In considering the question in hand, it is important from the outset to make a distinction
between the ambiguity of the international human rights norms themselves, and the
ambiguity of the obligations of these norms. The reason for this is, I believe, because it is
a mistake to assume that the rights themselves being vague is an issue. However, the
importance of human rights does require that the obligations of these norms should be
clear so that they can be applied equally and fairly.
I will begin by addressing the distinction alluded to above. I will then consider the
sources of international human rights norms, and address more closely whether the
obligations under them are clear, or whether they have been subject to “varying
interpretations”. Finally I will consider derogations from international human rights
norms, and consider briefly whether this can affect the clarity of the obligations imposed.
The distinction between norms and their obligations
The right to life is a long established natural law norm that ‘Every human being, even the
child in the womb, has the right to life directly from God and not from his parents, not
from any society or human authority.’1 However, to argue that this right in itself is an
obligation would create an unachievable burden on those that have to fulfil it. Rights are
arguably not an obligation but an ideal. They are something which we must strive to
achieve and ensure everybody has access to as great an extent as is possible. To say
that a doctor in a hospital has an obligation to his terminally ill patient to ensure life is
absurd. They cannot guarantee it, but they are under an obligation to do everything in
their power to prolong it. The achievement of these norms is therefore strived for by the
obligations they impose. The right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) is therefore recognised by Article 6, but the obligation is not to
ensure life itself but to make sure nobody ‘shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.2
In this sense therefore, international human rights norms are ideals which are to be
achieved. As a result of this they are vague, because to define them absolutely would be
1
Pope Pius XII ‘Address to Midwives on the Nature of Their Profession’ Papal Encyclical, October 29, 1951
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996, Article 6(1)
between the ambiguity of the international human rights norms themselves, and the
ambiguity of the obligations of these norms. The reason for this is, I believe, because it is
a mistake to assume that the rights themselves being vague is an issue. However, the
importance of human rights does require that the obligations of these norms should be
clear so that they can be applied equally and fairly.
I will begin by addressing the distinction alluded to above. I will then consider the
sources of international human rights norms, and address more closely whether the
obligations under them are clear, or whether they have been subject to “varying
interpretations”. Finally I will consider derogations from international human rights
norms, and consider briefly whether this can affect the clarity of the obligations imposed.
The distinction between norms and their obligations
The right to life is a long established natural law norm that ‘Every human being, even the
child in the womb, has the right to life directly from God and not from his parents, not
from any society or human authority.’1 However, to argue that this right in itself is an
obligation would create an unachievable burden on those that have to fulfil it. Rights are
arguably not an obligation but an ideal. They are something which we must strive to
achieve and ensure everybody has access to as great an extent as is possible. To say
that a doctor in a hospital has an obligation to his terminally ill patient to ensure life is
absurd. They cannot guarantee it, but they are under an obligation to do everything in
their power to prolong it. The achievement of these norms is therefore strived for by the
obligations they impose. The right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) is therefore recognised by Article 6, but the obligation is not to
ensure life itself but to make sure nobody ‘shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.2
In this sense therefore, international human rights norms are ideals which are to be
achieved. As a result of this they are vague, because to define them absolutely would be
1
Pope Pius XII ‘Address to Midwives on the Nature of Their Profession’ Papal Encyclical, October 29, 1951
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1996, Article 6(1)
