BOOK REVIEWS 541
Audi's book contains exemplary discussions of standard views about compat-
ibilism, self-deception, incontinence and even justified belief (since he uses analogies
with the latter in his treatment of rational action). The difficulties I have posed
are not distinctive to his book and cannot be fixed by tinkering; we need a new
framework which does not take the received views as adequate starting points for
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/46/185/541/1477676 by KIM Hohenheim user on 20 April 2022
philosophical work on action.
St Olqf College and University of Helsinki FREDERICK STOUTLAND
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. BY R. JAY WALLACE. (Harvard UP, 1994. Pp. ix
+ 275. Price not given.)
In this sophisticated and tightly argued book, Jay Wallace sets out to explicate more
fully the concept and conditions of moral responsibility, with an eye towards ex-
plaining why responsibility does not require the sort of strong freedom that is
incompatible with determinism. Starting with an interesting development of
Strawson's thesis that moral responsibility is best understood by reference to certain
moral sentiments, he argues that this account reinforces the Kantian idea that moral
agency is a capacity for rational reflection and direction; he then offers a sustained
analysis of why concerns regarding agency are quite separate from concerns about
the sort of freedom at odds with determinism. The clarity and care with which the
central argumentative thread is pursued and the admirable mastery of relevant
literature make this book an excellent contribution to the topic.
The book is impressive both in the respect it accords the classic debate over
freedom and responsibility and in the methodological approach it takes to that
debate. Wallace registers his suspicion of compatibilist solutions that assign signi-
ficant normative weight to 'precious modal distinctions' (p. 202), as well as his
dissatisfaction with solutions that imply that incompatibilism rests on some obvious
error, rather than on something that is deeply and persistently, if wrongly, seductive
to everyday folk and professional philosophers alike. He also takes issue with certain
approaches which many, on both sides of the divide, have taken to the debate,
eschewing, for example, what he calls 'metaphysical interpretations', which construe
questions about moral responsibility as questions about facts that are 'conceptually
independent from our practice of holding people responsible' (p. 87). In contrast,
Wallace argues that the debate is essentially normative - indeed, essentially moral:
questions about what it takes to be morally responsible are questions about when it
is fair to hold someone morally responsible. By analysing the patterns displayed in
our judgements of moral responsibility, as well as exploring our considered ethical
feelings about various principles of desert and reasonability, Wallace builds a
systematic case that people can fairly be held morally responsible even if determin-
ism were true.
The first half of the book is devoted to an analysis of moral responsibility.
Wallace organizes the discussion as a development and refinement of Strawson's
famous thesis that our treating people as morally responsible is importantly tied to
our propensities to respond to them with certain moral reactive attitudes. Wallace
© T h e Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 1996
Audi's book contains exemplary discussions of standard views about compat-
ibilism, self-deception, incontinence and even justified belief (since he uses analogies
with the latter in his treatment of rational action). The difficulties I have posed
are not distinctive to his book and cannot be fixed by tinkering; we need a new
framework which does not take the received views as adequate starting points for
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/46/185/541/1477676 by KIM Hohenheim user on 20 April 2022
philosophical work on action.
St Olqf College and University of Helsinki FREDERICK STOUTLAND
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. BY R. JAY WALLACE. (Harvard UP, 1994. Pp. ix
+ 275. Price not given.)
In this sophisticated and tightly argued book, Jay Wallace sets out to explicate more
fully the concept and conditions of moral responsibility, with an eye towards ex-
plaining why responsibility does not require the sort of strong freedom that is
incompatible with determinism. Starting with an interesting development of
Strawson's thesis that moral responsibility is best understood by reference to certain
moral sentiments, he argues that this account reinforces the Kantian idea that moral
agency is a capacity for rational reflection and direction; he then offers a sustained
analysis of why concerns regarding agency are quite separate from concerns about
the sort of freedom at odds with determinism. The clarity and care with which the
central argumentative thread is pursued and the admirable mastery of relevant
literature make this book an excellent contribution to the topic.
The book is impressive both in the respect it accords the classic debate over
freedom and responsibility and in the methodological approach it takes to that
debate. Wallace registers his suspicion of compatibilist solutions that assign signi-
ficant normative weight to 'precious modal distinctions' (p. 202), as well as his
dissatisfaction with solutions that imply that incompatibilism rests on some obvious
error, rather than on something that is deeply and persistently, if wrongly, seductive
to everyday folk and professional philosophers alike. He also takes issue with certain
approaches which many, on both sides of the divide, have taken to the debate,
eschewing, for example, what he calls 'metaphysical interpretations', which construe
questions about moral responsibility as questions about facts that are 'conceptually
independent from our practice of holding people responsible' (p. 87). In contrast,
Wallace argues that the debate is essentially normative - indeed, essentially moral:
questions about what it takes to be morally responsible are questions about when it
is fair to hold someone morally responsible. By analysing the patterns displayed in
our judgements of moral responsibility, as well as exploring our considered ethical
feelings about various principles of desert and reasonability, Wallace builds a
systematic case that people can fairly be held morally responsible even if determin-
ism were true.
The first half of the book is devoted to an analysis of moral responsibility.
Wallace organizes the discussion as a development and refinement of Strawson's
famous thesis that our treating people as morally responsible is importantly tied to
our propensities to respond to them with certain moral reactive attitudes. Wallace
© T h e Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 1996
