In the discourse on modernization of the Far East, the case of Japan serves as a particularly
important example. Historians of Japan and modernity agree to a great extent that the history of
modern Japan begins with the crise de regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the military rulers of
Japan from the year 1600. It is therefore pertinent to explore the relevant themes of political
instability, foreign contact and inner contradictions that eventually led to the decline and
subsequent collapse of this regime, while at the same time giving these factors a closer look in
order to understand whether the bakuhan system could have been preserved had the Tokugawa
leaders followed an alternate policy.
A survey of Japanese society in the 19th century reveals a complex feudal society which was
held together in a very precarious manner by the military regime of the Tokugawas. Japan still
maintained the institution of monarchy in these years. However, the Emperor was restricted to
his imperial city of Kyoto and served a symbolic role rather than a practical one. The
administration of Japan was a task which legitimately lay in the hands of the Emperor, but in
1600 was given by the Imperial court to the Tokugawa family. The Tokugawas were in-charge of
a feudal regime made up of a number of daimyo or feudal lords who governed their own Han or
territories/provinces with a certain degree of autonomy and sovereignty, providing in return
military service and loyalty to the Shogun. Whereas the daimyo exercised power specifically at a
local level, the Tokugawa Shogunate would not only govern their own vast lands and vassals, but
also make decisions related to foreign policy and national peacekeeping.1 This control that the
shoguns had on the daimyo found expression in the system of Sankin Kotai or the alternate
attendance system, whereby the daimyo were required to maintain a permanent residence in Edo
and be present there every other year. In addition to this, the family of the daimyo would be
permanently residing at Edo, thereby creating a sort of hostage system. An important side-effect
of the Sankin Kotai system was that it riddled the fragmented country with transport routes and
trading possibilities. The yearly processions of daimyo and their retainers threaded together the
economies of the domains through which they passed, resulting in the rapid growth of market
towns and trading stations as well as the development of one of the most impressive road
networks in the world. What resulted, as Richard Storry wrote, was the creation of a national
market in the 17th century which would clear the path for eventual economic modernization
programmes in the 19th century.
Andrew Gordon stated that Tokugawa rule in the 19th century was scraping through year after
year, pointing to an inherent instability in the regime. This was compounded by the increasing
Western presence in Japanese waters in this period.2 In his words, ‘they were powerful
emissaries of the capitalist and nationalist revolutions that were just then transforming Euro-
American societies and reaching beyond to transform the world.’ Hence, the appearance of these
foreigners amplified the shortcomings and flaws of the Tokugawa regime. According to W.G.
Beasley, the immediate background to the threat Japan faced from the Western powers was the
1
John Whitney Hall, "Japanese History", the Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (1970): pg. 155-60.
2
Garon, Sheldon. "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-
Society Relations." The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (1994): pg 346-66.
, latter’s trade with China. The isolationist policy of the Tokugawa regime with regard to foreign
trade was envisaged in the policy of sakoku which aimed to show hostility and aggression to any
foreigner in Japanese waters.3 However, as Beasley’s remark clearly shows, the aftermath of the
Opium Wars brought to light the view the Western powers had – that the structure they had
devised to deal with trade in China adequate to deal with other ‘orientals’. In 1844, the Dutch
king William II submitted a polite entreaty to the bakufu explaining that the world had changed,
and Japan could no longer remain safely disengaged from the commercial networks and
diplomatic order that the West was spreading throughout the globe. With the conclusion of the
Opium Wars, the bakufu seemed to realise that this warning was a sign of things to come and
initiated certain changes – relaxation of the 1825 policy of shoot first, ask questions later; allow
Westerners to collect fuel and provisions when in Japanese waters and then be sent on their way;
gradual build-up of coastal defences in the Tokugawa heartland as well as in other domains.
