Explain how the court does assess magnitude of risk to measure the standard of care in
negligence.
There are few factors that allow the court to assess the magnitude of risk to determine the
standard of care in negligence.
The first consideration is the likelihood of the damage occurring. This suggests that if a
danger is extremely pronounced, a reasonable person will take action to avoid the risk from
occurring. In the case of Bolton v Stone, for example. The defendant was struck by a cricket
ball outside her home. The cricket ground, on the other hand, is enclosed by a 7-foot fence.
The cricket pitch was 10 feet below ground; hence the fence was 17 feet above the pitch.
Furthermore, the striker was roughly 78 yards from the fence and little under 100 yards from
where the claimant was standing. Besides, A witness who lived on the same street as the
claimant but close to the pitch stated that he had seen balls hit his home or come into the yard
five or six times in the last 30 years. Two Club members with over 30 years of experience
agreed that the hit was unlike anything else seen on that ground. As a result, it was
determined that there was no breach of duty. This is due to the little possibility of injury and
the defendant's acceptance of all practical precaution in the circumstances. In addition, the
cricket pitch had been there for almost 90 years with no injuries. The case of Miller v Jackson
is another that can be reviewed. This case likewise concerned wayward cricket balls causing
damage; however, the cricket balls departed the ground numerous times a season, increasing
the likelihood of harm. Although the damage was similar in both circumstances, carelessness
was only discovered in this case because the possibility of injury was higher, as was the
applicable standard of care. This also demonstrates the predictability principle. For example,
in the case of Bolton v Stone, the injury was not particularly predictable because the cricket
ball rarely left the ground. However, the foreseeability happened in the case of Miller v
Jackson.
The severity of the injury comes next. This suggests that it is not important whether the
harmful event occurs, but rather the severity of the harm that occurs when the harmful events
occur. In the case of Paris v Stepney Borough Council, for example. The claimant worked as
a mechanic for the defendants. He was also blind in one eye. A metal fragment flew off a
truck he was working on and entered his good eye, rendering the claimant entirely blind. It
was not common practice at the time to provide eyewear to mechanics. The courts, however,