Global Nuclear Politics
Department of Politics, University of York, Autumn term 2020-21
Background briefing for lecture 4: Why do some states want (and keep)
nuclear weapons?
It has long been predicted that many states would acquire nuclear weapons. This
lecture will introduce you to different ways of understanding why states want,
and keep, nuclear weapons.
Realism, the security dilemma, and nuclear weapons acquisition: Scott
Sagan’s security explanation is rooted in the realist tradition. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons is explained through the neorealist argument that states facing
a major military threat (especially a nuclear threat) from another state in an
anarchic inter-state system will seek a nuclear capability to try and protect itself
from that threat on the basis that no other weapon or policy will improve their
security situation as much as nuclear weapons. Only nuclear weapons can
balance nuclear weapons in a realist balance of material (military) power. This is
a structural theory of nuclear weapons: the structure of international anarchy
compels states in particular conditions of insecurity to acquire nuclear weapons.
It connects with Ken Waltz’s theorising of structural realism (or neorealism as it
came to be called) and his theorising of nuclear deterrence.
Further explanation comes from the concept of the security dilemma, which
argues that one state’s accumulation of military power for security purposes
induces insecurity in other states, not least those with whom it has adversarial
relations. If a state constantly arms itself against potential enemies, other states
will face strong incentives to arm themselves in response, generating further
insecurity. The ‘dilemma’ in the ‘security dilemma’ is twofold: first, a dilemma of
how to interpret the acquisition of military power by a potential enemy and,
second, a dilemma of how to respond to it when the costs of getting it wrong are
potentially the survival of your state. Realism embodies a fatalist logic that it is
impossible to distinguish between a state’s offensive and defensive acquisition of
military power, meaning states are compelled to assume the worst and respond
accordingly. This can generate an interactive process can lead to arms racing
and is known as the ‘spiral model’ of state interaction. US scholar John Hertz
(1950, p. 157) called it “the vicious circle of security and power accumulation”. If
you’re interested in this, read Wheeler and Booth’s excellent 2007 book on The
Security Dilemma for the best recent treatment.
This view says that great or aspiring powers cannot forfeit the opportunity to
acquire nuclear weapons because of structural imperatives, especially in the
context of enduring rivalries, such as that between India and Pakistan. States
that do not have the capacity to procure nuclear weapons might join a security
alliance instead, primarily with the United States. Nuclear weapons, then, are
privileged in this realist scheme as an obvious, necessary and ultimate source of
national security.
The determinism of technology: The proliferation literature is often divided
between a focus on supply and a focus on demand. Stephen Meyer framed this
as technology-driven weapons acquisition (the supply) vs. politically motivated
weapons acquisition (the demand). Meyer called this the technological
imperative, arguing that because the technology is available, the
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Department of Politics, University of York, Autumn term 2020-21
Background briefing for lecture 4: Why do some states want (and keep)
nuclear weapons?
It has long been predicted that many states would acquire nuclear weapons. This
lecture will introduce you to different ways of understanding why states want,
and keep, nuclear weapons.
Realism, the security dilemma, and nuclear weapons acquisition: Scott
Sagan’s security explanation is rooted in the realist tradition. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons is explained through the neorealist argument that states facing
a major military threat (especially a nuclear threat) from another state in an
anarchic inter-state system will seek a nuclear capability to try and protect itself
from that threat on the basis that no other weapon or policy will improve their
security situation as much as nuclear weapons. Only nuclear weapons can
balance nuclear weapons in a realist balance of material (military) power. This is
a structural theory of nuclear weapons: the structure of international anarchy
compels states in particular conditions of insecurity to acquire nuclear weapons.
It connects with Ken Waltz’s theorising of structural realism (or neorealism as it
came to be called) and his theorising of nuclear deterrence.
Further explanation comes from the concept of the security dilemma, which
argues that one state’s accumulation of military power for security purposes
induces insecurity in other states, not least those with whom it has adversarial
relations. If a state constantly arms itself against potential enemies, other states
will face strong incentives to arm themselves in response, generating further
insecurity. The ‘dilemma’ in the ‘security dilemma’ is twofold: first, a dilemma of
how to interpret the acquisition of military power by a potential enemy and,
second, a dilemma of how to respond to it when the costs of getting it wrong are
potentially the survival of your state. Realism embodies a fatalist logic that it is
impossible to distinguish between a state’s offensive and defensive acquisition of
military power, meaning states are compelled to assume the worst and respond
accordingly. This can generate an interactive process can lead to arms racing
and is known as the ‘spiral model’ of state interaction. US scholar John Hertz
(1950, p. 157) called it “the vicious circle of security and power accumulation”. If
you’re interested in this, read Wheeler and Booth’s excellent 2007 book on The
Security Dilemma for the best recent treatment.
This view says that great or aspiring powers cannot forfeit the opportunity to
acquire nuclear weapons because of structural imperatives, especially in the
context of enduring rivalries, such as that between India and Pakistan. States
that do not have the capacity to procure nuclear weapons might join a security
alliance instead, primarily with the United States. Nuclear weapons, then, are
privileged in this realist scheme as an obvious, necessary and ultimate source of
national security.
The determinism of technology: The proliferation literature is often divided
between a focus on supply and a focus on demand. Stephen Meyer framed this
as technology-driven weapons acquisition (the supply) vs. politically motivated
weapons acquisition (the demand). Meyer called this the technological
imperative, arguing that because the technology is available, the
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