Will neuroscientists one day tell us what consciousness really is?
In this essay I am going to argue that neuroscientists will only ever be able to give us a limited
account of what consciousness is and will therefore never be able to say what it really is. The
word ‘really’ implies a complete account of consciousness which does not leave open any
explanatory gaps. I will argue that even the most ideal - in the sense of most advanced and
most complete - neuroscientific theory of consciousness will leave open at least some
explanatory gap.
My argument takes the following shape:
1. Neuroscientists are only able to tell us things in the language of science.
2. A complete account of consciousness resists the language of science.
3. Therefore, neuroscientists will never be able to give us a complete account of
consciousness.
Before defending the premises of this argument, I should clarify what I mean by a ‘complete’
vs. an ‘incomplete’ or ‘limited’ account of consciousness. Consciousness has various aspects,
some of which are amenable to scientific study and do not resist the language of science.
These aspects are the physical processes which take place in the brain and which are
associated with our notion of ‘consciousness.’
David Chalmers distinguishes between the ‘easy problem’ and the ‘hard problem’ of
consciousness. He draws this distinction to shed light on the two different aspects of
consciousness which are different in nature. The first aspect falls under the label of ‘ the easy-
problem’. These are the characteristics of consciousness I described in the previous
paragraph. Chalmers gives the following examples of easy problems: “How can a human
subject discriminate sensory stimuli and react to them appropriately? How does the brain
integrate information from many different sources and use this information to control
behaviour? How is it that subjects can verbalize their internal states? Although all these
questions are associated with consciousness, they all concern the objective mechanisms of
the cognitive system.”1 The key word here is the word ‘associated’. These problems do not
really concern consciousness itself, but are merely associated with it – what they really
concern is the brain as a physical organ which can be studied with the tools of neuroscience.
This brings out the significance of Chalmers’ phrasing: The easy problem is easy relative to
the hard problem precisely because it can be solved with the tools of neuroscience. One day,
neuroscientists may be able to tell us how exactly the brain operates and what exactly the
processes are which we associate with consciousness. This is what I mean by a ‘limited’ or
‘incomplete’ account of consciousness.
It is limited because there is another aspect to consciousness – the aspect Chalmers calls ‘the
hard problem of consciousness’. Other possible phrasings of this aspect are “phenomenal
consciousness” or “the phenomenology of consciousness.” Chalmers characterises the hard
problem of consciousness in the following way: “The hard problem […] is the question of how
physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. This puzzle involves the
inner aspect of thought and perception: the way things feel for the subject. When we see, for
1
Chalmers puzzle
In this essay I am going to argue that neuroscientists will only ever be able to give us a limited
account of what consciousness is and will therefore never be able to say what it really is. The
word ‘really’ implies a complete account of consciousness which does not leave open any
explanatory gaps. I will argue that even the most ideal - in the sense of most advanced and
most complete - neuroscientific theory of consciousness will leave open at least some
explanatory gap.
My argument takes the following shape:
1. Neuroscientists are only able to tell us things in the language of science.
2. A complete account of consciousness resists the language of science.
3. Therefore, neuroscientists will never be able to give us a complete account of
consciousness.
Before defending the premises of this argument, I should clarify what I mean by a ‘complete’
vs. an ‘incomplete’ or ‘limited’ account of consciousness. Consciousness has various aspects,
some of which are amenable to scientific study and do not resist the language of science.
These aspects are the physical processes which take place in the brain and which are
associated with our notion of ‘consciousness.’
David Chalmers distinguishes between the ‘easy problem’ and the ‘hard problem’ of
consciousness. He draws this distinction to shed light on the two different aspects of
consciousness which are different in nature. The first aspect falls under the label of ‘ the easy-
problem’. These are the characteristics of consciousness I described in the previous
paragraph. Chalmers gives the following examples of easy problems: “How can a human
subject discriminate sensory stimuli and react to them appropriately? How does the brain
integrate information from many different sources and use this information to control
behaviour? How is it that subjects can verbalize their internal states? Although all these
questions are associated with consciousness, they all concern the objective mechanisms of
the cognitive system.”1 The key word here is the word ‘associated’. These problems do not
really concern consciousness itself, but are merely associated with it – what they really
concern is the brain as a physical organ which can be studied with the tools of neuroscience.
This brings out the significance of Chalmers’ phrasing: The easy problem is easy relative to
the hard problem precisely because it can be solved with the tools of neuroscience. One day,
neuroscientists may be able to tell us how exactly the brain operates and what exactly the
processes are which we associate with consciousness. This is what I mean by a ‘limited’ or
‘incomplete’ account of consciousness.
It is limited because there is another aspect to consciousness – the aspect Chalmers calls ‘the
hard problem of consciousness’. Other possible phrasings of this aspect are “phenomenal
consciousness” or “the phenomenology of consciousness.” Chalmers characterises the hard
problem of consciousness in the following way: “The hard problem […] is the question of how
physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. This puzzle involves the
inner aspect of thought and perception: the way things feel for the subject. When we see, for
1
Chalmers puzzle