Andrew Gordon concluded that these measures led to the strengthening of an emergent national
consciousness among a growing body of political actors, and the Opium wars had definitely
confirmed the fears of those who viewed Westerners as insatiable predator’s intent on conquest
as well as profit, giving the stance of seclusion a more powerful rationale than ever. This was not
entirely false, as the tenets of free trade and diplomatic protocol gave the west the feeling of
being perched on a moral high ground which did not make for a flattering picture of the
Japanese.
Commodore Matthew Perry’s voyages to Japan were indeed a decisive moment in the narrative
of the downfall of the Tokugawas.4 It signalled the beginning of the end of the bakufu in a
number of respects. Perry’s 1853 visit and subsequent departure was marked with a request and a
warning – to agree to trade in peace, or to suffer the consequences in war. This sparked off a
wave of panic in Japan, particularly in the bakufu administration where a clear course of action
was not at hand. Such was the lack of clarity that with the intent of trying to garner consensus on
the issue of granting concessions, the bakufu actually requested the daimyo to submit their
advice in writing on how best to deal with the situation. With no other course of action in sight,
the bakufu granted certain rights to the Americans when Perry returned. The Treaty of Kanagawa
gave the United States of America, and later France, Britain, Holland and Russia as well, the
right to stop over and re-fuel and re-stock provisions at two remote ports - Shimoda and
Hakodate. The Americans were also allowed to establish a permanent consul in Shimoda, and
were given the right to extraterritoriality. By 1858, the bakufu negotiators signed yet another
treaty, which Andrew Gordon insisted ‘very nearly replicated the Opium War settlement with
China without a shot having been fired.’ Abe Masahiro, the chief councillor to the bakufu and
the initial policy-maker with regard to Western powers, had died in 1857, leaving the position to
Ii Naosuke to continue. Naosuke, in the name of the shogun, authorized Japanese signatures to
treaties with the United States, Britain, Russia and France, followed by acceptance of similar
3
Duus, Peter. Journal of Japanese Studies 14, no. 2 (1988): pg 449-54.
4
Kitahara, Michio. "Commodore Perry and the Japanese: A Study in the Dramaturgy of
Power." Symbolic Interaction 9, no. 1 (1986): pg 53-65.
important example. Historians of Japan and modernity agree to a great extent that the history of
modern Japan begins with the crise de regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the military rulers of
Japan from the year 1600. It is therefore pertinent to explore the relevant themes of political
instability, foreign contact and inner contradictions that eventually led to the decline and
subsequent collapse of this regime, while at the same time giving these factors a closer look in
order to understand whether the bakuhan system could have been preserved had the Tokugawa
leaders followed an alternate policy.
A survey of Japanese society in the 19th century reveals a complex feudal society which was
held together in a very precarious manner by the military regime of the Tokugawas. Japan still
maintained the institution of monarchy in these years. However, the Emperor was restricted to
his imperial city of Kyoto and served a symbolic role rather than a practical one. The
administration of Japan was a task which legitimately lay in the hands of the Emperor, but in
1600 was given by the Imperial court to the Tokugawa family. The Tokugawas were in-charge of
a feudal regime made up of a number of daimyo or feudal lords who governed their own Han or
territories/provinces with a certain degree of autonomy and sovereignty, providing in return
military service and loyalty to the Shogun. Whereas the daimyo exercised power specifically at a
local level, the Tokugawa Shogunate would not only govern their own vast lands and vassals, but
also make decisions related to foreign policy and national peacekeeping.1 This control that the
shoguns had on the daimyo found expression in the system of Sankin Kotai or the alternate
attendance system, whereby the daimyo were required to maintain a permanent residence in Edo
and be present there every other year. In addition to this, the family of the daimyo would be
permanently residing at Edo, thereby creating a sort of hostage system. An important side-effect
of the Sankin Kotai system was that it riddled the fragmented country with transport routes and
trading possibilities. The yearly processions of daimyo and their retainers threaded together the
economies of the domains through which they passed, resulting in the rapid growth of market
towns and trading stations as well as the development of one of the most impressive road
networks in the world. What resulted, as Richard Storry wrote, was the creation of a national
market in the 17th century which would clear the path for eventual economic modernization
programmes in the 19th century.
