Issue Clashing duties
Integration The plausibility of a purely deontological approach due to its
unattractive practical implications
Weighting This objection attacks one of the most fundamental claims made
by the Kantian Ethicist - deontology. Thus, it attacks the essence of
the theory and, therefore, if successful, would be very crucial.
However, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
deontology false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely unattractive.
This ensures that Kant can conceptually survive this objection.
Albeit, Kant would have to accept that his theory cannot possibly
apply in all cases and thus cannot be treated as a universally
applicable normative ethical theory. This largely decreases its
appeal.
This would be pro tanto a very crucial but not a fatal criticism, if
successful
Counter 1 If there appears to be a conflict, we have misunderstood what at
least one duty requires of us and thus have not used our reason
properly. To explicate this, Kant reiterates what perfect and
imperfect duties really are. When you have a perfect duty, there is
only one way of fulfilling it. Whereas, in the case of imperfect
duties, there are multiple ways of fulfilling them.
If two imperfect duties come into conflict, then you can always use
multiple means of fulfilment to creatively follow both. For example,
Sartre's soldier could go to war and pay for someone to look after
his ill parent. There are numerous ways to fulfil the duty of looking
after a sick parent that are not mutually exclusive with the duty to
fight for one’s country.
But what if two imperfect duties come into conflict? Consider the
following thought experiment: A person fleeing from someone
intent on harming them begs you for help, but the only way to
misdirect the attacker is to lie, and the only way to let the person
, escape is to take a key beside you that you do not own and to let
them into a house that isn’t your own. Taking a closer look, your
duties here are “do not lie” and “do not steal”. Because these are
both negative, you can follow both by simply doing nothing. You
can let the attacker attack the victim and not break a perfect duty.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve Kant’s
appeal by rejecting the claim that, in real or counterfactual cases of
conflicting duties, these duties cannot be followed simultaneously.
Success Sometimes, by doing nothing (being a bystander), we might
neglect an imperfect duty? Surely, you have an imperfect duty
to help victims in need?
But perhaps it is satisfactory in explaining how conflicts in
imperfect duties cannot really occur
Counter 2 Perhaps Kantian Ethics must accept that we cannot always follow
all perfect duties. If our perfect duties come into conflict, we must
appeal to a hierarchy to determine which is most important and
thus which to follow. For example, Korsgaard posits that we must
judge which actions undermine universal agency and human
dignity the least in nuanced, real-world applications. Similarly,
Scheler proposed a hierarchy of values. When these conflict, we
possess an a priori duty to prioritise the higher values (e.g holy
values) over lower values (e.g sensory values). This is still plausible
as it means we are driven by following our duties, but that we
accept that not all duties can practically be binding in all cases.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve Kant’s
appeal by rejecting the move from C1 to C2 as a non sequitur. Even
if there are real or counterfactual cases in which it is impossible to
fulfil all universally binding duties simultaneously, it does not
follow that Kantian ethics is thereby implausible.
Success Surely this departs from Kant’s absolutism? Kant’s perfect
duties are meant to be exceptionless and binding in all cases;
introducing a hierarchy arguably turns them into prima facie
duties, which looks much closer to W. D. Ross than to Kant. Is this
still genuinely Kantian?
, Doesn’t this just collapse into teleology? If we choose the duty
that minimises harm to agency or dignity, this can look like
weighing outcomes rather than following strict rules.
Perhaps this is appealing because it reflects our moral
reasoning? In extreme cases, many people already think some
duties matter more than others (e.g. protecting life over telling the
truth)
Issue Not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral; not all
universalisable maxims are immoral
Integration The plausibility of the Categorical Imperative’s conclusion in
relation to its contradictions with our moral intuitions
Weighting This objection attacks the most fundamental framework posited by
Kantian Ethics - the Categorical Imperative. Thus, it attacks how
Kant realises the essence of the theory and, therefore, if
successful, would be very significant.
However, perhaps it is not fatal because it does not attack
deontology. Modern Kantian Ethicists could recognise this
objection and propose a better framework to realise his
deontological, ethically rationalist foundation.
But it is significant for Kant’s specific theory.
Moreover, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
Kantian Ethics false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely
unappealing. Albeit, it survives at the cost of being misaligned with
and perhaps even incompatible with the values of our society.
