INDIAN INDEPENDENCE (PART 2)
Introductory Notes:
● Congress was not an overtly Hindu nationalist institution though it was susceptible to
unconscious forms of bias towards the Muslim minority
● Edwin Montagu felt “responsible government” was expected in India after 100 years
of British rule
● By 1945, the advantages of Indian territory had begun to erode for the British
Empire; the market for goods had become subject to serious tariffs, the Indian state
was in debt of £1.3bn after WW2 and the Indian military was not as loyal as it was
before WW2
● The British intentions were NOT to leave India divided; a united India was
advantageous to Britain in the event of another world war
Partition And the Making of South Asian Boundaries (TY Tan, G Kudaisya):
● The process of boundary-making has often been reduced to simply an administrative
procedure that was carried out once partition had been decided
● Boundary-making was more complex than often thought and the problems which
ensued from the process reflect its significance
● There had been attempts by Lord Wavell to secure a united independent India before
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947- these attempts had failed
● The Mountbatten Plan (announced on 3 June) provided for the division of the
subcontinent into a Muslim-majority Pakistan and a Hindu-majority India
● The acceptance of the June Plan by Bengal effectively signaled the final demise of
the “United Bengal” scheme that many prominent politicians (e.g., Sarat Bose) had
been pushing for
● The territorial basis underlying partition had never been clearly defined prior to 1947,
thereby leading to vague understandings around partition
● The European Chairman who sat between the Bengal and Punjab Boundary
Commission was Sir Cyril Radcliffe (an individual who had little to no knowledge of
the territories he was due to divide)
● Not only did Radcliffe lack an understanding of the territories he was due to divide
and lack a familiarity with the process of boundary-making, but he was also set a
tight time frame of 5 weeks within which he was expected to complete his work
● The tight time frame was due to Nehru’s personal impatience
● Radcliffe accepted the time frame pushed by Mountbatten/ Nehru because he felt his
suggestions would be subject to bilateral modifications later
● The terms of reference used in Mountbatten’s 3 June Plan were also ambiguous; it
did not make clear what “contiguous [Muslim/ Hindu] majority areas” were
● “Areas” might have referred to district, thana or tehsil
● In relation to the boundary demarcations of the Punjab region, the Muslim League
called for areas such as the Lahore district to come under Muslim control given the
Muslim-majority demography
Introductory Notes:
● Congress was not an overtly Hindu nationalist institution though it was susceptible to
unconscious forms of bias towards the Muslim minority
● Edwin Montagu felt “responsible government” was expected in India after 100 years
of British rule
● By 1945, the advantages of Indian territory had begun to erode for the British
Empire; the market for goods had become subject to serious tariffs, the Indian state
was in debt of £1.3bn after WW2 and the Indian military was not as loyal as it was
before WW2
● The British intentions were NOT to leave India divided; a united India was
advantageous to Britain in the event of another world war
Partition And the Making of South Asian Boundaries (TY Tan, G Kudaisya):
● The process of boundary-making has often been reduced to simply an administrative
procedure that was carried out once partition had been decided
● Boundary-making was more complex than often thought and the problems which
ensued from the process reflect its significance
● There had been attempts by Lord Wavell to secure a united independent India before
Lord Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947- these attempts had failed
● The Mountbatten Plan (announced on 3 June) provided for the division of the
subcontinent into a Muslim-majority Pakistan and a Hindu-majority India
● The acceptance of the June Plan by Bengal effectively signaled the final demise of
the “United Bengal” scheme that many prominent politicians (e.g., Sarat Bose) had
been pushing for
● The territorial basis underlying partition had never been clearly defined prior to 1947,
thereby leading to vague understandings around partition
● The European Chairman who sat between the Bengal and Punjab Boundary
Commission was Sir Cyril Radcliffe (an individual who had little to no knowledge of
the territories he was due to divide)
● Not only did Radcliffe lack an understanding of the territories he was due to divide
and lack a familiarity with the process of boundary-making, but he was also set a
tight time frame of 5 weeks within which he was expected to complete his work
● The tight time frame was due to Nehru’s personal impatience
● Radcliffe accepted the time frame pushed by Mountbatten/ Nehru because he felt his
suggestions would be subject to bilateral modifications later
● The terms of reference used in Mountbatten’s 3 June Plan were also ambiguous; it
did not make clear what “contiguous [Muslim/ Hindu] majority areas” were
● “Areas” might have referred to district, thana or tehsil
● In relation to the boundary demarcations of the Punjab region, the Muslim League
called for areas such as the Lahore district to come under Muslim control given the
Muslim-majority demography
