Ethno-philosophy is Rational: A Reply to Two Famous
Critics
Fainos Mangena
Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy
University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3
Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK)
New Series, Vol.6 No.2, December 2014, pp.23-38
http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index
ISSN: 2076-7714
,24 Fainos Mangena
Abstract
In this article, I contend that philosophical reactions against ethno-philosophy, especially the
arguments by professional African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Kwame Anthony
Appiah, cannot go unchallenged at a time when Africa is facing a myriad of problems such as
disease, famine, ethnic conflicts, religious wars, and natural disasters which, in my view, stem
from the continent’s failure to reflect on its past in the quest for lasting solutions. Having looked
at the historical context of the emergence of ethno-philosophy or the project of cultural
revivalism, and having closely examined the premises presented by Hountondji and Appiah
against ethno-philosophy - which I consider to be unconvincing because of their tendency to
glide into Western philosophical forms of thought - I argue that ethno-philosophy is just like
Western philosophy, as it is based on a recognized form of reasoning, namely inductive
reasoning, which is packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. I also argue that
religious beliefs are not an obstacle to the development of scientific thought in Africa; rather,
they are an aid to it since both have complementary rather than opposing roles.
Keywords
Philosophy, ethno-philosophy, primitive unanimity, induction, African proverbs
Introduction
As a regular contributor in the area of African philosophy, particularly on its attendant concept
hunhu/ubuntu, I have had to face hard questions from colleagues at work and those I have met at
international conferences who have accused me and others that have contributed in this area of
being too simplistic or overly ambitious in defending this system of thought as a distinct
category of African philosophy. While in the past I have argued for the recognition of
hunhu/ubuntu philosophy in Zimbabwe, in this article I appeal to a different form of argument in
order to defend ethno-philosophy against what I consider to be an unjustified attack by
professional African philosophers.1 I attempt to make a case for ethno-philosophy, showing that
it is a philosophy based on reason and evidence just like Western philosophy.
1
Professional African Philosophers are identified not only by their credentials as doctors of philosophy from
Western universities or Western style universities in Africa, but also by a common conviction among them that
philosophy, in its strictest academic sense, is a universal mode of inquiry. The sort of investigation that Professional
African Philosophers engage in is often described as a “second order activity” on first order claims to truth about the
, Ethno-philosophy is Rational: A Reply to Two Famous Critics 25
Recently, as I was carrying out research on ethno-philosophy, I came across a very interesting
article by Jay A. Ciaffa titled “Tradition and Modernity in Postcolonial African Philosophy”
(Ciaffa 2008) which revisited this debate, focusing on the contributions of Hountondji, Appiah
and Gyekye in their critique of ethno-philosophy. My discovery of this article stimulated my
interest in replying to those who have charged ethno-philosophy of being uncritical and
irrational. In my reply to such critics, I do three things:
(1) Outline familiar objections to ethno-philosophy.
(2) Offer a critique of these objections.
(3) Show why ethno-philosophy is a project that is worth pursuing in light of the many
problems bedeviling Africa today, which, in my view, are due to the failure of Africa to
harness its philosophy in order to solve them.
Among the Shona2 of Zimbabwe, there is a proverb which says: Chimwango choumwe hachina
ndima (A borrowed hoe cannot cover enough ground). This proverb can be used to succinctly
express the fact that Western philosophies and sciences cannot wholly solve Africa’s problems.
Ethno-philosophy: A Definition
Since ethno-philosophy is an aspect of African philosophy, it is important to begin this article by
defining African philosophy. To this end, K.C. Anyanwu and E.A. Ruch (1981) define African
philosophy as "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and
present make sense of their destiny and of the world in which they live." Understood this way,
African philosophy becomes that kind of philosophy which must necessarily be produced by
African people and must use distinct African philosophical methods (Janz 2009, 75-76).
Imbo (1998, 38-39) notes that although African philosophers are found in the various academic
fields of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy and political
philosophy, much of the modern African philosophy has been concerned with defining ethno-
philosophy as an aspect of African philosophy and identifying what differentiates it from other
philosophical traditions. In this article, I focus more on the criticisms leveled against ethno-
world, knowledge, inference and values. As a second order activity, so they claim, philosophy evaluates first order
claims in order to clarify their meanings and to identify appropriate ways of justifying them. It essentially involves
reflection, criticism, argument and written peer review (English and Kalumba 1996, 7).
2
The Shona people constitute the largest linguistic grouping in Zimbabwe which is made up of six dialects, namely,
Karanga, Korekore, Zezuru, Ndau, Manyika and Kalanga.
