Hoofdstuk 1
Appearances
Op 25 april 1966 besloot de Amerikaanse overheid een groot opbouwproject te
starten in Oakland, en stad met een hoog werkloosheidspercentage en raciale
onrust. Het doel was om een nieuw programma te creëren waarbij geld gestoken
zou worden in publiek werk en loon voor de werkeloze en voornamelijk zwarte
bevolking.
Opvallend was dat dit niet door het ministerie (department) van Wonen en
Stadsontwikkeling, maar door het ministerie van Economie (EDA) werden
opgestart. Het hoofd hiervan was de enthousiaste Eugene Foley. Hij zou 23
miljoen dollar steken in het project, met een verwachte baanopbrengst van 3000
in verschillende sectoren (vliegveld, haven, industrie).
Hoe?
Ieder bedrijf dat in aanmerking wilde komen met de subsidie, moest een
werknemersplan opstellen. Ze mochten hiervoor enkel werkloze (liefst zwarte)
mensen voor aannemen. Iedere maand diende ze de stand van zaken aan de EDA
te tonen. Het is een pilot, dit was nog nooit eerder gedaan en zeker niet op deze
schaal.
Maar, zo zal later in het boek blijken, heeft dit niet gewerkt. Er is veel racisme, en
de werkloosheid zal hoog blijven. Ook in de kranten zal het project slecht belicht
worden. Wat is precies is gebeurd zal van begin tot einde is de volgende
hoofdstukken belicht worden.
Hoofdstuk 2
Background EDA
The Public Works and Economic Development Act combined features of all
these preceding programs. The act proposed to overcome the unemployment
and underemployment problems by providing ‘financial assistance’. The Act
gave the Area Development Administration a new name: Economic
Development Administration.
Eligibility criteria made it difficult for cities to qualify for EDA programs. To be
designated as a redevelopment area, a country of municipality would have to
have registered an unemployment rate of 6 percent for the most recent
calendar year. Furthermore, unemployment would have had to be at least (a)
50 percent above the national average for three of the preceding years, or (b)
75 percent above the national average for two of the preceding for years, or
(c) 100 percent above the national average for one of the last two years.
Although parts of cities might have qualified on the basis of distressing
unemployment statistics, eligibility had to be gained on the basis of city-wide
figures.
EDA did not have the resources to become involved in cities. Their budget is a
small one. A program like in Oakland one could take up 10 percent of the
agency’s budget. Spending that much would be politically disastrous.
They made the decisions to focus the EDA’s efforts on one city (Oakland).
There are several reasons: There was not enough staff to spread around to
numerous cities. Besides, they wanted one significant experiment. If the
experiment worked, they would have a tangible accomplishment, visible and
humanitarian, to their credit. Normally we would expect an ‘experiment’ to
include some specification, but the EDA’s sense of urgency did not permit this
kind of preparation.
Why Oakland?
1. Previous ARA contacts and experience in Oakland
1
, 2. Oakland’s potential for riot
3. Oakland’s unemployment statistics
4. Oakland’s political situation
Timeline
The beginning 1965-66
In dealing with the problems posed by poverty, unemployment and racial
tensions, Oakland’s elected officials have faced a number of obstacles. One is the
fragmentation of governmental authority: several actors were outside the control
of City Hall. Second: an imbalance between the political and administrative sides
of Oakland city government.
First impressions
The overall impression they gained was a bleak one: blacks in the Oakland ghetto
faced uncertain employment prospects and suffered from poverty and woefully
inadequate housing.
The Oakland task force:
Foley assigned to the project group of staff members, mostly young, who he felt
were both capable and committed to urban programs. The members of the
Oakland task force were inclined towards nonbureaucratic innovation.
Unfortunately Washington officials never caught the ‘EDA fever’.
Dunsmuir House meeting:
Some staff members proposed that the EDA efforts could be coordinated carefully
with those of all other federal agencies. But Foley (director of the program)
rejected, on the grounds that it would delay the project. He said that the EDA
should proceed as fast as it could and let coordination follow later.
The employment program:
There was no unanimity within the EDA organization on the necessity of tying
financial aid to job guarantees. The Employment Plan Review Board was an
integral part of the process Bradford envisioned. Participation of the poor was
important to Bradford and some of his colleagues in the EDA. Although Bradford
found enthusiasm in Oakland for his employment plan proposal, some EDA
officials in Washington were less happy about it. Many were convinced that the
whole process was too cumbersome and harsh to be put into effect.
Project decisions:
If the appropriation was not spent by June 30, the EDA would lose the money and
its future appropriations might be reduced.
The announcement:
After the successful projects had been selected, but before they had been
announced, port officials expressed their concern about part of the employment
plan procedure. Specifically, they had serious reservations about the
requirements that the employment plan provisions be included in leased and
sales of port property developed with EDA funds.
From the beginning, the success of the EDA program depended on agreement
among a diverse group of participants with differing organizational objectives.
On October 5 the Oakland program suffered a severe jolt when Foley announced
his resignation as head of the EDA. Foley said he quit because commerce was
cracking down on EDA. The White House had decided that EDA should not be
spending money in cities. Vietnam was eating everything up.
As 1966 came to an end, there was unmistakable stirrings of activity in Oakland.
