2
AAAE ACE SMS Exam with verified detailed solutions
|| || || || || || ||
The final rule includes, among several other key elements, a list of three triggers (as
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
described in the SNPRM prior to the final rule) that determine the applicability of the rule.
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Airport certificate holders that qualify under one or more of the following triggering criteria
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
(triggers) are required to develop and implement SMS: - ✔✔• Are classified as large,
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
medium or small hubs, based on passenger data extracted from the FAA Air Carrier Activity
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Information System. ||
• Have a three-year rolling average of 100,000 or more total annual operations, meaning
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
the sum of all arrivals and departures.
|| || || || || || ||
• Serve any international operation other than general aviation
|| || || || || || || ||
. At this writing, the most likely tenants subject to SMS regulation are - ✔✔Part 121 airlines
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
SMS builds safety capacity, but also improves - ✔✔engagement, reduces waste, helps
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
employee retention, and increases operational effectiveness among many other positive
|| || || || || || || || || ||
outcomes.
Hazard - ✔✔"A condition that could foreseeably cause or
|| || || || || || || || ||
contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
(49 CFR) part 830, § 830.2."
|| || || || ||
There are two primary types of risk: pure risk and
|| || || || || || || || || ||
speculative risk - ✔✔Speculative risk is taken on voluntarily. In other words, the profit or
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
loss that may result from your conscious investment in a stock or bet on a horse is an
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
example of speculative risk. Pure risk conveys that only loss, not gain, is possible if the
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
event occurs ||
,2
Once risks are classified and assessed we must decide how best to treat the risk. As a
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
general overview, our options typically include the ability to - ✔✔- Avoid the risk (by
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
changing our work process or operations). || || || || ||
• Mitigate the risk (by reducing either the severity or likelihood, or both).
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Accept the risk (by acknowledging the risk and self-insuring for its potential impact).
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Transfer the risk (by outsourcing to a specialist, purchasing insurance, or by contract)
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
safety is - ✔✔"the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
is reduced to, and maintained at or
|| || || || || || ||
below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
risk management"
||
Safety implies that we are actively engaged in: - ✔✔• Creating functional resilience.
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Practical assessment of risk and risk-informed decision-making.
|| || || || || || ||
• The ability to identify, capture and learn from performance deviations.
|| || || || || || || || || ||
alternative definition of safety - ✔✔preventing harm by making risk-based
|| || || || || || || || || ||
decisions supported by positive, embedded cultural values.
|| || || || || ||
safety is never a stable state - ✔✔It is a dynamic trade-off as we negotiate changing risk
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
and hazards in an environment of competing goals.
|| || || || || || ||
The purpose of safety management and SMS - ✔✔to maintain operations within a safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
space (Figure 9), and even to expand the area of that space
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
as we learn.
|| ||
Active failures - ✔✔actions or inactions, including errors and violations, that have an
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
immediate adverse || ||
,2
effect. They are generally viewed, with the benefit of hindsight, as unsafe acts. Active
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
failures are generally associated with front-line personnel (pilots, air traffic controllers,
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
aircraft mechanical engineers, etc.) and may result in a harmful outcome
|| || || || || || || || || ||
Latent conditions - ✔✔those that exist in the aviation system well before a damaging
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
outcome is experienced. The consequences of latent conditions may remain dormant for
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
a long time. Initially, these latent conditions are not perceived as harmful, but they will
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
become evident once the system's defenses have been breached. These conditions are
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
generally created by people far removed in time and space from the event. Latent
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
conditions in the system may include those created by the lack of a strong, positive safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
culture, poor equipment or procedural design, conflicting organizational goals, or defective
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
organizational systems or management decisions. The perspective underlying || || || || || || || ||
the organizational accident aims to identify and mitigate these latent conditions on a
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
system-wide basis rather than through localized efforts to minimize active failures by
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
individuals
Speculative risk - ✔✔the profit or || || || || || ||
loss that may result from your conscious investment in a stock or bet on a horse is
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
an example of speculative risk.
|| || || ||
Pure risk - ✔✔conveys that only loss, not gain, is possible
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
if the event occurs. For most of our discussions on safety risk management, the risks
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
discussed are pure, i.e., undesired, adverse events.|| || || || || ||
how best to treat the risk. As a general overview, our options
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
typically include the ability to - ✔✔• Avoid the risk (by changing our work process or
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
operations).
