Legalisation of Assisted Dying
The purpose of this essay is to provide a discussion on the legalisation of assisted dying. In
this essay, it is argued that assisted dying should be legalised and regulated. In this essay, the
current position on the law of assisted dying will be first addressed, then the justifications and
the objectives of the current law, in order to provide the justifications for the legalisation of
assisted dying.
Assisted dying refers to a non-specific term which includes both euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Euthanasia refers to ‘good death’ which involves the killing of a person for the
purpose of ending one’s suffering. In cases of euthanasia, it would fall under the offence of
murder as defined by Lord Coke as the intentional killing of an individual, this was illustrated
in the case of Cox. While assisted suicide is an offence under s2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961,
however it is required to note that suicide, which was an offence prior of the enactment of the
1961 Act is decriminalised under S1 of the 1961 Act.
The rationale of the criminalisation of assisted dying can be seen highlighted in most cases,
which is to assert the significance of the right and sanctity of all human life which is
stipulated under Article 2 of the ECHR. This was clearly highlighted in the case of Pretty
where it was stated that an individual State is under a duty to act as the protector of the lives
of its citizens, as stated by McLean the courts have clearly asserted ‘the significance of the
sanctity of all human life’, and conceded the right to self-autonomy which is afforded to
individuals under Article 8 of the ECHR. Hence, it is argued that there is a clear conflict
between Article 2 and 8, as in cases where the patient intends to die autonomously, it would
conflict with his or her right under Article 2. In this essay, it is first argued that the current
legal framework is discriminatory against those who are physically disabled. and the
justifications of legalisation of assisted dying is twofold:
1) Respect to the right to self-autonomy; and
2) The respect for human dignity.
In addressing the discriminatory nature of the current legal framework, two fundamental
issues must be noted. Firstly, patients who are terminally ill, have the autonomy to refuse
treatment, this is deemed as ‘passive euthanasia’ which was well illustrated in the case of Re
B where the autonomous request of the withdrawal of treatment which would result in her
death, was followed by the doctors. This means that in such cases, the autonomy of patients
can override the principle of sanctity to life. Secondly, suicide as provided under S1 of the
1961 Act, is not an offence unlike assisted suicide, this would essentially mean that those
who intend and are physically capable of doing so, are allowed to exercise their own
autonomy and choice to kill themselves. However, for those who are unable to physically do
so, would not be able to commit suicide without the assistance of others, and would be held
criminally liable. Hence it is argued that not only the current position of law is discriminatory
in nature and inconsistent, it is a clear violation of Article 14 of ECHR which provides for the
prohibition of discrimination. Thus, it is argued that the fundamental question is why should
the autonomy of disabled persons deemed to be less enforceable as compared to those who
are terminally ill or/ and those who are not disabled?
In addressing the rationale of respect for right to exercise self-autonomy, one argues that as
death constitutes part of the life of a human, a person should be entitled to exercise his or her
right to choose to die without pain. As Stuart states, “We have no control over how we arrive
in the world but at the end of life we should have control over how we leave it.”. This was
The purpose of this essay is to provide a discussion on the legalisation of assisted dying. In
this essay, it is argued that assisted dying should be legalised and regulated. In this essay, the
current position on the law of assisted dying will be first addressed, then the justifications and
the objectives of the current law, in order to provide the justifications for the legalisation of
assisted dying.
Assisted dying refers to a non-specific term which includes both euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Euthanasia refers to ‘good death’ which involves the killing of a person for the
purpose of ending one’s suffering. In cases of euthanasia, it would fall under the offence of
murder as defined by Lord Coke as the intentional killing of an individual, this was illustrated
in the case of Cox. While assisted suicide is an offence under s2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961,
however it is required to note that suicide, which was an offence prior of the enactment of the
1961 Act is decriminalised under S1 of the 1961 Act.
The rationale of the criminalisation of assisted dying can be seen highlighted in most cases,
which is to assert the significance of the right and sanctity of all human life which is
stipulated under Article 2 of the ECHR. This was clearly highlighted in the case of Pretty
where it was stated that an individual State is under a duty to act as the protector of the lives
of its citizens, as stated by McLean the courts have clearly asserted ‘the significance of the
sanctity of all human life’, and conceded the right to self-autonomy which is afforded to
individuals under Article 8 of the ECHR. Hence, it is argued that there is a clear conflict
between Article 2 and 8, as in cases where the patient intends to die autonomously, it would
conflict with his or her right under Article 2. In this essay, it is first argued that the current
legal framework is discriminatory against those who are physically disabled. and the
justifications of legalisation of assisted dying is twofold:
1) Respect to the right to self-autonomy; and
2) The respect for human dignity.
In addressing the discriminatory nature of the current legal framework, two fundamental
issues must be noted. Firstly, patients who are terminally ill, have the autonomy to refuse
treatment, this is deemed as ‘passive euthanasia’ which was well illustrated in the case of Re
B where the autonomous request of the withdrawal of treatment which would result in her
death, was followed by the doctors. This means that in such cases, the autonomy of patients
can override the principle of sanctity to life. Secondly, suicide as provided under S1 of the
1961 Act, is not an offence unlike assisted suicide, this would essentially mean that those
who intend and are physically capable of doing so, are allowed to exercise their own
autonomy and choice to kill themselves. However, for those who are unable to physically do
so, would not be able to commit suicide without the assistance of others, and would be held
criminally liable. Hence it is argued that not only the current position of law is discriminatory
in nature and inconsistent, it is a clear violation of Article 14 of ECHR which provides for the
prohibition of discrimination. Thus, it is argued that the fundamental question is why should
the autonomy of disabled persons deemed to be less enforceable as compared to those who
are terminally ill or/ and those who are not disabled?
In addressing the rationale of respect for right to exercise self-autonomy, one argues that as
death constitutes part of the life of a human, a person should be entitled to exercise his or her
right to choose to die without pain. As Stuart states, “We have no control over how we arrive
in the world but at the end of life we should have control over how we leave it.”. This was
