1104021 – PO382 Vigilant State
Does the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario help or hinder our efforts to debate the vexed
issue of torture as a form of intelligence collection?
“To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
- Mark Twain
Introduction
This essay examines the usefulness of the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (henceforth TBS) in
determining whether torture should be used for intelligence purposes. I draw on epistemological
and strategic analyses, as well as recent intelligence history, to argue that using the TBS to debate
torture is not only futile, but actively counterproductive, and of little relevance to the moral,
consequential or legal debates on torture. Part One situates torture within the liberal discourse and
introduces the TBS in an intelligence collection context. I then consider the TBS’ deontological
value, and the various consequentialist and epistemological inconsistencies underpinning it. In Part
Two, I argue that even if the TBS were plausible, the strategic implications of institutionalisation
fatally undermine the argument for torture as an analytical tool, much less a policy instrument.1
1
Throughout, I assume the TBS is applied by a liberal regime subject to democratic checks and balances, and pursuant
of at least a basic framework of human rights and justice.
1
Does the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario help or hinder our efforts to debate the vexed
issue of torture as a form of intelligence collection?
“To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
- Mark Twain
Introduction
This essay examines the usefulness of the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (henceforth TBS) in
determining whether torture should be used for intelligence purposes. I draw on epistemological
and strategic analyses, as well as recent intelligence history, to argue that using the TBS to debate
torture is not only futile, but actively counterproductive, and of little relevance to the moral,
consequential or legal debates on torture. Part One situates torture within the liberal discourse and
introduces the TBS in an intelligence collection context. I then consider the TBS’ deontological
value, and the various consequentialist and epistemological inconsistencies underpinning it. In Part
Two, I argue that even if the TBS were plausible, the strategic implications of institutionalisation
fatally undermine the argument for torture as an analytical tool, much less a policy instrument.1
1
Throughout, I assume the TBS is applied by a liberal regime subject to democratic checks and balances, and pursuant
of at least a basic framework of human rights and justice.
1
