Notes (video) lectures
Week 1 – introduction: indexicality and deixis
To index = to point. Indexicality is the phenomenon that utterances are understood in the context in
which they occur; utterances point at context for the ways in which they must be interpreted.
In other words: an utterance points at the things that are needed, or the things that need to be
included, for the utterance to be understood (=the context).
Deixis is a form of indexicality. Deixis refers to linguistic elements that point to context for their
interpretation. Deictic elements of language, such as pronouns and time indicators: meaning
depends of who uses it, to whom it is used, where it is used, when it is used, etc.
All utterances are indexical: they invite the hearer/reader to draw on context to infer what they
mean. Language has a number of elements that are deictic: pronouns, verb tense, etc. Deixis is
always indexical, but indexical is not always deictic. Deixis is then more specific and indexical is more
general (non-deictic).
Week 2 – The problem of meaning
The problem of meaning asks how utterances get their meaning, either in isolation or in use. When
thinking about meaning, the triangle of meaning is often used as a starting point: thought – reality –
language. Then, there is the question which element of and relation within this triangle is the most
important? Consider the next relationships as a possibility of the most important relationship.
- Language and reality
Here, words are seen as pointing to objects (e.g., “tree” might point to an actual tree in reality) and
sentences pointing to a state of affairs (e.g., “a tree on top of a hill”). The theory of extensional
semantics (Donald Davison).
- Language and thought
Words point no longer to objects, but to concepts and sentences to a thought.
The theory of mentalism (Noam Chomsky).
- Language and thought and language and reality
Language functions as an intermediate between thought and reality. There is a direct link between
language and reality and thought projects the language onto reality.
Picture theory of meaning (when it does not correspond to reality; false sentence)/
correspondence theory of truth (Ludwig Wittgenstein).
Here, one ends up with sentences that are either true or false, based on two types of evidence: (1)
rationalism: A=A; necessary truth (tautologies), or (2) empiricism: correspondence between
language, thought and reality; sentences are true when they correspond to reality and false when
they do not.
There are some criticisms against these theories of truth.
- Wittgenstein’s argument against mentalism: language games, language = use.
The meaning of a utterance is not necessarily in its words, but in the use of these words, depending
on the context. E.g., saying ‘hammer’ can indicate that you are describing the thing in front of you or,
in the context of building a closet, asking for it. “The beetle in a box”
1
, - Ordinary Language Philosophy: Austin’s theory of language = action.
The thing done with the utterance (e.g., requesting or suggesting), does not have a truth value, it is a
speech act: an action in the world. The speaker then actually changes the world by producing this
utterance.
First, Austin distinguished both representatives and performatives: representations of language can
be (1) true or false = constatives (describe, concerned with truth; describing the world by stating or
asserting something), and can be (2) successful or not = performatives (act, concerned with action;
changing the world by doing something (instead of just saying)).
E.g., “The odds of getting a royal flush are 1 in 649,740” is constative, because it states
something, while “I promise this lecture is over soon” is performative, since it actually
changes the world.
Then, Austin abandons this distinction and argues that all utterances are performatives: even if you
are describing, you are still acting in the world. Performatives are not guided by truth conditions, but
they do have felicity conditions:
(a) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect and the circumstances and
persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure; context is relevant.
(b) The procedure must be executed correctly and completely.
(c) Often the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the
procedure, and if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do so; utterances
and the meaning of utterances are not so much guided by truth of falsehood, but are guided by
cultural knowledge about how to use these utterances and by their relationships to intentions and to
thoughts.
E.g., when you make a promise, you can only do this when you think that the recipient thinks
that what you are promising is something he might enjoy or thinks is good to come about. It
also has to be about something in the future, it has to be something that you are able to do.
If you compare this to a threat, you see it has similar conditions, but this has to be something
that the recipient would not enjoy. Whether something is a promise or a threat has to do
with our relationship, context, and the intentions of the speaker.
Week 3 part 1 – Utterance, sentence and proposition
Utterances are created by writing or speaking a piece of language (something that happens in the
world). Sentences are abstract grammatical elements (used in a real world, but not in the world;
theoretical concepts in linguistics). Propositions deal not with the form of an utterance (they are in
that sense non-linguistic), but with the (truth conditional) meaning of that sentence. As a result,
sentences may share the same meaning (=proposition).
E.g., if “you’re really letting the oxygen out of my tank here!” is said twice, the person who
says it produced two utterances, because he performed two actions in the world (saying it
two times), but only one sentence, since the grammatical elements are the same.
E.g., “Benny is upset” vs “It is Benny who is upset” are two utterances, two sentences, and
they have one proposition; they express the same thought (but in two different forms /
information structures). Or active vs. passive sentence: “Emmet hurt Benny” vs. “Benny was
hurt by Emmet.” where there is a difference in starting with the agent (Emmet) and patient
(Benny). This difference can be made in terms of which one is put more emphasis on.
Week 3 part 2 – Entailment and presupposition
The notion of truth allows us to determine relations between sentences. Two feature prominently in
the Grundy book are entailment and presupposition; sentences may be either in a relationship of
entailment or in a relationship of presupposition.
