The Lisbon Treaty participatory democracy and the democratic deficit
- an effective-prospective-defective outlook -
The year 2009 was marked by significant events relating to the European Union (EU).
Elections for the European Parliament (EP) and the appointment of the new Commission
President – as important as they were – have not been as prominent as the ratifying
process of the Lisbon Treaty, its success and the subsequent and immediate
implementation of its provisions. (For more on the institutional and chronological outline
of the 2009 developments, see Dinan, 2010)
The Lisbon Treaty came at the end of a long and protracted process – starting in 2001
with the Laeken Declaration – characterized by disenchantment, tedious bargaining and
severe concessions. One of its objectives however, albeit as taken over from the defunct
Constitutional Treaty, has been to address the ‘democratic challenge facing Europe’
(European Council, 2001). The present essay seeks to examine a few changes in this
respect, notably issues pertaining to the participatory aspect of democracy. It will argue
that some of the provisions of the Treaty are truly conducive to democracy (effective),
others have the prospect of being as such (prospective) while some are quite futile for this
purpose (defective). First, however, it will develop a framework of analysis through
which the reader can make an informed choice of perspective on how democracy in the
European Union should be addressed – if at all. It will do so by acknowledging the
mainstream and academic debate on what is very often referred to as the ‘democratic
deficit’. This will be covered in Section 1, while Section 2 will develop the effective-
prospective-defective framework and examine the said provisions accordingly.
Section 1: The ‘Democratic Deficit’
The term democratic deficit was first coined by David Marquand, a former British MP,
who in his 1979 book Parliament for Europe argued against further integration that is not
accompanied by a proportional increase of accountability of the EU decision-makers
(Marquand, 1979:64). Another argument he posited was that majority voting in the
1
, Council of Ministers was disfavoring democratic accountability of the national executives
to their parliaments.
What is the democratic deficit of the EU? In order to understand this concept, one must
first appreciate that there are as many different shades of conceptualizing what
democracy presupposes and how this should relate to the EU as there are commentators.
This essay will examine a few prominent positions in the debate that in the past two
decades has become increasingly salient to academics and mainstream observers alike.
The democratic deficit theme truly came to the fore after the Maastricht Treaty failed to
be ratified in the first try. The general disconnection between the EU and the citizens of
its Member States became apparent when the former tried to impose on the latter what is
now considered to be one of the most innovating treaties in EU history. What followed
was a EU-wide public debate on how this problem can be addressed.
Joseph Weiler and his colleagues, writing in the mid 90s, are credited with sketching a
‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit (Weiler et al, 1995), which will serve as a
starting point for this discussion. Drawing on Simon Hix’s contributions to the standard
version (Follesdal and Hix, 2006), five major claims are briefly outlined in the following
lines. Firstly, as a result of European integration, the powers of the national parliaments
decrease in relation to those of the executive governments while the latter increase (see
also Raunio, 1999). Due to the secretive and increasingly majoritarian nature in which
decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers, growing EU competences and the EP as
less than a sufficient replacement to national parliaments, the latter become less and less
able to control and direct their governments in taking decisions in Brussels. Secondly, the
EP is weak and therefore does not come as an appropriate substitute for the national
parliaments. Although in some cases it acts as a co-legislator with the Council, in some
areas it is limited to an advisory status. In terms of control over the Commission, the EP
is restricted to ‘electing’ its President, giving a vote of confidence to the College and an
ability to censure the body of Commissioners as a whole. Thirdly, elections to the EP are
considered to be ‘second order national contests’ (in the words of Reif and Schmitt – Hix,
2006), void of European content, in which the electorate usually punishes the government
in office by sending the opposition to Brussels. This context comes against the rather
wishful predictions of Walter Hallstein, that direct elections ‘would give [EP] candidates
2
- an effective-prospective-defective outlook -
The year 2009 was marked by significant events relating to the European Union (EU).
Elections for the European Parliament (EP) and the appointment of the new Commission
President – as important as they were – have not been as prominent as the ratifying
process of the Lisbon Treaty, its success and the subsequent and immediate
implementation of its provisions. (For more on the institutional and chronological outline
of the 2009 developments, see Dinan, 2010)
The Lisbon Treaty came at the end of a long and protracted process – starting in 2001
with the Laeken Declaration – characterized by disenchantment, tedious bargaining and
severe concessions. One of its objectives however, albeit as taken over from the defunct
Constitutional Treaty, has been to address the ‘democratic challenge facing Europe’
(European Council, 2001). The present essay seeks to examine a few changes in this
respect, notably issues pertaining to the participatory aspect of democracy. It will argue
that some of the provisions of the Treaty are truly conducive to democracy (effective),
others have the prospect of being as such (prospective) while some are quite futile for this
purpose (defective). First, however, it will develop a framework of analysis through
which the reader can make an informed choice of perspective on how democracy in the
European Union should be addressed – if at all. It will do so by acknowledging the
mainstream and academic debate on what is very often referred to as the ‘democratic
deficit’. This will be covered in Section 1, while Section 2 will develop the effective-
prospective-defective framework and examine the said provisions accordingly.
Section 1: The ‘Democratic Deficit’
The term democratic deficit was first coined by David Marquand, a former British MP,
who in his 1979 book Parliament for Europe argued against further integration that is not
accompanied by a proportional increase of accountability of the EU decision-makers
(Marquand, 1979:64). Another argument he posited was that majority voting in the
1
, Council of Ministers was disfavoring democratic accountability of the national executives
to their parliaments.
What is the democratic deficit of the EU? In order to understand this concept, one must
first appreciate that there are as many different shades of conceptualizing what
democracy presupposes and how this should relate to the EU as there are commentators.
This essay will examine a few prominent positions in the debate that in the past two
decades has become increasingly salient to academics and mainstream observers alike.
The democratic deficit theme truly came to the fore after the Maastricht Treaty failed to
be ratified in the first try. The general disconnection between the EU and the citizens of
its Member States became apparent when the former tried to impose on the latter what is
now considered to be one of the most innovating treaties in EU history. What followed
was a EU-wide public debate on how this problem can be addressed.
Joseph Weiler and his colleagues, writing in the mid 90s, are credited with sketching a
‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit (Weiler et al, 1995), which will serve as a
starting point for this discussion. Drawing on Simon Hix’s contributions to the standard
version (Follesdal and Hix, 2006), five major claims are briefly outlined in the following
lines. Firstly, as a result of European integration, the powers of the national parliaments
decrease in relation to those of the executive governments while the latter increase (see
also Raunio, 1999). Due to the secretive and increasingly majoritarian nature in which
decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers, growing EU competences and the EP as
less than a sufficient replacement to national parliaments, the latter become less and less
able to control and direct their governments in taking decisions in Brussels. Secondly, the
EP is weak and therefore does not come as an appropriate substitute for the national
parliaments. Although in some cases it acts as a co-legislator with the Council, in some
areas it is limited to an advisory status. In terms of control over the Commission, the EP
is restricted to ‘electing’ its President, giving a vote of confidence to the College and an
ability to censure the body of Commissioners as a whole. Thirdly, elections to the EP are
considered to be ‘second order national contests’ (in the words of Reif and Schmitt – Hix,
2006), void of European content, in which the electorate usually punishes the government
in office by sending the opposition to Brussels. This context comes against the rather
wishful predictions of Walter Hallstein, that direct elections ‘would give [EP] candidates
2
