PH338 Universal Values and Human Rights
This is the question of the content and form (as opposed to “scope”) of obligations to
foreigners.
How should we conceive these obligations and give them meaning?
Can we compare values across borders and if not, how can we fulfil obligations to
non-compatriots? Should human rights be minimal or comprehensive?
Do human rights cover non-universal issues like religious freedom, democracy,
secular education and absence of gross inequality.
Empirically, most states have formally accepted the existence of human rights. Do
these commitments extend to practical matters?
“All Human Beings are born Free and Equal”
Is this really true? It seems complicated to argue from a philosophical standpoint and also
gives rise to issues of universality. Political debates are often framed within moral
absolutism - the notion that some practices and the cultures that practice them are
unequivocally bad (FGM, women’s rights etc.). But this presupposes the existence of a
universal standard.
How can we justify universalism?
Dworkin see relativism as self-refuting; cultural relativists necessarily lay claim to
universal truths, thus becoming universalists themselves.
Caney dismisses attempts to attack universalism, concluding that “relativism is
self-defeating”. Admits that it could be possible that human rights exist universally,
but their content does not. Universalism is at least plausible due to the existence of
human commonalities. The question remains of where the threshold should be,
what humans have in common, and the implications for global justice.
Miller: A Basic Minimum
Miller takes ‘basic rights’ from Shue. These give rise to claims on others, backed by
social guarantees that provide the institutions necessary to enforce them (as opposed to
a formal declaration of rights). These basic rights would be “urgent enough to trigger
remedial responsibilities in outsiders” and require immediate action to enforce. Miller’s
rights:
“Can specify a global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of
justice, and that therefore may impose obligations, on rich nations especially”
They should be based on principles that everyone has a reason to accept - i.e.,
non-paternalistic.
Miller’s grounding for such rights presents 3 options - he advocates the third:
Empirical: The existing practice of human rights indicates the minimum. This only
This is the question of the content and form (as opposed to “scope”) of obligations to
foreigners.
How should we conceive these obligations and give them meaning?
Can we compare values across borders and if not, how can we fulfil obligations to
non-compatriots? Should human rights be minimal or comprehensive?
Do human rights cover non-universal issues like religious freedom, democracy,
secular education and absence of gross inequality.
Empirically, most states have formally accepted the existence of human rights. Do
these commitments extend to practical matters?
“All Human Beings are born Free and Equal”
Is this really true? It seems complicated to argue from a philosophical standpoint and also
gives rise to issues of universality. Political debates are often framed within moral
absolutism - the notion that some practices and the cultures that practice them are
unequivocally bad (FGM, women’s rights etc.). But this presupposes the existence of a
universal standard.
How can we justify universalism?
Dworkin see relativism as self-refuting; cultural relativists necessarily lay claim to
universal truths, thus becoming universalists themselves.
Caney dismisses attempts to attack universalism, concluding that “relativism is
self-defeating”. Admits that it could be possible that human rights exist universally,
but their content does not. Universalism is at least plausible due to the existence of
human commonalities. The question remains of where the threshold should be,
what humans have in common, and the implications for global justice.
Miller: A Basic Minimum
Miller takes ‘basic rights’ from Shue. These give rise to claims on others, backed by
social guarantees that provide the institutions necessary to enforce them (as opposed to
a formal declaration of rights). These basic rights would be “urgent enough to trigger
remedial responsibilities in outsiders” and require immediate action to enforce. Miller’s
rights:
“Can specify a global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of
justice, and that therefore may impose obligations, on rich nations especially”
They should be based on principles that everyone has a reason to accept - i.e.,
non-paternalistic.
Miller’s grounding for such rights presents 3 options - he advocates the third:
Empirical: The existing practice of human rights indicates the minimum. This only