• Mitigate the risk (by reducing either the severity or likelihood, or both).
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
, 2
• Accept the risk (by acknowledging the risk and self-insuring for its potential impact).
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Transfer the risk (by outsourcing to a specialist, purchasing insurance. or contract
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
normalization of deviance - ✔✔success can be awfully convincing, and because no negative
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
consequence ||
materializes after crossing the boundary, we may do it again. By repeating the cycle, the
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
practical boundary begins to move. || || || ||
practical drift - ✔✔you gradually began to drift away from those baselines of performance.
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Every organization experiences
|| || ||
this to varying degrees because baseline performance expectations cannot always account
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
for the complexity of real-life operational influences. Those influences create
|| || || || || || || || || ||
pressure to deviate from the intended performance of the system
|| || || || || || || || ||
Safety observations - ✔✔Using tools derived from LOSA or similar programs can help us to
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
understand ||
work as it is actually done
|| || || || ||
Safety investigations - ✔✔Investigations traditionally focus on accidents or occurrences, but
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
we can also investigate what went right in an operation with the goal of
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
identifying purposeful action that contributes to safety || || || || || ||
Safety assessments - ✔✔: Proactive use of tools like HFACS can help us to look at success,
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
as well as failure
|| || ||
Safety culture surveys - ✔✔Assessing safety culture helps us to understand how people feel
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
about safety in the work environment.
|| || || || ||
AAAE ACE SMS Exam with verified detailed solutions
|| || || || || || ||
The final rule includes, among several other key elements, a list of three triggers (as
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
described in the SNPRM prior to the final rule) that determine the applicability of the rule.
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Airport certificate holders that qualify under one or more of the following triggering criteria
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
(triggers) are required to develop and implement SMS: - ✔✔• Are classified as large,
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
medium or small hubs, based on passenger data extracted from the FAA Air Carrier Activity
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Information System. ||
• Have a three-year rolling average of 100,000 or more total annual operations, meaning
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
the sum of all arrivals and departures.
|| || || || || || ||
• Serve any international operation other than general aviation
|| || || || || || || ||
. At this writing, the most likely tenants subject to SMS regulation are - ✔✔Part 121 airlines
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
SMS builds safety capacity, but also improves - ✔✔engagement, reduces waste, helps
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
employee retention, and increases operational effectiveness among many other positive
|| || || || || || || || || ||
outcomes.
Hazard - ✔✔"A condition that could foreseeably cause or
|| || || || || || || || ||
contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
(49 CFR) part 830, § 830.2."
|| || || || ||
There are two primary types of risk: pure risk and
|| || || || || || || || || ||
speculative risk - ✔✔Speculative risk is taken on voluntarily. In other words, the profit or
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
loss that may result from your conscious investment in a stock or bet on a horse is an
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
example of speculative risk. Pure risk conveys that only loss, not gain, is possible if the
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
event occurs ||
,2
Once risks are classified and assessed we must decide how best to treat the risk. As a
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
general overview, our options typically include the ability to - ✔✔- Avoid the risk (by
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
changing our work process or operations). || || || || ||
• Mitigate the risk (by reducing either the severity or likelihood, or both).
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Accept the risk (by acknowledging the risk and self-insuring for its potential impact).
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Transfer the risk (by outsourcing to a specialist, purchasing insurance, or by contract)
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
safety is - ✔✔"the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
is reduced to, and maintained at or
|| || || || || || ||
below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
risk management"
||
Safety implies that we are actively engaged in: - ✔✔• Creating functional resilience.
