3. Experience, Desire and the Ideal
Veridical and non-veridical experience
A veridical experience is an experience of something real such as drinking a glass of wine or
swimming in a pool
A non-veridical experience is an experience which seems to be of something real but is in fact not,
such as a dream of riding a horse
If the non-veridical experience is realistic, e.g. A vivid dream, then it may not be distinguishable from
the veridical experience by the person experiencing it
I.e. The experience itself is the same
The dream life:
A is living a life rich in higher pleasure
B is in a coma experiencing roughly the same things as A
On the veridical experience account B's life is worthless
On the wide experience account the values of the lives are roughly equivalent
Mill doesn't seem to specifically chose one of these views over the other
Mill's account and the value of authenticity
Many would disagree with the statement that B's experience is roughly as valuable as A's
This suggests that the value of an experience depends on not just how it seems from the inside, but
also its source
A competent judge, because it would be experiencing it from the inside and as such would not be
able to tell the difference between a veridical or non-veridical experience, would value them equally
However, B cannot be a 'competent' judge because B is not aware of the fact that B's experiences
are in fact a dream - if B did know i.e. Was competent, B may take a different view
Therefore whether an experience is genuine affects how enjoyable it is, and therefore its value
This moves towards the Aristotelian view, according to which how pleasurable an experience is a
matter to be judged not only be the person experiencing that experience.
Beyond Experience
Perhaps we should allow that genuineness is a good making property in itself
This would be a move away from hedonism
An example of such a view is the pure organic view (Moore):
Whereby an experience has to be both veridical and enjoyable to be of value
However this view goes too far
Because B's life clearly does have some welfare, despite all experiences being non-veridical
Furthermore, some experiences that people do not particularly enjoy are of value, e.g writing a book
which is only fully appreciated after the death of the author
Veridical and non-veridical experience
A veridical experience is an experience of something real such as drinking a glass of wine or
swimming in a pool
A non-veridical experience is an experience which seems to be of something real but is in fact not,
such as a dream of riding a horse
If the non-veridical experience is realistic, e.g. A vivid dream, then it may not be distinguishable from
the veridical experience by the person experiencing it
I.e. The experience itself is the same
The dream life:
A is living a life rich in higher pleasure
B is in a coma experiencing roughly the same things as A
On the veridical experience account B's life is worthless
On the wide experience account the values of the lives are roughly equivalent
Mill doesn't seem to specifically chose one of these views over the other
Mill's account and the value of authenticity
Many would disagree with the statement that B's experience is roughly as valuable as A's
This suggests that the value of an experience depends on not just how it seems from the inside, but
also its source
A competent judge, because it would be experiencing it from the inside and as such would not be
able to tell the difference between a veridical or non-veridical experience, would value them equally
However, B cannot be a 'competent' judge because B is not aware of the fact that B's experiences
are in fact a dream - if B did know i.e. Was competent, B may take a different view
Therefore whether an experience is genuine affects how enjoyable it is, and therefore its value
This moves towards the Aristotelian view, according to which how pleasurable an experience is a
matter to be judged not only be the person experiencing that experience.
Beyond Experience
Perhaps we should allow that genuineness is a good making property in itself
This would be a move away from hedonism
An example of such a view is the pure organic view (Moore):
Whereby an experience has to be both veridical and enjoyable to be of value
However this view goes too far
Because B's life clearly does have some welfare, despite all experiences being non-veridical
Furthermore, some experiences that people do not particularly enjoy are of value, e.g writing a book
which is only fully appreciated after the death of the author
