Australian Journal of International Affairs
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20
Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The
limits of a traditional middle power
Gabriele Abbondanza
To cite this article: Gabriele Abbondanza (2021) Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The
limits of a traditional middle power, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75:2, 178-196, DOI:
10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
Published online: 15 Oct 2020.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 1995
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caji20
,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2021, VOL. 75, NO. 2, 178–196
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The limits of a
traditional middle power
Gabriele Abbondanza
Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Australia is often described as a ‘good international citizen’ (GIC), Australian foreign policy;
which is intertwined to its status of ‘quintessential’ middle power. good international citizen;
However, a number of elements might undermine both notions. middle power; international
law; multilateralism
This research reviews the concept of GIC and contributes to this
niche of IR theory by providing a dedicated definitional
framework, which consists of: i) the respect of the international
law; ii) multilateralism; iii) the pursuing of humanitarian and
idealist objectives; iv) an active support for the rules-based order;
and v) a congruous identity matched by consistent domestic
policies. After assessing the country’s foreign and domestic
policies against this, it finds that Australia has damaged its GIC
credentials due to a number of reasons, including: the hard-line
policies against seaborne asylum seekers; the participation in
missions that are not sanctioned by the UN; the transformation of
its global multilateralism into a selective regionalism; the budget
cuts to foreign aid; a controversial attitude towards climate
change mitigation; and a preference for the US-led global order
over a rules-based international society. Far from criticising the
country’s foreign policy in its entirety, it argues that in the 21st
century Australia behaves as a ‘neutral international citizen’, and
a traditional but not ‘quintessential’ middle power.
Introduction
An ‘international society’, rather than a simple ‘international system’, traditionally
requires states to conceive themselves as bound by shared norms and collective insti-
tutions (Buzan 1993). As logic dictates, if a state’s society consists of citizens, each
with formal rights and duties, then it follows that an international society comprises
international citizens, whose membership can be defined in a comparable manner. At
a basic level, as it requires some degree of supranational sovereignty, international citi-
zenship is generally equated with membership to the United Nations (UN), which
enshrines a number of ideals that have been instrumental in the development of the con-
temporary society of states, therefore representing an institutionalised (if imperfect)
version of it (Shattle 2008, 137–158). The notion of ‘good international citizen’ (GIC)
stems from these considerations, and, despite lacking a universal definition, not unlike
many other concepts in international relations, it is commonly employed to describe
CONTACT Gabriele Abbondanza
© 2020 Australian Institute of International Affairs
, AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 179
law-abiding and cooperative nations (Pert 2014, 4–16). An additional concept—older in
its conception, though bearing a similar definitional ambiguity—is that of middle
powers, a term that may be used to represent a country with considerable but second-
tier material capabilities, a nation displaying normative and multilateral attitudes, a
state that self-identifies with this status and behaves accordingly, or, in rarer cases, a com-
bination of all of the above (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 17–19).
These two concepts are here presented together for two reasons: first, as they are inter-
related; and second, because they apply equally to Australia. With regards to the first
motivation, middle power theory (MPT) defines middle powers according to a range
of criteria, and of these definitional parameters, at least two reflect the notion of ‘good
international citizen’. As per the second point, Australia has often been depicted,
either implicitly or explicitly, as a GIC by a wide range of people, including politicians,
academics, lawyers, and journalists. Among them, the most emphatic voice has been that
of Evans, who has been the first to publicly link such a concept to Australia in 1988
(Evans 1989a, 9). As a result, the significance of ‘good international citizenship’ for Aus-
tralian political discourses is easily discernible thanks to the presence of a number of pub-
lications dedicated to it (Bell 1997; Horner and Connor 2014; Pert 2014, among the
many). The country’s association with middle powerdom, on the other hand, is much
older, and it was established thanks to Evatt’s intense diplomatic work during the prep-
aration of the 1945 San Francisco Conference (Holbraad 1984, 60–64). In a similar
fashion to ‘good international citizenship’, but to a much larger scale, Australia as a
middle power has been the object of abundant scholarly research, to such an extent
that it is generally considered an ‘archetypal’, ‘ideal’, or ‘quintessential’ middle power,
(Efstathopoulos 2015, 54; Wilkins 2019).
And yet, despite the country’s considerable and long-standing association with such
concepts, part of the current scholarship focusing on either Australian domestic or
foreign policy highlights a number of elements that undermine the very notion of Aus-
tralia as a ‘good international citizen’, and, consequently, that of an ‘exemplary’ middle
power as well. The extant literature identifies some key issue areas, including the secur-
itisation of maritime immigration and the severe attitude towards asylum seekers
(Kampmark 2017), a controversial approach to climate change (Tangney 2019), a
meagre record in terms of rights of Indigenous peoples (Synot 2019), and an awkward
international posture, torn between the support for the rules-based order on the one
hand, and that to the US—often resorting to unilateralism—on the other (Raymond
2019). This ongoing and increasingly-heated debate has long transcended the country’s
borders, and has sparked numerous international discussions on Australia’s track record
in the above areas, most notably at (though not limited to) the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR 2020).