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Practical assessment of risk and risk-informed decision-making.
|| || || || || || ||
• The ability to identify, capture and learn from performance deviations.
|| || || || || || || || || ||
alternative definition of safety - ✔✔preventing harm by making risk-based
|| || || || || || || || || ||
decisions supported by positive, embedded cultural values.
|| || || || || ||
safety is never a stable state - ✔✔It is a dynamic trade-off as we negotiate changing risk
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
and hazards in an environment of competing goals.
|| || || || || || ||
The purpose of safety management and SMS - ✔✔to maintain operations within a safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
space (Figure 9), and even to expand the area of that space
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
as we learn.
|| ||
Active failures - ✔✔actions or inactions, including errors and violations, that have an
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
immediate adverse || ||
,2
effect. They are generally viewed, with the benefit of hindsight, as unsafe acts. Active
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
failures are generally associated with front-line personnel (pilots, air traffic controllers,
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
aircraft mechanical engineers, etc.) and may result in a harmful outcome
|| || || || || || || || || ||
Latent conditions - ✔✔those that exist in the aviation system well before a damaging
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
outcome is experienced. The consequences of latent conditions may remain dormant for
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
a long time. Initially, these latent conditions are not perceived as harmful, but they will
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
become evident once the system's defenses have been breached. These conditions are
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
generally created by people far removed in time and space from the event. Latent
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
conditions in the system may include those created by the lack of a strong, positive safety
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
culture, poor equipment or procedural design, conflicting organizational goals, or defective
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
organizational systems or management decisions. The perspective underlying || || || || || || || ||
the organizational accident aims to identify and mitigate these latent conditions on a
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
system-wide basis rather than through localized efforts to minimize active failures by
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
individuals
Speculative risk - ✔✔the profit or || || || || || ||
loss that may result from your conscious investment in a stock or bet on a horse is
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
an example of speculative risk.
|| || || ||
Pure risk - ✔✔conveys that only loss, not gain, is possible
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
if the event occurs. For most of our discussions on safety risk management, the risks
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
discussed are pure, i.e., undesired, adverse events.|| || || || || ||
how best to treat the risk. As a general overview, our options
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
typically include the ability to - ✔✔• Avoid the risk (by changing our work process or
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
operations).
• Mitigate the risk (by reducing either the severity or likelihood, or both).
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
, 2
• Accept the risk (by acknowledging the risk and self-insuring for its potential impact).
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
• Transfer the risk (by outsourcing to a specialist, purchasing insurance. or contract
|| || || || || || || || || || || ||
normalization of deviance - ✔✔success can be awfully convincing, and because no negative
|| || || || || || || || || || || || ||
consequence ||
materializes after crossing the boundary, we may do it again. By repeating the cycle, the
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
practical boundary begins to move. || || || ||
practical drift - ✔✔you gradually began to drift away from those baselines of performance.
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
Every organization experiences
|| || ||
this to varying degrees because baseline performance expectations cannot always account
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
for the complexity of real-life operational influences. Those influences create
|| || || || || || || || || ||
pressure to deviate from the intended performance of the system
|| || || || || || || || ||
Safety observations - ✔✔Using tools derived from LOSA or similar programs can help us to
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
understand ||
work as it is actually done
|| || || || ||
Safety investigations - ✔✔Investigations traditionally focus on accidents or occurrences, but
|| || || || || || || || || || ||
we can also investigate what went right in an operation with the goal of
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
identifying purposeful action that contributes to safety || || || || || ||
Safety assessments - ✔✔: Proactive use of tools like HFACS can help us to look at success,
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
as well as failure
|| || ||
Safety culture surveys - ✔✔Assessing safety culture helps us to understand how people feel
|| || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
about safety in the work environment.
|| || || || ||
