Enrique Sarabia Sánchez - personal identifier : G6533073
A333 - TMA 02 – 2000 words limit
Are there any circumstances of war in which the deliberate targeting
of non-combatants is justified?
In this essay, I attempt to ascertain the extent to which attacks on non-combatants are
rationally justified.
The idea of the supreme emergency exception for the protection of non-combatants is
problematic for several reasons. On the one hand, the utilitarianism of this concept
contradicts the principles of Walzer's ethics of war, which are primarily conceived
based on human rights. Also, this exception is made during supreme emergencies and
conflicts with the immunity of non-combatants. The notion of non-combatants Can
nonviolent individuals benefit from immunity in the event of intentional aggression.
The limits set for the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants make it
possible to establish the ethical boundary between those who make a specific
contribution to war and those who do not. Walzer also raises the possibility of making a
distinction between those who fight in a just war and those who fight in an unjust one. If
this is feasible, the law in war could be stated as a rule whereby if there is a greater
justification there would be correspondingly greater rights. It would be a clear
indication that the more just your cause, the more rules you can break to defend
yourself, even if there are rules that are not followed. Just as war represents a rule of
law that confers on countries an equal right to use military force, it must also be
accepted that war is a moral condition that gives armies and combatants a mutual
authorization, "the equal right to kill". In other words, there is a principle of a general
moral character, distinct from the law of war, which is applicable to humanity. Only
with the admission of this fundamental principle can the rules of war be defined, which
Walzer likens to the different modes of warfare in international law. In his opinion,
there is, on the one hand, the Ius ad Bellum, i.e. those rules which specify how and
when to fight and which, although they are recognized to limit both the intensity of
combat and its duration or the suffering of the combatants, do not contribute in any way
to weighing up the ethical magnitude of war. On the other hand, there is the Ius in
Bello, which would comprise the body of rules that indicate who may be killed in war
and who may not.
The concern is with this second type of victim, for therein lies one of the most
problematic and difficult questions in the theory of war, namely, how to discern
between victims who are susceptible to attack and those who are to be respected. There
is no doubt that for war to have moral status, to be distinguished from homicide and
massacre, this question must be answered. This argument could be interpreted to mean
that combatants fighting in a just conflict have the right to do whatever they want if it is
justified for the outcome of the conflict. If we consider aggression as criminal activity, it
would not be the same for the perpetrator of these aggressions. It would only be the case
if these aggressions were directed against non-combatants, innocent people, civilians. It
is the rules of war that determine the obligations of combatants, who must respect
ethical rules and laws. In this respect, Walzer's question is whether civilians can be
attacked. In order to answer this question, he relies on the supposed "principle of double
effect". This principle indicates that, according to the laws of war, the civilian
population can neither be the victim nor the object of action by military forces, but if
they cooperate in the fight, they can be attacked. This double effect represents a
A333 - TMA 02 – 2000 words limit
Are there any circumstances of war in which the deliberate targeting
of non-combatants is justified?
In this essay, I attempt to ascertain the extent to which attacks on non-combatants are
rationally justified.
The idea of the supreme emergency exception for the protection of non-combatants is
problematic for several reasons. On the one hand, the utilitarianism of this concept
contradicts the principles of Walzer's ethics of war, which are primarily conceived
based on human rights. Also, this exception is made during supreme emergencies and
conflicts with the immunity of non-combatants. The notion of non-combatants Can
nonviolent individuals benefit from immunity in the event of intentional aggression.
The limits set for the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants make it
possible to establish the ethical boundary between those who make a specific
contribution to war and those who do not. Walzer also raises the possibility of making a
distinction between those who fight in a just war and those who fight in an unjust one. If
this is feasible, the law in war could be stated as a rule whereby if there is a greater
justification there would be correspondingly greater rights. It would be a clear
indication that the more just your cause, the more rules you can break to defend
yourself, even if there are rules that are not followed. Just as war represents a rule of
law that confers on countries an equal right to use military force, it must also be
accepted that war is a moral condition that gives armies and combatants a mutual
authorization, "the equal right to kill". In other words, there is a principle of a general
moral character, distinct from the law of war, which is applicable to humanity. Only
with the admission of this fundamental principle can the rules of war be defined, which
Walzer likens to the different modes of warfare in international law. In his opinion,
there is, on the one hand, the Ius ad Bellum, i.e. those rules which specify how and
when to fight and which, although they are recognized to limit both the intensity of
combat and its duration or the suffering of the combatants, do not contribute in any way
to weighing up the ethical magnitude of war. On the other hand, there is the Ius in
Bello, which would comprise the body of rules that indicate who may be killed in war
and who may not.
The concern is with this second type of victim, for therein lies one of the most
problematic and difficult questions in the theory of war, namely, how to discern
between victims who are susceptible to attack and those who are to be respected. There
is no doubt that for war to have moral status, to be distinguished from homicide and
massacre, this question must be answered. This argument could be interpreted to mean
that combatants fighting in a just conflict have the right to do whatever they want if it is
justified for the outcome of the conflict. If we consider aggression as criminal activity, it
would not be the same for the perpetrator of these aggressions. It would only be the case
if these aggressions were directed against non-combatants, innocent people, civilians. It
is the rules of war that determine the obligations of combatants, who must respect
ethical rules and laws. In this respect, Walzer's question is whether civilians can be
attacked. In order to answer this question, he relies on the supposed "principle of double
effect". This principle indicates that, according to the laws of war, the civilian
population can neither be the victim nor the object of action by military forces, but if
they cooperate in the fight, they can be attacked. This double effect represents a
