauvinism is liberalism.)
SPECIFICATION
Functionalism:
= all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles
which can be multiply realised.
ISSUES:
the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted
qualia)
the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned
Block’s China thought experiment)
the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts
(no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia)
FUNCTIONALISM:
Defines mental states as functional states within an organism
-> not to be analysed in terms of ontology (what they are made of) but the functional role they play
within a system of inputs and outputs
, E.g. functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation that causes one to get away from the thing that’s
causing it harm
- Part of the function of e.g. pain is to cause other mental states - such as a belief you are in pain/the
desire for it to stop
> Functional definition = clocks, eyes, poison
-> we define something as a clock if it fulfils the function as one, we don’t care what it is made of
> Compositional definition (MBIT) = diamonds, water, sunflowers
-> a diamond is only a diamond if it is made from pure carbon that has formed specific bonds
-> it is not enough for it to function like a diamond (e.g. shiny, in jewellery), it has to be made of
exactly the right stuff
=> difference between MBIT and functionalism definitions of the mind:
MBIT: compositional - mind defined by what it is - could conclude mind is physical states
Functionalist: not making any claim about what the mind is but what it does
=> are functionalists dualist or physicalist:
Many are physicalists and claim only something physical could realise a mental state or could
play any kind of functional role at all
HILARY PUTNAM:
Mental states can be understood using a machine table - lists all possible inputs + outputs of a
system
"computational functionalism" or "machine state functionalism"
-> definition: mental states are machine states specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations
to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table. The mind is like a program
which runs on the hardware of the brain
- Certain inputs cause mental states/behaviour relating to e.g. pain
- Anything that is capable of receiving those inputs and giving certain outputs is (functionally) a mind
==> how does the machine table work?
- Lists every possible combination of state + input and assigns each combination an output
- Describe operation of software which can be implemented into different systems
- Have different physical constructions + different hardware (so different systems)
"THEY'RE MADE OF MEAT - SHORT STORY"
- Aliens try to make sense as to how life forms made of meat can have consciousness/minds
- They conclude meat can't give rise to consciousness
- Are we guilty of the opposite assumption? That objects unlike us can't have minds?
=> how does functionalism deal with carbon chauvinism?
= the view that only carbon based life-forms such as humans can have minds
- If we define a mind by what it does, then minds are not limited to carbon life forms, but could be
found in e.g. computers
ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONALISM:
1. Multiple realisability - Putnam
Objects to MBIT but supports functionalism
=> issue for MBIT: says mental states can only be realised by specific physical structures/properties -
denies animals with different brain structures to humans could have minds or that non-carbon life
forms could have minds (carbon chauvinism)
=> how functionalism avoids it: doesn’t make any claims as to what constitutes a mind, only that it
functions as a mind. In that sense, minds can be realised in any object that fulfils the functional role of
a mind, e.g. an alien can experience pain and hold beliefs if its brain instantiates the relevant functional
states. (The opposite of chauvinism is liberalism.)
