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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY BELIEFS
1. Conceptualising Conspiracy Beliefs as a Psychological Experience
The psychological conceptualisation of conspiracy beliefs has been approached from multiple
theoretical perspectives, with scholars generally agreeing that these beliefs are not merely random or
delusional but rather structured cognitive and motivational responses to perceived threats and social
dynamics (Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka, 2017). A review of the literature reveals several
commonalities across definitions. Most researchers concur that conspiracy beliefs involve an
explanation for significant events that appeals to the secret actions of powerful and malevolent
groups (Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013). Additionally, there is broad consensus that these
beliefs serve psychological functions related to satisfying a need for understanding, control, and
security (van Prooijen and Douglas, 2018). Common features include a rejection of official accounts,
an assumption that nothing happens by accident, and a tendency to attribute events to deliberate,
hidden agendas (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton, 2012).
However, differences in conceptualising conspiracy beliefs emerge when scholars break the
construct into distinct dimensions. For example, some researchers emphasise the dimension of
pattern perception—the cognitive tendency to see meaningful connections between unrelated events
(van Prooijen, Douglas, and De Inocencio, 2018). This dimension is distinct from agency, which
focuses specifically on attributing events to intentional actors rather than natural or accidental causes
(Douglas et al., 2016). Coalition as a dimension refers to the belief that conspirators operate in
coordinated, secret groups, which differs from threat, which highlights the perceived harmful or
deceptive goals of the conspirators (Franks, Bangerter, and Bauer, 2013). Finally, secrecy is a unique
dimension because it renders conspiracy beliefs almost impossible to falsify—the lack of evidence is
itself interpreted as proof of a cover-up (Keeley, 1999). What differentiates these dimensions is their
psychological function: pattern perception addresses cognitive biases, agency addresses
intentionality, coalition addresses social coordination, threat addresses emotional security, and
secrecy addresses epistemic justification (Douglas and Sutton, 2018).
Based on this literature, a workable definition of conspiracy beliefs can be proposed: Conspiracy
beliefs are the psychological tendency to attribute significant events or social outcomes to the secret,
deliberate, and malevolent actions of coordinated groups, often accompanied by a perception of
hidden patterns, a sense of threat, and a resistance to disconfirming evidence (adapted from
Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013; Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka, 2017; van Prooijen and
Douglas, 2018). This definition integrates the key dimensions while acknowledging that conspiracy
beliefs exist on a continuum from benign to harmful.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY BELIEFS
1. Conceptualising Conspiracy Beliefs as a Psychological Experience
The psychological conceptualisation of conspiracy beliefs has been approached from multiple
theoretical perspectives, with scholars generally agreeing that these beliefs are not merely random or
delusional but rather structured cognitive and motivational responses to perceived threats and social
dynamics (Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka, 2017). A review of the literature reveals several
commonalities across definitions. Most researchers concur that conspiracy beliefs involve an
explanation for significant events that appeals to the secret actions of powerful and malevolent
groups (Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013). Additionally, there is broad consensus that these
beliefs serve psychological functions related to satisfying a need for understanding, control, and
security (van Prooijen and Douglas, 2018). Common features include a rejection of official accounts,
an assumption that nothing happens by accident, and a tendency to attribute events to deliberate,
hidden agendas (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton, 2012).
However, differences in conceptualising conspiracy beliefs emerge when scholars break the
construct into distinct dimensions. For example, some researchers emphasise the dimension of
pattern perception—the cognitive tendency to see meaningful connections between unrelated events
(van Prooijen, Douglas, and De Inocencio, 2018). This dimension is distinct from agency, which
focuses specifically on attributing events to intentional actors rather than natural or accidental causes
(Douglas et al., 2016). Coalition as a dimension refers to the belief that conspirators operate in
coordinated, secret groups, which differs from threat, which highlights the perceived harmful or
deceptive goals of the conspirators (Franks, Bangerter, and Bauer, 2013). Finally, secrecy is a unique
dimension because it renders conspiracy beliefs almost impossible to falsify—the lack of evidence is
itself interpreted as proof of a cover-up (Keeley, 1999). What differentiates these dimensions is their
psychological function: pattern perception addresses cognitive biases, agency addresses
intentionality, coalition addresses social coordination, threat addresses emotional security, and
secrecy addresses epistemic justification (Douglas and Sutton, 2018).
Based on this literature, a workable definition of conspiracy beliefs can be proposed: Conspiracy
beliefs are the psychological tendency to attribute significant events or social outcomes to the secret,
deliberate, and malevolent actions of coordinated groups, often accompanied by a perception of
hidden patterns, a sense of threat, and a resistance to disconfirming evidence (adapted from
Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013; Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka, 2017; van Prooijen and
Douglas, 2018). This definition integrates the key dimensions while acknowledging that conspiracy
beliefs exist on a continuum from benign to harmful.
