Commonwealth of Australia
Copyright Act 1968
WARNING
This material has been reproduced and communicated to you by or on behalf of
Western Sydney University in accordance with Section 113P, Copyright Act 1968 (the Act).
The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act.
Any further reproduction or communication of this material by you
may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act.
Do not remove this notice.
, Chapter 17
The Second World War and the
Japanese Occupation, 1942-5
The three and a half years of Japanese occupation constitute one of the most
crucial episodes of Indonesian history. Before the Japanese invasion, no
serious challenge to the Dutch existed. By the time the Japanese surrendered,
there had been so many extraordinary changes that the Indonesian Revolu-
tion was possible. The Japanese contributed directly to these developments.
Especially in Java and to a le~ser extent in Sumatra, they indoctrinated, ...
i
trained and armed many of the younger generation and gave older leaders
opportunities to forge links with the masses. Throughout the archipelago
they politicised Indonesians down to village level both by intention and by
subjecting Indonesia to the most oppressive and devastating colonial regime
in its history. The villages were thus rudely shaken out of the lethargy and
political isolation of the later Dutch period. In the end, the most helpful thing
the Japanese did was to lose the war, for had they succeeded in their inten-
tions for a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' there would have been
little prospect of real Indonesian independence.
Indonesia was divided into three regions by the Japanese. Sumatra
was placed under the 25th Army, while Java and Madura were under the
16th Army; both of these were under the 7th Area Army with its headquar-
ters in Singapore. Kalimantan and East Indonesia were controlled by the
navy. Policies differed among these regions. In general, Java was perceived
as the most politically advanced and least economically important area,
its main resource being people. Japanese policies there stimulated nation-
alism much more than in the other two regions and the greater political
sophistication of Java over other areas was thereby enhanced. Sumatra was
important for its strategic resources and only when Japan was on the brink
of defeat were nationalist ideas encouraged there. The area under naval
control was regarded as politically primitive and economically essential to
Japan; it was governed in the most repressive manner of all.
Mopping up Dutch and Allied troops and taking over the adminis-
tration required many months. Dutch military forces collapsed and only a
very few bodies of troops held out in some isolated regions. Most Indon-
esians gave them no support. In some areas they attacked Dutch troops and
civilians, whose only means of salvation became surrender to the Japan-
ese. The Japanese intended to intern all Europeans (except nationals of
Japan's allies, most notably Germans, and neutrals), but in some cases
235
-
Copyright Act 1968
WARNING
This material has been reproduced and communicated to you by or on behalf of
Western Sydney University in accordance with Section 113P, Copyright Act 1968 (the Act).
The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act.
Any further reproduction or communication of this material by you
may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act.
Do not remove this notice.
, Chapter 17
The Second World War and the
Japanese Occupation, 1942-5
The three and a half years of Japanese occupation constitute one of the most
crucial episodes of Indonesian history. Before the Japanese invasion, no
serious challenge to the Dutch existed. By the time the Japanese surrendered,
there had been so many extraordinary changes that the Indonesian Revolu-
tion was possible. The Japanese contributed directly to these developments.
Especially in Java and to a le~ser extent in Sumatra, they indoctrinated, ...
i
trained and armed many of the younger generation and gave older leaders
opportunities to forge links with the masses. Throughout the archipelago
they politicised Indonesians down to village level both by intention and by
subjecting Indonesia to the most oppressive and devastating colonial regime
in its history. The villages were thus rudely shaken out of the lethargy and
political isolation of the later Dutch period. In the end, the most helpful thing
the Japanese did was to lose the war, for had they succeeded in their inten-
tions for a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' there would have been
little prospect of real Indonesian independence.
Indonesia was divided into three regions by the Japanese. Sumatra
was placed under the 25th Army, while Java and Madura were under the
16th Army; both of these were under the 7th Area Army with its headquar-
ters in Singapore. Kalimantan and East Indonesia were controlled by the
navy. Policies differed among these regions. In general, Java was perceived
as the most politically advanced and least economically important area,
its main resource being people. Japanese policies there stimulated nation-
alism much more than in the other two regions and the greater political
sophistication of Java over other areas was thereby enhanced. Sumatra was
important for its strategic resources and only when Japan was on the brink
of defeat were nationalist ideas encouraged there. The area under naval
control was regarded as politically primitive and economically essential to
Japan; it was governed in the most repressive manner of all.
Mopping up Dutch and Allied troops and taking over the adminis-
tration required many months. Dutch military forces collapsed and only a
very few bodies of troops held out in some isolated regions. Most Indon-
esians gave them no support. In some areas they attacked Dutch troops and
civilians, whose only means of salvation became surrender to the Japan-
ese. The Japanese intended to intern all Europeans (except nationals of
Japan's allies, most notably Germans, and neutrals), but in some cases
235
-