Andrew Gordon stated that Tokugawa rule in the 19th century was scraping through year after
year, pointing to an inherent instability in the regime. This was compounded by the increasing
Western presence in Japanese waters in this period.2 In his words, ‘they were powerful
emissaries of the capitalist and nationalist revolutions that were just then transforming Euro-
American societies and reaching beyond to transform the world.’ Hence, the appearance of these
foreigners amplified the shortcomings and flaws of the Tokugawa regime. According to W.G.
Beasley, the immediate background to the threat Japan faced from the Western powers was the
1
John Whitney Hall, "Japanese History", the Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (1970): pg. 155-60.
2
Garon, Sheldon. "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-
Society Relations." The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (1994): pg 346-66.
, latter’s trade with China. The isolationist policy of the Tokugawa regime with regard to foreign
trade was envisaged in the policy of sakoku which aimed to show hostility and aggression to any
foreigner in Japanese waters.3 However, as Beasley’s remark clearly shows, the aftermath of the
Opium Wars brought to light the view the Western powers had – that the structure they had
devised to deal with trade in China adequate to deal with other ‘orientals’. In 1844, the Dutch
king William II submitted a polite entreaty to the bakufu explaining that the world had changed,
and Japan could no longer remain safely disengaged from the commercial networks and
diplomatic order that the West was spreading throughout the globe. With the conclusion of the
Opium Wars, the bakufu seemed to realise that this warning was a sign of things to come and
initiated certain changes – relaxation of the 1825 policy of shoot first, ask questions later; allow
Westerners to collect fuel and provisions when in Japanese waters and then be sent on their way;
gradual build-up of coastal defences in the Tokugawa heartland as well as in other domains.
Andrew Gordon concluded that these measures led to the strengthening of an emergent national
consciousness among a growing body of political actors, and the Opium wars had definitely
confirmed the fears of those who viewed Westerners as insatiable predator’s intent on conquest
as well as profit, giving the stance of seclusion a more powerful rationale than ever. This was not
entirely false, as the tenets of free trade and diplomatic protocol gave the west the feeling of
being perched on a moral high ground which did not make for a flattering picture of the
Japanese.
Commodore Matthew Perry’s voyages to Japan were indeed a decisive moment in the narrative
of the downfall of the Tokugawas.4 It signalled the beginning of the end of the bakufu in a
number of respects. Perry’s 1853 visit and subsequent departure was marked with a request and a
warning – to agree to trade in peace, or to suffer the consequences in war. This sparked off a
wave of panic in Japan, particularly in the bakufu administration where a clear course of action
was not at hand. Such was the lack of clarity that with the intent of trying to garner consensus on
the issue of granting concessions, the bakufu actually requested the daimyo to submit their
advice in writing on how best to deal with the situation. With no other course of action in sight,
the bakufu granted certain rights to the Americans when Perry returned. The Treaty of Kanagawa
gave the United States of America, and later France, Britain, Holland and Russia as well, the
right to stop over and re-fuel and re-stock provisions at two remote ports - Shimoda and
Hakodate. The Americans were also allowed to establish a permanent consul in Shimoda, and
were given the right to extraterritoriality. By 1858, the bakufu negotiators signed yet another
treaty, which Andrew Gordon insisted ‘very nearly replicated the Opium War settlement with
China without a shot having been fired.’ Abe Masahiro, the chief councillor to the bakufu and
the initial policy-maker with regard to Western powers, had died in 1857, leaving the position to
Ii Naosuke to continue. Naosuke, in the name of the shogun, authorized Japanese signatures to
treaties with the United States, Britain, Russia and France, followed by acceptance of similar
3
Duus, Peter. Journal of Japanese Studies 14, no. 2 (1988): pg 449-54.
4
Kitahara, Michio. "Commodore Perry and the Japanese: A Study in the Dramaturgy of
Power." Symbolic Interaction 9, no. 1 (1986): pg 53-65.