In consideration of the importance of both the GIC and the middle power notions for
Australian domestic and foreign policy, and since the above issues warrant more specific
and up-to-date research, this article aims to ascertain Australia’s actual status, examining
whether it can still be defined a ‘good international citizen’. This notion is a precondition
for the status of ‘quintessential’, ‘archetypal’, or ‘exemplary’ middle power. Such labels
are interchangeably employed in the literature to illustrate the same idea: states display-
ing the entirety of quantitative (capabilities, impact) and qualitative (behaviour, identity)
attributes conventionally ascribed to middle powers. Accordingly, scholars have framed
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20
Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The
limits of a traditional middle power
Gabriele Abbondanza
To cite this article: Gabriele Abbondanza (2021) Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The
limits of a traditional middle power, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75:2, 178-196, DOI:
10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
Published online: 15 Oct 2020.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 1995
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caji20
,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2021, VOL. 75, NO. 2, 178–196
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1831436
Australia the ‘good international citizen’? The limits of a
traditional middle power
Gabriele Abbondanza
Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Australia is often described as a ‘good international citizen’ (GIC), Australian foreign policy;
which is intertwined to its status of ‘quintessential’ middle power. good international citizen;
However, a number of elements might undermine both notions. middle power; international
law; multilateralism
This research reviews the concept of GIC and contributes to this
niche of IR theory by providing a dedicated definitional
framework, which consists of: i) the respect of the international
law; ii) multilateralism; iii) the pursuing of humanitarian and
idealist objectives; iv) an active support for the rules-based order;
and v) a congruous identity matched by consistent domestic
policies. After assessing the country’s foreign and domestic
policies against this, it finds that Australia has damaged its GIC
credentials due to a number of reasons, including: the hard-line
policies against seaborne asylum seekers; the participation in
missions that are not sanctioned by the UN; the transformation of
its global multilateralism into a selective regionalism; the budget
cuts to foreign aid; a controversial attitude towards climate
change mitigation; and a preference for the US-led global order
over a rules-based international society. Far from criticising the
country’s foreign policy in its entirety, it argues that in the 21st
century Australia behaves as a ‘neutral international citizen’, and
a traditional but not ‘quintessential’ middle power.
Introduction
An ‘international society’, rather than a simple ‘international system’, traditionally
requires states to conceive themselves as bound by shared norms and collective insti-
tutions (Buzan 1993). As logic dictates, if a state’s society consists of citizens, each
with formal rights and duties, then it follows that an international society comprises
international citizens, whose membership can be defined in a comparable manner. At
a basic level, as it requires some degree of supranational sovereignty, international citi-
zenship is generally equated with membership to the United Nations (UN), which
enshrines a number of ideals that have been instrumental in the development of the con-
temporary society of states, therefore representing an institutionalised (if imperfect)
version of it (Shattle 2008, 137–158). The notion of ‘good international citizen’ (GIC)
stems from these considerations, and, despite lacking a universal definition, not unlike
many other concepts in international relations, it is commonly employed to describe
CONTACT Gabriele Abbondanza
© 2020 Australian Institute of International Affairs
, AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 179
law-abiding and cooperative nations (Pert 2014, 4–16). An additional concept—older in
its conception, though bearing a similar definitional ambiguity—is that of middle
powers, a term that may be used to represent a country with considerable but second-
tier material capabilities, a nation displaying normative and multilateral attitudes, a
state that self-identifies with this status and behaves accordingly, or, in rarer cases, a com-
bination of all of the above (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 17–19).
These two concepts are here presented together for two reasons: first, as they are inter-
related; and second, because they apply equally to Australia. With regards to the first
motivation, middle power theory (MPT) defines middle powers according to a range
of criteria, and of these definitional parameters, at least two reflect the notion of ‘good
international citizen’. As per the second point, Australia has often been depicted,
either implicitly or explicitly, as a GIC by a wide range of people, including politicians,
academics, lawyers, and journalists. Among them, the most emphatic voice has been that
of Evans, who has been the first to publicly link such a concept to Australia in 1988
(Evans 1989a, 9). As a result, the significance of ‘good international citizenship’ for Aus-
tralian political discourses is easily discernible thanks to the presence of a number of pub-
lications dedicated to it (Bell 1997; Horner and Connor 2014; Pert 2014, among the
many). The country’s association with middle powerdom, on the other hand, is much
older, and it was established thanks to Evatt’s intense diplomatic work during the prep-
aration of the 1945 San Francisco Conference (Holbraad 1984, 60–64). In a similar
fashion to ‘good international citizenship’, but to a much larger scale, Australia as a
middle power has been the object of abundant scholarly research, to such an extent
that it is generally considered an ‘archetypal’, ‘ideal’, or ‘quintessential’ middle power,
(Efstathopoulos 2015, 54; Wilkins 2019).
And yet, despite the country’s considerable and long-standing association with such
concepts, part of the current scholarship focusing on either Australian domestic or
foreign policy highlights a number of elements that undermine the very notion of Aus-
tralia as a ‘good international citizen’, and, consequently, that of an ‘exemplary’ middle
power as well. The extant literature identifies some key issue areas, including the secur-
itisation of maritime immigration and the severe attitude towards asylum seekers
(Kampmark 2017), a controversial approach to climate change (Tangney 2019), a
meagre record in terms of rights of Indigenous peoples (Synot 2019), and an awkward
international posture, torn between the support for the rules-based order on the one
hand, and that to the US—often resorting to unilateralism—on the other (Raymond
2019). This ongoing and increasingly-heated debate has long transcended the country’s
borders, and has sparked numerous international discussions on Australia’s track record
in the above areas, most notably at (though not limited to) the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR 2020).
In consideration of the importance of both the GIC and the middle power notions for
Australian domestic and foreign policy, and since the above issues warrant more specific
and up-to-date research, this article aims to ascertain Australia’s actual status, examining
whether it can still be defined a ‘good international citizen’. This notion is a precondition
for the status of ‘quintessential’, ‘archetypal’, or ‘exemplary’ middle power. Such labels
are interchangeably employed in the literature to illustrate the same idea: states display-
ing the entirety of quantitative (capabilities, impact) and qualitative (behaviour, identity)
attributes conventionally ascribed to middle powers. Accordingly, scholars have framed
