Schuurman, B. & Bakker, E. (2016), Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative,
2013- 2014. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 66-85.
The initiative’s primary goal was to reduce the chance of recidivism among prisoners with a
background of involvement in extremism or terrorism. The Dutch re-integration initiative was
found to be based on largely realistic assumptions on how to successfully reintegrate
terrorists and extremists via disengagement and deradicalization. Nevertheless, the
program’s first year saw mixed results, in part because of various obstacles encountered
during its organizational implementation.
Extremism refers to a person’s attitude that is positively in favour of the use of force to
obtain and maintain political power.
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special
form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a
conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or
moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.
Reliable data on recidivism rates among extremists and terrorists tends to be scarce and
anecdotal, making it difficult to gauge the extent to which this group poses additional
reintegration challenges compared to “regular” prisoners.
An evaluation study was conducted that (1) sought to uncover the assumptions program staff
had about how to (a) reintegrate terrorists and extremists and (b) implement such a project
organizationally; (2) assessed the organizational implementation of the initiative and (3)
provided a preliminary indication of its effectiveness, as perceived by the program’s staff.
Disengagement can be seen as “the process whereby an individual experiences a change in
role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation.
Deradicalization implies the pursuit of cognitive change; that is, the abandonment ideas and
worldviews that justify or encourage the use of violence.
In contrast to disengagement, deradicalization can be seen as a social and psychological
process that results in attitudinal change, effectively reducing an individual’s commitment to
the belief that personal involvement in violence is necessary and justified. Whereas
disengagement is primarily a process of behavioral change, deradicalization seeks cognitive
adaptations. Deradicalization thus does not appear to be a necessary condition for successful
reintegration.
“Push” factors that drive individuals away from extremist or terrorist groups are:
disappointment about the efficacy of violence as a strategy. “Pull” factors that entice them to
this life are: family responsibilities. It is striking that personal crises are frequently the
instigators of both movements towards and away from extremism and terrorism.
To implement the project, a team of RN employees was assembled who were to be trained
to become specialists in the reintegration of clients with a jihadist extremist background.
Because it was not possible to utilize a control-group of extremists and terrorists who were
not enrolled in the special initiative, the authors had to rely on RN and NCTV staff’s
perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken. Also, no interviews with the clients
themselves took place as their RN supervisors believed such talks could interfere with their
reintegration work.
2013- 2014. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 66-85.
The initiative’s primary goal was to reduce the chance of recidivism among prisoners with a
background of involvement in extremism or terrorism. The Dutch re-integration initiative was
found to be based on largely realistic assumptions on how to successfully reintegrate
terrorists and extremists via disengagement and deradicalization. Nevertheless, the
program’s first year saw mixed results, in part because of various obstacles encountered
during its organizational implementation.
Extremism refers to a person’s attitude that is positively in favour of the use of force to
obtain and maintain political power.
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special
form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a
conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or
moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.
Reliable data on recidivism rates among extremists and terrorists tends to be scarce and
anecdotal, making it difficult to gauge the extent to which this group poses additional
reintegration challenges compared to “regular” prisoners.
An evaluation study was conducted that (1) sought to uncover the assumptions program staff
had about how to (a) reintegrate terrorists and extremists and (b) implement such a project
organizationally; (2) assessed the organizational implementation of the initiative and (3)
provided a preliminary indication of its effectiveness, as perceived by the program’s staff.
Disengagement can be seen as “the process whereby an individual experiences a change in
role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation.
Deradicalization implies the pursuit of cognitive change; that is, the abandonment ideas and
worldviews that justify or encourage the use of violence.
In contrast to disengagement, deradicalization can be seen as a social and psychological
process that results in attitudinal change, effectively reducing an individual’s commitment to
the belief that personal involvement in violence is necessary and justified. Whereas
disengagement is primarily a process of behavioral change, deradicalization seeks cognitive
adaptations. Deradicalization thus does not appear to be a necessary condition for successful
reintegration.
“Push” factors that drive individuals away from extremist or terrorist groups are:
disappointment about the efficacy of violence as a strategy. “Pull” factors that entice them to
this life are: family responsibilities. It is striking that personal crises are frequently the
instigators of both movements towards and away from extremism and terrorism.
To implement the project, a team of RN employees was assembled who were to be trained
to become specialists in the reintegration of clients with a jihadist extremist background.
Because it was not possible to utilize a control-group of extremists and terrorists who were
not enrolled in the special initiative, the authors had to rely on RN and NCTV staff’s
perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken. Also, no interviews with the clients
themselves took place as their RN supervisors believed such talks could interfere with their
reintegration work.
