NOTES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS and
CITIZENSHIP
Excerpts from the January-June 2018 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ
Police
Power
… while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is
granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with
corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the
power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
governmental act. (The City of Bacolod v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289,
January 17, 2018)
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of building and
other structures such as billboards within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. (Evasco v.
Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
[Note: Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao
City Charter), enacted on June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative
power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of
billboards and similar structures. With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly granted the Davao
City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures
within its territorial jurisdiction. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)]
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful subject
such that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
[Note: First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures based on
prescribed standards as to its location, design, size, quality of materials, construction and maintenance to:
(a) safeguard the life and property of Davao City's inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and
orderly; (c) ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious aesthetic relationship of
these structures as against the general surroundings. Second, the ordinance employs the following
rules in implementing its policy, viz.: (a) Minimum distances must be observed in installing and constructing
outdoor billboards (i.e., 150 meters unobstructed line of sight, 10 meters away from the property lines
abutting the right-of-way); (b) Additional requirements shall be observed (i.e., billboards shall have a
maximum total height of 17 meters, the top and bottom lines of billboards shall follow a common base) in
locations designated as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of the Davao River, Mt.
Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island; (c) Sign permits must be secured from and
proper fees paid to the city government; and (d) Billboards without permits, without the required
marking signs, or otherwise violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing the owner 60
1
,days from receipt of notice to correct and address its violation. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172,
February 21, 2018)]
The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules
imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. It must be remembered that the local legislative authority has a wide discretion
to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. We accord high respect to the Sanggunian's
issuance because the local council is in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
Eminent Domain
Private Property
In the instant case, petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the possession of the road lot
being one of the co-owners of the same since it is registered under the name of petitioner's
parents. While respondents do not claim ownership of the subject lot, they argued that the
road lot is now public property because of Ordinance No. 88-04, series of 1988, constituting it
as "Don Juan St. Gat-Mendoza." As such, petitioner cannot evict respondents. It is undisputed
that the road lot is registered under the name of petitioner's parents. Even the respondents did
not dispute this fact. It is also undisputed that the municipal government has not undertaken
any expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property; neither did the petitioner
donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent any expropriation
proceedings and without any evidence that the petitioner donated or sold the subject property
to the municipal government, the same is still private property. (Gatchalian v. Flores, G.R.
No. 225176, January 19, 2018)
[Note: Since the local government of Parañaque has not purchased nor undertaken any
expropriation proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the
latter is still a private property and Ordinance No. 88-04 did not convert the same to public property.
(Gatchalian v. Flores, G.R. No. 225176, January 19, 2018)]
Taking
There is no question that at the time of taking of the subject property, it was classified as
agricultural land, based on the records of the Municipal Assessor's Office of Porac, Pampanga.
As observed by Mr. Murillo in his Commissioner's Report, the subject property consists of
sugar land and sand deposits. He further noted that while there were allegations that the
property was reclassified to industrial land, there was no sign of industrial development at
the time of
the ocular inspection except for the construction of the SCTEX project. (The Manila Banking
Corporation v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, G.R. No. 230144, January
22, 2018)
Public Use
"The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate,
not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to
2
,public purpose." There are two mandatory requirements before the government may exercise
such right, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation
be paid to the property owner. "Notably, in agrarian reform cases, the taking of private
property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one for public use." (Apo
Fruits Corporation v. The Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 217985-96, March
21, 2018)
Just Compensation
The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in
a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. Indeed,
the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but
also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its
value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for
the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been
completed. This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the
expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation in eminent domain. (Republic v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 227215, January 10,
2018)
The concept of just compensation has long been settled by the Court as the full and fair
equivalent of the property which must be paid to the owners of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. This is because, without prompt payment, "compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." (Yared v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
The Court recognizes that the owner's loss is not limited to his property alone but
includes its income-generating potential. The government, upon its taking of the landholding,
must properly compensate the landowner through its payment of the full valuation of the
property with imposition of legal interest. This is the only way to achieve a fair exchange for
the property and the potential income loss of the landowner. (Yared v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
… the determination of just compensation must be based on reliable and actual data.
(The Manila Banking Corporation v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, G.R. No. 230144, January 22, 2018, citing Republic of the Philippines v. C. C.
Unson Company, Inc., G.R. No. 215107, February 24, 2016)
3
, The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R.
No. 188243, January 24, 2018)
[Note: There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special Agrarian Court for determination of just
compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)]
[Note: Thus, while Section 17 (of Republic Act No. 6657) requires due consideration of the formula
prescribed by DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the
proper court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)]
Jurisprudence clearly provides for the landowner’s remedies when his property is taken
by the government for public use; he may recover his property if its return is still feasible or, if
it is not, he may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. In this case, the
return of the subject properties is no longer feasible as they had been used in the construction
of dams for the DPWH’s SWIM project, which was already completed. Thus, the Rebadullas’
relief was to recover just compensation. (Rebadulla v. Republic, G.R. No. 222159, January
31, 2018)
[Note: In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the recovery of just compensation through a
petition for mandamus with damages. (Rebadulla v. Republic, G.R. No. 222159, January 31, 2018)]
… until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the basic formulas contained in DAR
administrative orders partake of the nature of statutes; hence, courts have the positive legal
duty to consider, and not disregard, their use and application in the determination of just
compensation for agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 187423, February 28, 2018)
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which
cannot be vested in administrative agencies. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill
of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of
the decreed compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Herederos de Ciriaco
Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018)
[Note: Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would
be void. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdiction over the determination
of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the 15-day reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
XIII of the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained. The RTC-SAC cannot simply be reduced to an appellate
court which reviews administrative decisions of the DAR within a short period to appeal. (Land Bank
of
the Philippines v. Herederos de Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018)]
4
CITIZENSHIP
Excerpts from the January-June 2018 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ
Police
Power
… while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is
granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with
corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the
power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
governmental act. (The City of Bacolod v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190289,
January 17, 2018)
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of building and
other structures such as billboards within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. (Evasco v.
Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
[Note: Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao
City Charter), enacted on June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative
power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of
billboards and similar structures. With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly granted the Davao
City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures
within its territorial jurisdiction. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)]
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful subject
such that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
[Note: First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures based on
prescribed standards as to its location, design, size, quality of materials, construction and maintenance to:
(a) safeguard the life and property of Davao City's inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and
orderly; (c) ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious aesthetic relationship of
these structures as against the general surroundings. Second, the ordinance employs the following
rules in implementing its policy, viz.: (a) Minimum distances must be observed in installing and constructing
outdoor billboards (i.e., 150 meters unobstructed line of sight, 10 meters away from the property lines
abutting the right-of-way); (b) Additional requirements shall be observed (i.e., billboards shall have a
maximum total height of 17 meters, the top and bottom lines of billboards shall follow a common base) in
locations designated as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of the Davao River, Mt.
Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island; (c) Sign permits must be secured from and
proper fees paid to the city government; and (d) Billboards without permits, without the required
marking signs, or otherwise violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing the owner 60
1
,days from receipt of notice to correct and address its violation. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172,
February 21, 2018)]
The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules
imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. It must be remembered that the local legislative authority has a wide discretion
to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. We accord high respect to the Sanggunian's
issuance because the local council is in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
Eminent Domain
Private Property
In the instant case, petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the possession of the road lot
being one of the co-owners of the same since it is registered under the name of petitioner's
parents. While respondents do not claim ownership of the subject lot, they argued that the
road lot is now public property because of Ordinance No. 88-04, series of 1988, constituting it
as "Don Juan St. Gat-Mendoza." As such, petitioner cannot evict respondents. It is undisputed
that the road lot is registered under the name of petitioner's parents. Even the respondents did
not dispute this fact. It is also undisputed that the municipal government has not undertaken
any expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property; neither did the petitioner
donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent any expropriation
proceedings and without any evidence that the petitioner donated or sold the subject property
to the municipal government, the same is still private property. (Gatchalian v. Flores, G.R.
No. 225176, January 19, 2018)
[Note: Since the local government of Parañaque has not purchased nor undertaken any
expropriation proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the
latter is still a private property and Ordinance No. 88-04 did not convert the same to public property.
(Gatchalian v. Flores, G.R. No. 225176, January 19, 2018)]
Taking
There is no question that at the time of taking of the subject property, it was classified as
agricultural land, based on the records of the Municipal Assessor's Office of Porac, Pampanga.
As observed by Mr. Murillo in his Commissioner's Report, the subject property consists of
sugar land and sand deposits. He further noted that while there were allegations that the
property was reclassified to industrial land, there was no sign of industrial development at
the time of
the ocular inspection except for the construction of the SCTEX project. (The Manila Banking
Corporation v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, G.R. No. 230144, January
22, 2018)
Public Use
"The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate,
not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to
2
,public purpose." There are two mandatory requirements before the government may exercise
such right, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation
be paid to the property owner. "Notably, in agrarian reform cases, the taking of private
property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one for public use." (Apo
Fruits Corporation v. The Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 217985-96, March
21, 2018)
Just Compensation
The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in
a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. Indeed,
the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but
also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its
value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for
the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been
completed. This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the
expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation in eminent domain. (Republic v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 227215, January 10,
2018)
The concept of just compensation has long been settled by the Court as the full and fair
equivalent of the property which must be paid to the owners of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. This is because, without prompt payment, "compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." (Yared v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
The Court recognizes that the owner's loss is not limited to his property alone but
includes its income-generating potential. The government, upon its taking of the landholding,
must properly compensate the landowner through its payment of the full valuation of the
property with imposition of legal interest. This is the only way to achieve a fair exchange for
the property and the potential income loss of the landowner. (Yared v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
… the determination of just compensation must be based on reliable and actual data.
(The Manila Banking Corporation v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, G.R. No. 230144, January 22, 2018, citing Republic of the Philippines v. C. C.
Unson Company, Inc., G.R. No. 215107, February 24, 2016)
3
, The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R.
No. 188243, January 24, 2018)
[Note: There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special Agrarian Court for determination of just
compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)]
[Note: Thus, while Section 17 (of Republic Act No. 6657) requires due consideration of the formula
prescribed by DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the
proper court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)]
Jurisprudence clearly provides for the landowner’s remedies when his property is taken
by the government for public use; he may recover his property if its return is still feasible or, if
it is not, he may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. In this case, the
return of the subject properties is no longer feasible as they had been used in the construction
of dams for the DPWH’s SWIM project, which was already completed. Thus, the Rebadullas’
relief was to recover just compensation. (Rebadulla v. Republic, G.R. No. 222159, January
31, 2018)
[Note: In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the recovery of just compensation through a
petition for mandamus with damages. (Rebadulla v. Republic, G.R. No. 222159, January 31, 2018)]
… until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the basic formulas contained in DAR
administrative orders partake of the nature of statutes; hence, courts have the positive legal
duty to consider, and not disregard, their use and application in the determination of just
compensation for agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 187423, February 28, 2018)
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which
cannot be vested in administrative agencies. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill
of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of
the decreed compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Herederos de Ciriaco
Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018)
[Note: Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would
be void. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdiction over the determination
of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the 15-day reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
XIII of the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained. The RTC-SAC cannot simply be reduced to an appellate
court which reviews administrative decisions of the DAR within a short period to appeal. (Land Bank
of
the Philippines v. Herederos de Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018)]
4
