PVL1501 ASSIGNMENT 1&2
SEMESTER 1 2020
, ASSIGNMENT 01&2 FOR PVL1501 – FIRST SEMESTER
ASSIGNMENT 01 DUE DATE: 20 MARCH 2020
ASSIGNMENT 02 DUE DATE: 15 APRIL 2020
UNIQUE NUMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT 01: 867258
UNIQUE NUMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT 02: 792546
ASSIGNMENT 01 SOLUTIONS
Question 1
Mr Groeneveld should not sue Ms Trischa de Ville in her personal capacity because we are
told in the given set of facts that Ms Trisch de Ville committed these allegations not in her
personal capacity as a natural person. The Applicant (Mr Groeneveld) may however sue Ms
Trischa on the grounds of vicarious liability. Please note that the parties are referred to as
the applicant and the respondent because a court a quo in this matter is the High Court
unless credits been given directly to C.C and another reason is that, this case touch bases
on the Fundamental Rights litigations, the Magistrate Courts are constrained to heir this
matter in terms of Magistrates’ Act 32 of 1944.
In the case of Damnum iniuria datum and Loureiro and others v iMvula Quality Protection
(Pty) Ltd, the applicants instituted action against the company and not against the security
guard (a company is a juristic person with legal rights and duties). The guard was acting
within his scope of employment and as an employee of the company (the respondent).
Remember: a company is an abstract entity and cannot act without the assistance of human
beings. When the employees of a company act in the course and scope of their
employment, they could cause the company to be delictually liable. Therefore, in this
regard, the respondent (Great Party) is liable for the conduct of it representative, Ms
Trischa de Ville. This type of liability is known as vicarious liability.
The respondent may argue that his conduct is justifiable and protected by section 58 of the
Constitution which provides as follows: Parliament and its members enjoy parliamentary
privilege so that they are able to perform their functions without outside hindrance or
interference. Parliamentary privilege is based on the notion that MP’s need to be able to
speak freely and uninhibitedly to be able to do their work and to expose wrongdoing
without the fear of being held legally liable for what they say. For further details in this
defence please see Dikoko v Makhatla and Speakers of the National Assemble v De Lille
MP and Another.
SEMESTER 1 2020
, ASSIGNMENT 01&2 FOR PVL1501 – FIRST SEMESTER
ASSIGNMENT 01 DUE DATE: 20 MARCH 2020
ASSIGNMENT 02 DUE DATE: 15 APRIL 2020
UNIQUE NUMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT 01: 867258
UNIQUE NUMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT 02: 792546
ASSIGNMENT 01 SOLUTIONS
Question 1
Mr Groeneveld should not sue Ms Trischa de Ville in her personal capacity because we are
told in the given set of facts that Ms Trisch de Ville committed these allegations not in her
personal capacity as a natural person. The Applicant (Mr Groeneveld) may however sue Ms
Trischa on the grounds of vicarious liability. Please note that the parties are referred to as
the applicant and the respondent because a court a quo in this matter is the High Court
unless credits been given directly to C.C and another reason is that, this case touch bases
on the Fundamental Rights litigations, the Magistrate Courts are constrained to heir this
matter in terms of Magistrates’ Act 32 of 1944.
In the case of Damnum iniuria datum and Loureiro and others v iMvula Quality Protection
(Pty) Ltd, the applicants instituted action against the company and not against the security
guard (a company is a juristic person with legal rights and duties). The guard was acting
within his scope of employment and as an employee of the company (the respondent).
Remember: a company is an abstract entity and cannot act without the assistance of human
beings. When the employees of a company act in the course and scope of their
employment, they could cause the company to be delictually liable. Therefore, in this
regard, the respondent (Great Party) is liable for the conduct of it representative, Ms
Trischa de Ville. This type of liability is known as vicarious liability.
The respondent may argue that his conduct is justifiable and protected by section 58 of the
Constitution which provides as follows: Parliament and its members enjoy parliamentary
privilege so that they are able to perform their functions without outside hindrance or
interference. Parliamentary privilege is based on the notion that MP’s need to be able to
speak freely and uninhibitedly to be able to do their work and to expose wrongdoing
without the fear of being held legally liable for what they say. For further details in this
defence please see Dikoko v Makhatla and Speakers of the National Assemble v De Lille
MP and Another.
