Global Nuclear Politics
Department of Politics, University of York, Autumn term 2020-21
Background briefing for lecture 6: Can we control the bomb? Order and
discipline
This lecture outlines more coercive measures to prevent the spread of nuclear
materials and technology to states and non-state actors, primarily by the United
States. It locates the US at the heart of a ‘nuclear control order’ that extends
Williams Walker’s framework.
This handout gives a bit more background on nuclear terrorism. The lecture will
touch on this but we haven’t time to go into too much detail. The text below is an
excerpt from a chapter I wrote on ‘Countering the threat of nuclear terrorism’ for
an edited book in 2009 (hence all the footnotes, which constitute a pretty good
resource list on nuclear terrorism).
Nuclear terrorism
Evidence suggests that some terrorist groups have had both the intent and
potential capability to undertake a nuclear attack. First, a few terrorist groups
have expressed a clear interest in conducting a nuclear attack, in particular the
apocalyptic Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo and Al-Qa‛ida. In the early 1990s the
well-financed Aum group began recruiting scientists and engineers to try and
acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Members of the cult made a
number of ultimately unsuccessful trips to Russia to try and procure nuclear
weapon expertise and nuclear weapons, reportedly for the sum of $15million. 1
The group later focussed on building rather than purchasing a nuclear weapon
and bought a sheep farm in Australia in 1993 to test chemical weapons and mine
uranium, but with little success. The group abandoned its nuclear effort and in
1995 conducted a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway killing 12 and injuring
over 1,000.2
Al-Qa‛ida has also attempted to procure nuclear weapons and fissile material. 3 In
Sudan in the mid-1990s the group attempted to purchase uranium for a weapon
but fell victim to a scam in which it reportedly paid $1.5million for radiological
waste. The group may also have attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from
Russia and other former Soviet republics in the early 1990s. 4 Documents
uncovered after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 strongly suggest that Al-
Qa‛ida was studying nuclear weapon design, effects and properties and
procurement of fissile material. It is also reported that in August 2001 Osama bin
Laden met with two senior former officials from Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programme to discuss biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. 5 Nevertheless,
1
Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor
Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism, RAND (Arlington, VA, 2005), p.
13.
2
Daly et al, Aum Shinrikyo, pp. 16-18.
3
See David Albright, Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,
Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47, November 6, 2002. Available at
<http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html>.
4
Daly et al, Aum Shinrikyo, p. vii. See also ‘Al-Qa’ida's WMD Activities’, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, May 13, 2005. Available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm>.
5
Ferguson and Potter, Four Faces, p. 116; Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Risks and
Consequences of the Ultimate Disaster (London, 2006), p. 20.
1
Department of Politics, University of York, Autumn term 2020-21
Background briefing for lecture 6: Can we control the bomb? Order and
discipline
This lecture outlines more coercive measures to prevent the spread of nuclear
materials and technology to states and non-state actors, primarily by the United
States. It locates the US at the heart of a ‘nuclear control order’ that extends
Williams Walker’s framework.
This handout gives a bit more background on nuclear terrorism. The lecture will
touch on this but we haven’t time to go into too much detail. The text below is an
excerpt from a chapter I wrote on ‘Countering the threat of nuclear terrorism’ for
an edited book in 2009 (hence all the footnotes, which constitute a pretty good
resource list on nuclear terrorism).
Nuclear terrorism
Evidence suggests that some terrorist groups have had both the intent and
potential capability to undertake a nuclear attack. First, a few terrorist groups
have expressed a clear interest in conducting a nuclear attack, in particular the
apocalyptic Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo and Al-Qa‛ida. In the early 1990s the
well-financed Aum group began recruiting scientists and engineers to try and
acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Members of the cult made a
number of ultimately unsuccessful trips to Russia to try and procure nuclear
weapon expertise and nuclear weapons, reportedly for the sum of $15million. 1
The group later focussed on building rather than purchasing a nuclear weapon
and bought a sheep farm in Australia in 1993 to test chemical weapons and mine
uranium, but with little success. The group abandoned its nuclear effort and in
1995 conducted a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway killing 12 and injuring
over 1,000.2
Al-Qa‛ida has also attempted to procure nuclear weapons and fissile material. 3 In
Sudan in the mid-1990s the group attempted to purchase uranium for a weapon
but fell victim to a scam in which it reportedly paid $1.5million for radiological
waste. The group may also have attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from
Russia and other former Soviet republics in the early 1990s. 4 Documents
uncovered after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 strongly suggest that Al-
Qa‛ida was studying nuclear weapon design, effects and properties and
procurement of fissile material. It is also reported that in August 2001 Osama bin
Laden met with two senior former officials from Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programme to discuss biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. 5 Nevertheless,
1
Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor
Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism, RAND (Arlington, VA, 2005), p.
13.
2
Daly et al, Aum Shinrikyo, pp. 16-18.
3
See David Albright, Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,
Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47, November 6, 2002. Available at
<http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html>.
4
Daly et al, Aum Shinrikyo, p. vii. See also ‘Al-Qa’ida's WMD Activities’, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, May 13, 2005. Available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm>.
5
Ferguson and Potter, Four Faces, p. 116; Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Risks and
Consequences of the Ultimate Disaster (London, 2006), p. 20.
1