2
Appearances
Op 25 april 1966 besloot de Amerikaanse overheid een groot opbouwproject te
starten in Oakland, en stad met een hoog werkloosheidspercentage en raciale
onrust. Het doel was om een nieuw programma te creëren waarbij geld gestoken
zou worden in publiek werk en loon voor de werkeloze en voornamelijk zwarte
bevolking.
Opvallend was dat dit niet door het ministerie (department) van Wonen en
Stadsontwikkeling, maar door het ministerie van Economie (EDA) werden
opgestart. Het hoofd hiervan was de enthousiaste Eugene Foley. Hij zou 23
miljoen dollar steken in het project, met een verwachte baanopbrengst van 3000
in verschillende sectoren (vliegveld, haven, industrie).
Hoe?
Ieder bedrijf dat in aanmerking wilde komen met de subsidie, moest een
werknemersplan opstellen. Ze mochten hiervoor enkel werkloze (liefst zwarte)
mensen voor aannemen. Iedere maand diende ze de stand van zaken aan de EDA
te tonen. Het is een pilot, dit was nog nooit eerder gedaan en zeker niet op deze
schaal.
Maar, zo zal later in het boek blijken, heeft dit niet gewerkt. Er is veel racisme, en
de werkloosheid zal hoog blijven. Ook in de kranten zal het project slecht belicht
worden. Wat is precies is gebeurd zal van begin tot einde is de volgende
hoofdstukken belicht worden.
Hoofdstuk 2
Background EDA
The Public Works and Economic Development Act combined features of all
these preceding programs. The act proposed to overcome the unemployment
and underemployment problems by providing ‘financial assistance’. The Act
gave the Area Development Administration a new name: Economic
Development Administration.
Eligibility criteria made it difficult for cities to qualify for EDA programs. To be
designated as a redevelopment area, a country of municipality would have to
have registered an unemployment rate of 6 percent for the most recent
calendar year. Furthermore, unemployment would have had to be at least (a)
50 percent above the national average for three of the preceding years, or (b)
75 percent above the national average for two of the preceding for years, or
(c) 100 percent above the national average for one of the last two years.
Although parts of cities might have qualified on the basis of distressing
unemployment statistics, eligibility had to be gained on the basis of city-wide
figures.
EDA did not have the resources to become involved in cities. Their budget is a
small one. A program like in Oakland one could take up 10 percent of the
agency’s budget. Spending that much would be politically disastrous.
They made the decisions to focus the EDA’s efforts on one city (Oakland).
There are several reasons: There was not enough staff to spread around to
numerous cities. Besides, they wanted one significant experiment. If the
experiment worked, they would have a tangible accomplishment, visible and
humanitarian, to their credit. Normally we would expect an ‘experiment’ to
include some specification, but the EDA’s sense of urgency did not permit this
kind of preparation.
Why Oakland?
1. Previous ARA contacts and experience in Oakland
1
, 2. Oakland’s potential for riot
3. Oakland’s unemployment statistics
4. Oakland’s political situation
Timeline
The beginning 1965-66
In dealing with the problems posed by poverty, unemployment and racial
tensions, Oakland’s elected officials have faced a number of obstacles. One is the
fragmentation of governmental authority: several actors were outside the control
of City Hall. Second: an imbalance between the political and administrative sides
of Oakland city government.
First impressions
The overall impression they gained was a bleak one: blacks in the Oakland ghetto
faced uncertain employment prospects and suffered from poverty and woefully
inadequate housing.
The Oakland task force:
Foley assigned to the project group of staff members, mostly young, who he felt
were both capable and committed to urban programs. The members of the
Oakland task force were inclined towards nonbureaucratic innovation.
Unfortunately Washington officials never caught the ‘EDA fever’.
Dunsmuir House meeting:
Some staff members proposed that the EDA efforts could be coordinated carefully
with those of all other federal agencies. But Foley (director of the program)
rejected, on the grounds that it would delay the project. He said that the EDA
should proceed as fast as it could and let coordination follow later.
The employment program:
There was no unanimity within the EDA organization on the necessity of tying
financial aid to job guarantees. The Employment Plan Review Board was an
integral part of the process Bradford envisioned. Participation of the poor was
important to Bradford and some of his colleagues in the EDA. Although Bradford
found enthusiasm in Oakland for his employment plan proposal, some EDA
officials in Washington were less happy about it. Many were convinced that the
whole process was too cumbersome and harsh to be put into effect.
Project decisions:
If the appropriation was not spent by June 30, the EDA would lose the money and
its future appropriations might be reduced.
The announcement:
After the successful projects had been selected, but before they had been
announced, port officials expressed their concern about part of the employment
plan procedure. Specifically, they had serious reservations about the
requirements that the employment plan provisions be included in leased and
sales of port property developed with EDA funds.
From the beginning, the success of the EDA program depended on agreement
among a diverse group of participants with differing organizational objectives.
On October 5 the Oakland program suffered a severe jolt when Foley announced
his resignation as head of the EDA. Foley said he quit because commerce was
cracking down on EDA. The White House had decided that EDA should not be
spending money in cities. Vietnam was eating everything up.
As 1966 came to an end, there was unmistakable stirrings of activity in Oakland.
2