This would be pro tanto a notable but not a fatal criticism, if
successful
Counter 1 The examples given are pseudo, modified maxims designed to
Integration The plausibility of a purely deontological approach due to its
unattractive practical implications
Weighting This objection attacks one of the most fundamental claims made
by the Kantian Ethicist - deontology. Thus, it attacks the essence of
the theory and, therefore, if successful, would be very crucial.
However, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
deontology false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely unattractive.
This ensures that Kant can conceptually survive this objection.
Albeit, Kant would have to accept that his theory cannot possibly
apply in all cases and thus cannot be treated as a universally
applicable normative ethical theory. This largely decreases its
appeal.
This would be pro tanto a very crucial but not a fatal criticism, if
successful
Counter 1 If there appears to be a conflict, we have misunderstood what at
least one duty requires of us and thus have not used our reason
properly. To explicate this, Kant reiterates what perfect and
imperfect duties really are. When you have a perfect duty, there is
only one way of fulfilling it. Whereas, in the case of imperfect
duties, there are multiple ways of fulfilling them.
If two imperfect duties come into conflict, then you can always use
multiple means of fulfilment to creatively follow both. For example,
Sartre's soldier could go to war and pay for someone to look after
his ill parent. There are numerous ways to fulfil the duty of looking
after a sick parent that are not mutually exclusive with the duty to
fight for one’s country.
But what if two imperfect duties come into conflict? Consider the
following thought experiment: A person fleeing from someone
intent on harming them begs you for help, but the only way to
misdirect the attacker is to lie, and the only way to let the person
, escape is to take a key beside you that you do not own and to let
them into a house that isn’t your own. Taking a closer look, your
duties here are “do not lie” and “do not steal”. Because these are
both negative, you can follow both by simply doing nothing. You
can let the attacker attack the victim and not break a perfect duty.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve Kant’s
appeal by rejecting the claim that, in real or counterfactual cases of
conflicting duties, these duties cannot be followed simultaneously.
Success Sometimes, by doing nothing (being a bystander), we might
neglect an imperfect duty? Surely, you have an imperfect duty
to help victims in need?
But perhaps it is satisfactory in explaining how conflicts in
imperfect duties cannot really occur
Counter 2 Perhaps Kantian Ethics must accept that we cannot always follow
all perfect duties. If our perfect duties come into conflict, we must
appeal to a hierarchy to determine which is most important and
thus which to follow. For example, Korsgaard posits that we must
judge which actions undermine universal agency and human
dignity the least in nuanced, real-world applications. Similarly,
Scheler proposed a hierarchy of values. When these conflict, we
possess an a priori duty to prioritise the higher values (e.g holy
values) over lower values (e.g sensory values). This is still plausible
as it means we are driven by following our duties, but that we
accept that not all duties can practically be binding in all cases.
Integration This counter-argument considers whether we can preserve Kant’s
appeal by rejecting the move from C1 to C2 as a non sequitur. Even
if there are real or counterfactual cases in which it is impossible to
fulfil all universally binding duties simultaneously, it does not
follow that Kantian ethics is thereby implausible.
Success Surely this departs from Kant’s absolutism? Kant’s perfect
duties are meant to be exceptionless and binding in all cases;
introducing a hierarchy arguably turns them into prima facie
duties, which looks much closer to W. D. Ross than to Kant. Is this
still genuinely Kantian?
, Doesn’t this just collapse into teleology? If we choose the duty
that minimises harm to agency or dignity, this can look like
weighing outcomes rather than following strict rules.
Perhaps this is appealing because it reflects our moral
reasoning? In extreme cases, many people already think some
duties matter more than others (e.g. protecting life over telling the
truth)
Issue Not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral; not all
universalisable maxims are immoral
Integration The plausibility of the Categorical Imperative’s conclusion in
relation to its contradictions with our moral intuitions
Weighting This objection attacks the most fundamental framework posited by
Kantian Ethics - the Categorical Imperative. Thus, it attacks how
Kant realises the essence of the theory and, therefore, if
successful, would be very significant.
However, perhaps it is not fatal because it does not attack
deontology. Modern Kantian Ethicists could recognise this
objection and propose a better framework to realise his
deontological, ethically rationalist foundation.
But it is significant for Kant’s specific theory.
Moreover, it is perhaps not fatal as it does not ipso facto render
Kantian Ethics false. Instead, it highlights that it is merely
unappealing. Albeit, it survives at the cost of being misaligned with
and perhaps even incompatible with the values of our society.
This would be pro tanto a notable but not a fatal criticism, if
successful
Counter 1 The examples given are pseudo, modified maxims designed to
