Statutory Interpretation
Parliament makes the legislation, but it is left to the courts to apply it. Bennion identified some
factors for the implications of a stature for the case which leads to uncertainty. He stated that
words may be left out, or broad, ambiguous terms might have been used.
Parliamentary intention is that once courts have interpreted a statute, it becomes part of case
law and subject to the same rules of precedent. The Interpretation Act 1978 acts as a guidance
which provides certain standard definitions of common provisions.
The literal rule gives all the words in a statute their ordinary and natural meaning. In R v City of
London Court Judge, Lord Esher stated ‘if the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity’. An example is Fisher v Bell where the
defendant had flick-knives in his shop window and was charged with offering these for sale but
the courts held that the term ‘offers for sale’ must be given its ordinary meaning.
The advantages of literal rule is it respects parliamentary sovereignty, leaving law-making to
those elected for the job, restricting the role of courts. However, the Law Commission in 1969
pointed out that the same word may mean different things to different people and that words
shift their meanings over time; draftsmen cannot predict every situation to which legislation must
be applied.
The golden rule, defined by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson, can only be used if the literal
rule gives an absurd result then the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning in the light of
the statute as a whole. In Adler v George, the defendant was charged with obstructing a
member of the armed forces ‘in the vicinity of’ which natural meaning meant ‘near to’, the court
held that ‘in the vicinity’ is to include being within the prohibited place. The advantages of the
golden rule is that it can prevent absurdity and injustice and help courts put into practice what
Parliament really means. However, The Law Commission noted that the rule provided no clear
meaning of an ‘absurd result’.
The mischief rule is defined in Heydon’s Case. It provides that judges should consider three
factors: what the law was before the statute was passed, what problem the statute was trying to
remedy and what remedy Parliament was trying to provide. In Smith v Hughes, a prostitute
tried to attract the attention of men by tapping on the window on the first floor. Although she was
not on the street, the Act was to enable people to walk the street without being solicited. An
advantage of the Mischief rule is that it helps avoid absurdity and injustice and promotes
flexibility. The disadvantage is that it does not reflect modern needs.
Recently, judges are influenced by the European approach to statutory interpretation. Lord
Denning establishes a more purposive approach to produce decisions put into practice the spirit
of the law. The House of Lords was totally against this approach but over time accepted that it
could be appropriate in some instances. In Pickstone v Freemans the House of Lords held that
it had to read words in inadequate domestic legislation to give effect to the European legislation.
Parliament makes the legislation, but it is left to the courts to apply it. Bennion identified some
factors for the implications of a stature for the case which leads to uncertainty. He stated that
words may be left out, or broad, ambiguous terms might have been used.
Parliamentary intention is that once courts have interpreted a statute, it becomes part of case
law and subject to the same rules of precedent. The Interpretation Act 1978 acts as a guidance
which provides certain standard definitions of common provisions.
The literal rule gives all the words in a statute their ordinary and natural meaning. In R v City of
London Court Judge, Lord Esher stated ‘if the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity’. An example is Fisher v Bell where the
defendant had flick-knives in his shop window and was charged with offering these for sale but
the courts held that the term ‘offers for sale’ must be given its ordinary meaning.
The advantages of literal rule is it respects parliamentary sovereignty, leaving law-making to
those elected for the job, restricting the role of courts. However, the Law Commission in 1969
pointed out that the same word may mean different things to different people and that words
shift their meanings over time; draftsmen cannot predict every situation to which legislation must
be applied.
The golden rule, defined by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson, can only be used if the literal
rule gives an absurd result then the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning in the light of
the statute as a whole. In Adler v George, the defendant was charged with obstructing a
member of the armed forces ‘in the vicinity of’ which natural meaning meant ‘near to’, the court
held that ‘in the vicinity’ is to include being within the prohibited place. The advantages of the
golden rule is that it can prevent absurdity and injustice and help courts put into practice what
Parliament really means. However, The Law Commission noted that the rule provided no clear
meaning of an ‘absurd result’.
The mischief rule is defined in Heydon’s Case. It provides that judges should consider three
factors: what the law was before the statute was passed, what problem the statute was trying to
remedy and what remedy Parliament was trying to provide. In Smith v Hughes, a prostitute
tried to attract the attention of men by tapping on the window on the first floor. Although she was
not on the street, the Act was to enable people to walk the street without being solicited. An
advantage of the Mischief rule is that it helps avoid absurdity and injustice and promotes
flexibility. The disadvantage is that it does not reflect modern needs.
Recently, judges are influenced by the European approach to statutory interpretation. Lord
Denning establishes a more purposive approach to produce decisions put into practice the spirit
of the law. The House of Lords was totally against this approach but over time accepted that it
could be appropriate in some instances. In Pickstone v Freemans the House of Lords held that
it had to read words in inadequate domestic legislation to give effect to the European legislation.