Critics
Fainos Mangena
Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy
University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/tp.v6i2.3
Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK)
New Series, Vol.6 No.2, December 2014, pp.23-38
http://ajol.info/index.php/tp/index
ISSN: 2076-7714
,24 Fainos Mangena
Abstract
In this article, I contend that philosophical reactions against ethno-philosophy, especially the
arguments by professional African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Kwame Anthony
Appiah, cannot go unchallenged at a time when Africa is facing a myriad of problems such as
disease, famine, ethnic conflicts, religious wars, and natural disasters which, in my view, stem
from the continent’s failure to reflect on its past in the quest for lasting solutions. Having looked
at the historical context of the emergence of ethno-philosophy or the project of cultural
revivalism, and having closely examined the premises presented by Hountondji and Appiah
against ethno-philosophy - which I consider to be unconvincing because of their tendency to
glide into Western philosophical forms of thought - I argue that ethno-philosophy is just like
Western philosophy, as it is based on a recognized form of reasoning, namely inductive
reasoning, which is packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. I also argue that
religious beliefs are not an obstacle to the development of scientific thought in Africa; rather,
they are an aid to it since both have complementary rather than opposing roles.
Keywords
Philosophy, ethno-philosophy, primitive unanimity, induction, African proverbs
Introduction
As a regular contributor in the area of African philosophy, particularly on its attendant concept
hunhu/ubuntu, I have had to face hard questions from colleagues at work and those I have met at
international conferences who have accused me and others that have contributed in this area of
being too simplistic or overly ambitious in defending this system of thought as a distinct
category of African philosophy. While in the past I have argued for the recognition of
hunhu/ubuntu philosophy in Zimbabwe, in this article I appeal to a different form of argument in
order to defend ethno-philosophy against what I consider to be an unjustified attack by
professional African philosophers.1 I attempt to make a case for ethno-philosophy, showing that
it is a philosophy based on reason and evidence just like Western philosophy.
1
Professional African Philosophers are identified not only by their credentials as doctors of philosophy from
Western universities or Western style universities in Africa, but also by a common conviction among them that
philosophy, in its strictest academic sense, is a universal mode of inquiry. The sort of investigation that Professional
African Philosophers engage in is often described as a “second order activity” on first order claims to truth about the
, Ethno-philosophy is Rational: A Reply to Two Famous Critics 25
Recently, as I was carrying out research on ethno-philosophy, I came across a very interesting
article by Jay A. Ciaffa titled “Tradition and Modernity in Postcolonial African Philosophy”
(Ciaffa 2008) which revisited this debate, focusing on the contributions of Hountondji, Appiah
and Gyekye in their critique of ethno-philosophy. My discovery of this article stimulated my
interest in replying to those who have charged ethno-philosophy of being uncritical and
irrational. In my reply to such critics, I do three things:
(1) Outline familiar objections to ethno-philosophy.
(2) Offer a critique of these objections.
(3) Show why ethno-philosophy is a project that is worth pursuing in light of the many
problems bedeviling Africa today, which, in my view, are due to the failure of Africa to
harness its philosophy in order to solve them.
Among the Shona2 of Zimbabwe, there is a proverb which says: Chimwango choumwe hachina
ndima (A borrowed hoe cannot cover enough ground). This proverb can be used to succinctly
express the fact that Western philosophies and sciences cannot wholly solve Africa’s problems.
Ethno-philosophy: A Definition
Since ethno-philosophy is an aspect of African philosophy, it is important to begin this article by
defining African philosophy. To this end, K.C. Anyanwu and E.A. Ruch (1981) define African
philosophy as "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and
present make sense of their destiny and of the world in which they live." Understood this way,
African philosophy becomes that kind of philosophy which must necessarily be produced by
African people and must use distinct African philosophical methods (Janz 2009, 75-76).
Imbo (1998, 38-39) notes that although African philosophers are found in the various academic
fields of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy and political
philosophy, much of the modern African philosophy has been concerned with defining ethno-
philosophy as an aspect of African philosophy and identifying what differentiates it from other
philosophical traditions. In this article, I focus more on the criticisms leveled against ethno-
world, knowledge, inference and values. As a second order activity, so they claim, philosophy evaluates first order
claims in order to clarify their meanings and to identify appropriate ways of justifying them. It essentially involves
reflection, criticism, argument and written peer review (English and Kalumba 1996, 7).
2
The Shona people constitute the largest linguistic grouping in Zimbabwe which is made up of six dialects, namely,
Karanga, Korekore, Zezuru, Ndau, Manyika and Kalanga.
