CHAPTER # 4
Prosecution will always argue that COC is enacted against D. Prosecution’s task becomes
harder when there are more than one events in result.
CHAPTER # 9
Conditional assault is no assault.
Immediacy is necessary for assault.
It is not an unlawful force (assault) when D used it as self-defence, or the contact is
consented (Slingsby).
Assault’s definition was defined in Venna 1975.
Battery cannot be committed by omission even where there is a legal duty to act. (Fagan
1983)
The degree of force for battery is very slight and no harm is required.
Unconsented-to contacts issuing from the ordinary rough and tumble of everyday life do not
count as batteries so long as the force used was not excessive (Donnelly v Jackman) (Collins
v Wilcock. This will include such contacts as taps on the shoulder to attract another’s
attention, slaps on the back in greeting, jostling, knocking and bumping in queues, on trains
and while running for the bus.
Physical harm is not necessary in battery. (Collin v Willcock)
No battery if the use of force is lawful. (Barnes, Slingsby)
Assaults causing minor scratches and bruises tend to be charged as common assault.
Assault/battery+ABH= s.47
Occasion means to same as cause in s.47.
ABH means physical or psychological injury.
Severe bruising would usually be ABH. But could be GBH if V is very young or very old.
In s.47, jury is to judge of the fact as to whether the ‘hurt’ suffered by V is ‘actual bodily
harm’.
In s.47, It is not necessary to prove D intended or foresaw the injury (Roberts) (Savage, D
threw a pint of beer in V’s face).
Rules of causation may need to be applied in these sections.
A scratch, burn or graze is not a wound. (Mcloughlin)
A minor wound might be charged under s.20.
Wound requires a penetration/breaking of both layers of skin. (Eisenhower)
Commonly called malicious wounding covers both wounding and GBH. (s.20)
Whether the injury is really serious or not, is a question of fact for jury. The jury should take
into account physical fitness and age of V and also nature of injury. (Bollom 2003) (GBH)
The word maliciously in s.20 is intention or subjective recklessness. (MR)
Professor Kenny said the world ‘malicious’ must be taken either as intention or recklessness.
The actus reus for s.18 is the same as s.20.
In Burstow, it was held that there was no meaningful difference between inflicting harm and
causing harm.
DPP v Smith defined GBH as ‘really serious harm or injury’.
It is necessary to view degree of harm in s.18 but not in s.20
GBH also includes sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV. (Dica 2004)
D must intend serious harm for s.18.
, V’s consent is not normally a defence to a crime of violence.
It is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, each other
actual bodily harm for no good reason. (Lord Lane CJ in AG Reference 1981)
Things which are not in public interest cannot be given effective consent. (Brown &
Emmett)
CHAPTER # 5
Intention is the state of mind. Motive is the reason of a person that forms state of mind.
Foresight of anything less than virtual certainty cannot be intention but can only be
recklessness.
Cunningham: 1. Risk was obvious. 2. D appreciated that risk. (Subjective form)
Being aware of the risk does not always require conscious thought process. In Parker, D
was deliberately closing his mind to the obvious.
CHAPTER # 7
For murder, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the serious injury or GBH by
D was life threatening. It just must be a serious injury.
Revenge cannot be used as a defense for LOSC. s.54(4)
Elements of LOSC in s.54(1): 1. Acts or omission in killing resulted from LOSC. 2. LOSC had a
qualifying trigger. 3. A person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint, and in the circumstances of D, would have reacted in the same way. (objective
test)
D might find difficulty in successfully pleading LOSC if he has waited sometime before acting.
(A cooling off period)
To rely on LOSC, the trigger must be serious to justify the loss. There are two such qualifying
triggers. The first trigger is fear of serious violence (Ahluwalia). The second trigger is about
extremely grave character and justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
LOSC would not be available if it is like s.55(6).
D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded if it was caused by a thing which D incited
or said for the purposes of an excuse to use violence. (s.55(6)(a)).
Revenge does not apply (s.54(4)) neither does sexual infidelity (s.55(6)(b)).
Sexual infidelity is excluded from range of qualifying trigger under section 55(6)(c).
The LOSC also contains objective element like the old law of provocation and it must be
proved for defence of LOSC. Section 54(c).
D may still have difficulty in pleading LOSC if he was waited sometime before act. (cooling
off period). Duffy 1949: Duffy test of suddenness has now been removed but still
suddenness matters. (Duffy, Thornton, Ahluwalia).
