Evidence Law
Essays Page
Hearsay 2
Identification evidence 7
Character evidence 13
Burden of proof 19
S78 25
Problem questions
Confessions (1) 31
Confessions (2) 36
Exam Paper 42
Marks and feedback provided – first-class answers
Only for reference purposes
1
, Has the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on hearsay evidence really abolished the common law
position?
The common law hearsay rule and its exceptions were aptly characterised by Morgan and
Maguire as "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by
cubists, futurists, and surrealists." The prevailing rule in common law was that hearsay was
inadmissible in court. The rule is intended to safeguard juries from hearing or seeing material
that may be false or misleading. As in R v Harry, the exceptions could bar corroborative
evidence while allowing doubtful evidence.
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (hereinafter CJA 2003) was passed to simplify and codify all the
rules and exceptions relating to hearsay and discard rigid rules. This essay will draw out
comparative analysis between common law position and that of CJA 2003 to examine
whether the common law position has been abolished.
For common law, hearsay is defined by Sir Rupert Cross as any assertions made other than
oral evidence in proceedings. It’s approved by R v Sharp and modified in Subramaniam v
Public Prosecutor that a piece of evidence is hearsay if it’s adduced for proving the truth of
the facts.
The definition of hearsay in s114 CJA 2003 has superseded the common-law definition, but
the two are in many respects similar. The emphasis at common law was on inadmissibility, as
hearsay could be admitted only where an exception to the rule applied. Under the CJA 2003
the rule is reformulated in more positive terms.
Spencer claimed that the new definition of hearsay is obviously an improvement on its
predecessor, to the extent that it reduces the amount of cogent evidence that falls within the
scope of it, and hence is excluded by the rule.
In Teper v R, the statement by an unidentified person asking why the defendant goes away
when his own place is burning was inadmissible as it implied that he caused the fire to defraud
the insurer. The courts in R v Singh and R v Nation assumed that the disputed evidence in R
2
Essays Page
Hearsay 2
Identification evidence 7
Character evidence 13
Burden of proof 19
S78 25
Problem questions
Confessions (1) 31
Confessions (2) 36
Exam Paper 42
Marks and feedback provided – first-class answers
Only for reference purposes
1
, Has the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on hearsay evidence really abolished the common law
position?
The common law hearsay rule and its exceptions were aptly characterised by Morgan and
Maguire as "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by
cubists, futurists, and surrealists." The prevailing rule in common law was that hearsay was
inadmissible in court. The rule is intended to safeguard juries from hearing or seeing material
that may be false or misleading. As in R v Harry, the exceptions could bar corroborative
evidence while allowing doubtful evidence.
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (hereinafter CJA 2003) was passed to simplify and codify all the
rules and exceptions relating to hearsay and discard rigid rules. This essay will draw out
comparative analysis between common law position and that of CJA 2003 to examine
whether the common law position has been abolished.
For common law, hearsay is defined by Sir Rupert Cross as any assertions made other than
oral evidence in proceedings. It’s approved by R v Sharp and modified in Subramaniam v
Public Prosecutor that a piece of evidence is hearsay if it’s adduced for proving the truth of
the facts.
The definition of hearsay in s114 CJA 2003 has superseded the common-law definition, but
the two are in many respects similar. The emphasis at common law was on inadmissibility, as
hearsay could be admitted only where an exception to the rule applied. Under the CJA 2003
the rule is reformulated in more positive terms.
Spencer claimed that the new definition of hearsay is obviously an improvement on its
predecessor, to the extent that it reduces the amount of cogent evidence that falls within the
scope of it, and hence is excluded by the rule.
In Teper v R, the statement by an unidentified person asking why the defendant goes away
when his own place is burning was inadmissible as it implied that he caused the fire to defraud
the insurer. The courts in R v Singh and R v Nation assumed that the disputed evidence in R
2