2
Week 1 – introduction: indexicality and deixis
To index = to point. Indexicality is the phenomenon that utterances are understood in the context in
which they occur; utterances point at context for the ways in which they must be interpreted.
In other words: an utterance points at the things that are needed, or the things that need to be
included, for the utterance to be understood (=the context).
Deixis is a form of indexicality. Deixis refers to linguistic elements that point to context for their
interpretation. Deictic elements of language, such as pronouns and time indicators: meaning
depends of who uses it, to whom it is used, where it is used, when it is used, etc.
All utterances are indexical: they invite the hearer/reader to draw on context to infer what they
mean. Language has a number of elements that are deictic: pronouns, verb tense, etc. Deixis is
always indexical, but indexical is not always deictic. Deixis is then more specific and indexical is more
general (non-deictic).
Week 2 – The problem of meaning
The problem of meaning asks how utterances get their meaning, either in isolation or in use. When
thinking about meaning, the triangle of meaning is often used as a starting point: thought – reality –
language. Then, there is the question which element of and relation within this triangle is the most
important? Consider the next relationships as a possibility of the most important relationship.
- Language and reality
Here, words are seen as pointing to objects (e.g., “tree” might point to an actual tree in reality) and
sentences pointing to a state of affairs (e.g., “a tree on top of a hill”). The theory of extensional
semantics (Donald Davison).
- Language and thought
Words point no longer to objects, but to concepts and sentences to a thought.
The theory of mentalism (Noam Chomsky).
- Language and thought and language and reality
Language functions as an intermediate between thought and reality. There is a direct link between
language and reality and thought projects the language onto reality.
Picture theory of meaning (when it does not correspond to reality; false sentence)/
correspondence theory of truth (Ludwig Wittgenstein).
Here, one ends up with sentences that are either true or false, based on two types of evidence: (1)
rationalism: A=A; necessary truth (tautologies), or (2) empiricism: correspondence between
language, thought and reality; sentences are true when they correspond to reality and false when
they do not.
There are some criticisms against these theories of truth.
- Wittgenstein’s argument against mentalism: language games, language = use.
The meaning of a utterance is not necessarily in its words, but in the use of these words, depending
on the context. E.g., saying ‘hammer’ can indicate that you are describing the thing in front of you or,
in the context of building a closet, asking for it. “The beetle in a box”
1
, - Ordinary Language Philosophy: Austin’s theory of language = action.
The thing done with the utterance (e.g., requesting or suggesting), does not have a truth value, it is a
speech act: an action in the world. The speaker then actually changes the world by producing this
utterance.
First, Austin distinguished both representatives and performatives: representations of language can
be (1) true or false = constatives (describe, concerned with truth; describing the world by stating or
asserting something), and can be (2) successful or not = performatives (act, concerned with action;
changing the world by doing something (instead of just saying)).
E.g., “The odds of getting a royal flush are 1 in 649,740” is constative, because it states
something, while “I promise this lecture is over soon” is performative, since it actually
changes the world.
Then, Austin abandons this distinction and argues that all utterances are performatives: even if you
are describing, you are still acting in the world. Performatives are not guided by truth conditions, but
they do have felicity conditions:
(a) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect and the circumstances and
persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure; context is relevant.
(b) The procedure must be executed correctly and completely.
(c) Often the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the
procedure, and if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do so; utterances
and the meaning of utterances are not so much guided by truth of falsehood, but are guided by
cultural knowledge about how to use these utterances and by their relationships to intentions and to
thoughts.
E.g., when you make a promise, you can only do this when you think that the recipient thinks
that what you are promising is something he might enjoy or thinks is good to come about. It
also has to be about something in the future, it has to be something that you are able to do.
If you compare this to a threat, you see it has similar conditions, but this has to be something
that the recipient would not enjoy. Whether something is a promise or a threat has to do
with our relationship, context, and the intentions of the speaker.
Week 3 part 1 – Utterance, sentence and proposition
Utterances are created by writing or speaking a piece of language (something that happens in the
world). Sentences are abstract grammatical elements (used in a real world, but not in the world;
theoretical concepts in linguistics). Propositions deal not with the form of an utterance (they are in
that sense non-linguistic), but with the (truth conditional) meaning of that sentence. As a result,
sentences may share the same meaning (=proposition).
E.g., if “you’re really letting the oxygen out of my tank here!” is said twice, the person who
says it produced two utterances, because he performed two actions in the world (saying it
two times), but only one sentence, since the grammatical elements are the same.
E.g., “Benny is upset” vs “It is Benny who is upset” are two utterances, two sentences, and
they have one proposition; they express the same thought (but in two different forms /
information structures). Or active vs. passive sentence: “Emmet hurt Benny” vs. “Benny was
hurt by Emmet.” where there is a difference in starting with the agent (Emmet) and patient
(Benny). This difference can be made in terms of which one is put more emphasis on.
Week 3 part 2 – Entailment and presupposition
The notion of truth allows us to determine relations between sentences. Two feature prominently in
the Grundy book are entailment and presupposition; sentences may be either in a relationship of
entailment or in a relationship of presupposition.
2
