FSWBM-4075 Global Governance Summary Complete (IMP)

FSWMB-4075 – Global Governance
Week 1 – Introduction and basics
Interests, Power, Multilateralism – Martin (1992)
3 Institutions of Multilateralism (Ruggie):
1. Indivisibility: collective security arrangements wherein an attack on one is considered an
attack on all.
2. Nondiscrimination: all parties are treated similarly.
3. Diffuse reciprocity: states rely on longer-term assurances of balance in their relations (instead
of specific quid-pro-quo exchanges).


Prisoner’s Dilemma (Collaboration Problem)
State B cooperates State B defects
State A cooperates A3 – B3 A1 – B4
State A defects A4 – B1 A2 – B2
Collaboration contains strong incentives to defect because there are different payoffs. States do
cooperate because they need information about the behavior of others, and because of Shadow of the
Future. Multilateral organizations work better than the institutions of multilateralism, as indivisibility
and diffuse reciprocity create incentives to freeride. Solutions are a hegemony and self-enforcing
agreements.


Battle of the Sexes (Coordination Problem)
State B option A State B option B
State A option A A4 – B3 A1 – B2
State A option B A2 – B1 A3 – B4
Coordination is dependent on how other actors behave. Once an equilibrium has been established,
neither actor has an incentive to defect. Multilateral organizations will not have strong enforcement
powers, but states will create these organizations to lower transaction-costs. Negotiations focus on
creating new standards. How to induce cooperation:
- Threat
- Bribe
- Package Deal
- Pre-Emptive Action

,State Transformations in OECD Countries – Genschel & Zangl (2004)
3 dimensions of Authority:
1. Regulation: state can make collective binding decisions for domestic society.
2. Operational Power: state can implement, monitor, and enforce its decisions by its own
organizations means.
3. Legitimacy: state provides justifications for its regulatory and operational acts to ensure
voluntary compliance.


Post-Statist Perspective Statist Perspective
International Relations International institutions gain States continue to control the
debate; to which extent independent authority: authority of international
challenge international - Regulatory authority to institutions:
institutions the state’s international - Operative authority
political authority institutions remains state
- Output legitimacy to - Input legitimacy
international remains state
institutions
Comparative Political Private market actors gain States continue to control the
Economy debate; to which independent authority: private authority:
extent loses the state control - Operative authority to - Regulatory authority
to private market owners private market actors remains state
- Output legitimacy to - Input legitimacy
private market actors remains state


3 empirical findings:
1. Empirical agreement between post-statists and statists that non-state actors gain authority, but
in the end, states have the authority.
2. Theoretical inconsistencies within IR and CPE arguments, as they switch between different
types of authority.
3. States remain a unique site of authority as they remain to have all 3 types of authority, they
allow others to gain authority.


The role left for states is the state as manager, as they remain the basic unit of authority. The state
makes the rules, has higher legitimacy, and both international institutions and private market actors
are fundamentally incomplete. The spread of non-state authority doesn’t make the state redundant, but
it becomes one of its core functions.

,Technology: How the US, EU and China compete to set industry standards – Beattie (2019)
Trump’s trade war on China:
1. Punitive tariffs on 250 billion dollars of its exports
2. Citing national security imperatives to try to drive Chinese companies out of tech supply
chains
Despite the underpowered tech sector, the third trading power (EU) has ambitions to become a rule
marker, for example through the General Data Protection Regulation. The Chinese government has
created a domestic mass market, which they use to promote their standards and aggressively export its
technologies. The US rejects most proposals from China in the early states, while the EU has a subtler
strategy; they regulate the way technology is used, instead of going after the companies that make it.


Video: The Basics of International Relations
Montevideo Convention (1993): the state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications:
1. Permanent population
2. Defined territory
3. Government
4. Capacity to enter relations


4 types of sovereignty (Krasner):
1. Domestic: the ability of the state to control its domestic politics and affairs.
2. Interdependence: state can enter relations with others, but it can also manage cross-border
flows of goods and people.
3. International legal: whether a state is recognized as sovereign by others.
4. Westphalian: “negative” as states are free from external interference in its territory and laws.
Krasner’s organized hypocrisy: the international community talks a lot about sovereignty and self-
determination, but often violates these principles.


Anarchy is the result of state sovereignty. This leads to the 911-problem: for international authority,
there is no higher authority to ask for help. Therefore, mistrust of other states and uncertainty about
the intention of others rise. This leads to the Security Dilemma:
1. Dilemma of Interpretation
2. Dilemma of Response
This could lead to the Security Paradox; when states enhance their security, by for example
manufacturing more weapons, this reversely leads to a lower level of security, because other states
react negatively to this.

, Week 2 – What do states want and why?
The False Promise of International Institutions – Mearsheimer (1994)
After the Cold War, Western institutions were created to promote world peace, democracy, and
capitalism:
- Realism: institutions don’t affect stability, as they reflect the power distribution in the world,
based on self-interest.
- Institutionalism: institutions affect stability, as they can alter state preferences, and thus
change state behavior.


5 assumptions of Realism:
1. International system is anarchic.
2. States inherently possess some offensive military capability.
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states.
4. The most basic motive driving states is survival.
5. States will behave competitively.


Out of these assumptions, 3 patterns of behavior result:
1. States fear each other, partly because there is no central authority to turn to for help.
2. States aim to guarantee their own survival because states cannot depend on others for their
security.
3. States aim to maximize their relative power position over other states because the greater the
military advantage one state has over others, the more secure it is.


3 institutionalist theories about how institutions push states away from war and help foster stability:
1. Liberal Institutionalism
Economic and environmental cooperation reduced the likelihood of war. Institutions help
overcoming the Prisoner’s Dilemma because of 1) the increasing number of transactions, 2)
issue-linkage, 3) the increasing amount of information available that makes monitoring
possible, and 4) the reduction of transaction-costs.
However, this theory ignores the relative-gains concerns. It states that relative gains must be
considered, but when military offense is high, the costs of war is low, and institutions can do
little. But, when defensive offense is high, the cost of war is high, and relative gains are
subdued, which allows institutions to cause cooperation.
2. Collective Security
States behave according to the dictates of realism, but the threat of war can be greatly reduced
by 1) states rejecting the idea of using military force to change the status-quo, 2) dealing with