Prosecution will always argue that COC is enacted against D. Prosecution’s task becomes
harder when there are more than one events in result.
CHAPTER # 9
Conditional assault is no assault.
Immediacy is necessary for assault.
It is not an unlawful force (assault) when D used it as self-defence, or the contact is
consented (Slingsby).
Assault’s definition was defined in Venna 1975.
Battery cannot be committed by omission even where there is a legal duty to act. (Fagan
1983)
The degree of force for battery is very slight and no harm is required.
Unconsented-to contacts issuing from the ordinary rough and tumble of everyday life do not
count as batteries so long as the force used was not excessive (Donnelly v Jackman) (Collins
v Wilcock. This will include such contacts as taps on the shoulder to attract another’s
attention, slaps on the back in greeting, jostling, knocking and bumping in queues, on trains
and while running for the bus.
Physical harm is not necessary in battery. (Collin v Willcock)
No battery if the use of force is lawful. (Barnes, Slingsby)
Assaults causing minor scratches and bruises tend to be charged as common assault.
Assault/battery+ABH= s.47
Occasion means to same as cause in s.47.
ABH means physical or psychological injury.
Severe bruising would usually be ABH. But could be GBH if V is very young or very old.
In s.47, jury is to judge of the fact as to whether the ‘hurt’ suffered by V is ‘actual bodily
harm’.
In s.47, It is not necessary to prove D intended or foresaw the injury (Roberts) (Savage, D
threw a pint of beer in V’s face).
Rules of causation may need to be applied in these sections.
A scratch, burn or graze is not a wound. (Mcloughlin)
A minor wound might be charged under s.20.
Wound requires a penetration/breaking of both layers of skin. (Eisenhower)
Commonly called malicious wounding covers both wounding and GBH. (s.20)
Whether the injury is really serious or not, is a question of fact for jury. The jury should take
into account physical fitness and age of V and also nature of injury. (Bollom 2003) (GBH)
The word maliciously in s.20 is intention or subjective recklessness. (MR)
Professor Kenny said the world ‘malicious’ must be taken either as intention or recklessness.
The actus reus for s.18 is the same as s.20.
In Burstow, it was held that there was no meaningful difference between inflicting harm and
causing harm.
DPP v Smith defined GBH as ‘really serious harm or injury’.
It is necessary to view degree of harm in s.18 but not in s.20
GBH also includes sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV. (Dica 2004)
D must intend serious harm for s.18.
, V’s consent is not normally a defence to a crime of violence.
It is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, each other
actual bodily harm for no good reason. (Lord Lane CJ in AG Reference 1981)
Things which are not in public interest cannot be given effective consent. (Brown &
Emmett)
CHAPTER # 5
Intention is the state of mind. Motive is the reason of a person that forms state of mind.
Foresight of anything less than virtual certainty cannot be intention but can only be
recklessness.
Cunningham: 1. Risk was obvious. 2. D appreciated that risk. (Subjective form)
Being aware of the risk does not always require conscious thought process. In Parker, D
was deliberately closing his mind to the obvious.
CHAPTER # 7
For murder, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the serious injury or GBH by
D was life threatening. It just must be a serious injury.
Revenge cannot be used as a defense for LOSC. s.54(4)
Elements of LOSC in s.54(1): 1. Acts or omission in killing resulted from LOSC. 2. LOSC had a
qualifying trigger. 3. A person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint, and in the circumstances of D, would have reacted in the same way. (objective
test)
D might find difficulty in successfully pleading LOSC if he has waited sometime before acting.
(A cooling off period)
To rely on LOSC, the trigger must be serious to justify the loss. There are two such qualifying
triggers. The first trigger is fear of serious violence (Ahluwalia). The second trigger is about
extremely grave character and justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
LOSC would not be available if it is like s.55(6).
D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded if it was caused by a thing which D incited
or said for the purposes of an excuse to use violence. (s.55(6)(a)).
Revenge does not apply (s.54(4)) neither does sexual infidelity (s.55(6)(b)).
Sexual infidelity is excluded from range of qualifying trigger under section 55(6)(c).
The LOSC also contains objective element like the old law of provocation and it must be
proved for defence of LOSC. Section 54(c).
D may still have difficulty in pleading LOSC if he was waited sometime before act. (cooling
off period). Duffy 1949: Duffy test of suddenness has now been removed but still
suddenness matters. (Duffy, Thornton, Ahluwalia).
