Gov-381
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq?
Helms School of Government,
Liberty University
Government 381-001: Intelligence Analysis
Introduction:
Rafid Ahmed Alwan (also known as Curveball) was a defector from Iraq, who was
directly responsible for fabricating the intelligence that was given to the United States. He
provided false intelligence about the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the WMD
program that Iraq was claimed to have had. The intelligence that Curveball provided was full
of gaps and was not properly screened or vetted to prove its legitimacy. This led to the United
States government filling in these gaps with their own formulation of the truth and to false
implementation of foreign policy by the United States. Not all the blame for this should be put
onto just the intelligence community. The intelligence community was under direct pressure
from the White House to bring forward evidence and produce results. It’s beyond question that
policymakers had a part in the intelligence failure that was the United States government
believing Iraq had WMDs. The policymakers in the United States government made open and
public remarks that there were weapons of mass destruction within Iraq and used as a
justification for the invasion that was to come.
There was a belief that weapons of mass destruction were within Iraq and there was
never evidence or proof brought to successfully refute this belief or proof it was false until after
the invasion had occurred. In order to refute the claim and belief that there were WMDs in Iraq
there would have needed to be explicit evidence that went against what Rafid Alwan was saying.
The most common justification for an invasion of Iraq was the alleged claim that there was
, WMDs in Iraq and that Iraq had WMD programs. It is hard to think that reasons beyond the
belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were discussed when the time came to plan for
the invasion of Iraq. Regarding Rafid Alwan’s intelligence, his sole focus was on the topic of
weapons of mass destruction. There was a clear and important tie between Alwan’s intelligence
and the choice that was made to invade Iraq.
Literature Review:
Royner in “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”, analyzes the questions that analysts
had to address in a targeted conclusion and specific predictions. This conclusion and the
predictions were based on an untrustworthy source and from fragmented and flawed evidence. In
the article, Royner discusses how the doubts that they were facing lessened when analysts were
faced with pressure from politicians, as they knew that they had to have results. There were three
different phases of relations between policymakers and the intelligence community before the
start of the Iraq invasion. First, policymakers contacted the intelligence community with a
request for them to find a connection between terrorist activity in Iraq and Iraq’s possible
weapons of mass destruction. Next, when the policymakers became aware of the magnitude of
influence that intelligence would have on the debate of war in the public’s eye, pressure was
applied on the intelligence community by the policymakers to get on board with the consensus
that had been formed by the policymakers. Lastly, the intelligence community came forth with
cautious and careful estimates of the capabilities of Iraq when they realized how flawed and
unsubstantiated their intelligence was and from this information policymakers decided to
make their own decisions and assumptions.
Royner describes how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was cautious to listen to
Rafid Alwan’s intelligence because two reasons. One reason is that the CIA was suspicious due
to the lack of face-to-face time that they had with Alwan and the hesitation German authorities
had about working with him. Due to this lack of intelligence, the intelligence estimates went
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq?
Helms School of Government,
Liberty University
Government 381-001: Intelligence Analysis
Introduction:
Rafid Ahmed Alwan (also known as Curveball) was a defector from Iraq, who was
directly responsible for fabricating the intelligence that was given to the United States. He
provided false intelligence about the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the WMD
program that Iraq was claimed to have had. The intelligence that Curveball provided was full
of gaps and was not properly screened or vetted to prove its legitimacy. This led to the United
States government filling in these gaps with their own formulation of the truth and to false
implementation of foreign policy by the United States. Not all the blame for this should be put
onto just the intelligence community. The intelligence community was under direct pressure
from the White House to bring forward evidence and produce results. It’s beyond question that
policymakers had a part in the intelligence failure that was the United States government
believing Iraq had WMDs. The policymakers in the United States government made open and
public remarks that there were weapons of mass destruction within Iraq and used as a
justification for the invasion that was to come.
There was a belief that weapons of mass destruction were within Iraq and there was
never evidence or proof brought to successfully refute this belief or proof it was false until after
the invasion had occurred. In order to refute the claim and belief that there were WMDs in Iraq
there would have needed to be explicit evidence that went against what Rafid Alwan was saying.
The most common justification for an invasion of Iraq was the alleged claim that there was
, WMDs in Iraq and that Iraq had WMD programs. It is hard to think that reasons beyond the
belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were discussed when the time came to plan for
the invasion of Iraq. Regarding Rafid Alwan’s intelligence, his sole focus was on the topic of
weapons of mass destruction. There was a clear and important tie between Alwan’s intelligence
and the choice that was made to invade Iraq.
Literature Review:
Royner in “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”, analyzes the questions that analysts
had to address in a targeted conclusion and specific predictions. This conclusion and the
predictions were based on an untrustworthy source and from fragmented and flawed evidence. In
the article, Royner discusses how the doubts that they were facing lessened when analysts were
faced with pressure from politicians, as they knew that they had to have results. There were three
different phases of relations between policymakers and the intelligence community before the
start of the Iraq invasion. First, policymakers contacted the intelligence community with a
request for them to find a connection between terrorist activity in Iraq and Iraq’s possible
weapons of mass destruction. Next, when the policymakers became aware of the magnitude of
influence that intelligence would have on the debate of war in the public’s eye, pressure was
applied on the intelligence community by the policymakers to get on board with the consensus
that had been formed by the policymakers. Lastly, the intelligence community came forth with
cautious and careful estimates of the capabilities of Iraq when they realized how flawed and
unsubstantiated their intelligence was and from this information policymakers decided to
make their own decisions and assumptions.
Royner describes how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was cautious to listen to
Rafid Alwan’s intelligence because two reasons. One reason is that the CIA was suspicious due
to the lack of face-to-face time that they had with Alwan and the hesitation German authorities
had about working with him. Due to this lack of intelligence, the intelligence estimates went
