Genetic engineering and it's dangers
There are many risks involved in genetic engineering. The release of genetically altered
organisms in the environment can increase human suffering, decrease animal welfare, and
lead to ecological disasters. The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and
industrial plants contributes to the risk of accidental release, especially if the handling and
storage are inadequate. The purely political dangers include intensified economic inequality,
the possibility of large-scale eugenic programs, and totalitarian control over human lives.
How should the acceptability of these risks be determined? We argue that the assessment
should be left to those who can be harmed by the decisions in question. Economic risks are
acceptable, if they are condoned by the corporations and governments who take them. The
risks imposed on laboratory personnel by the containment of dangerous materials ought to
be evaluated by the laboratory personnel themselves. All other risks are more or less
universal, and should therefore be assessed as democratically as possible. If risk-taking is
based on the choices of those who can be harmed by the consequences, then, even if the
undesired outcome is realized, the risk is acceptable, because it is embedded in their own
system of ethical and epistemic values.
Dangers in Genetic engineering:
Risk can be defined as the possibility or probability of harm — that is, of a loss, an injury, an
unwanted outcome or an undesired result. The main risks involved in genetic engineering
are the following.
The release of genetically altered organisms in the environment can increase human
suffering (when medical measures are concerned), decrease animal welfare (in experiments
or through the use of recombinant DNA-techniques in breeding), and lead to ecological
disasters. The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and industrial plants
involves two layers of risk. The first is the possibility of an accidental release in and by itself.
Whether or not this will cause any further damage, the escape of an altered organism into
the environment is normally seen as an undesired event. The second layer of risk becomes
visible in the case of accidental release, and it is the increased probability with which this
can produce harm. These are matters which have traditionally been dealt with by systematic
risk assessment.
A risk that lies between the 'scientifically controllable' dangers of release and containment,
and the more indirect political hazards of biotechnology, is the probability of the inadequate
handling and irresponsible use of genetically altered material, prompted by the economic
self-interest of research groups and industrial corporations. The difference between this type
of risk and the more calculated hazard is the following. In the case of balanced decision-
making we can reasonably suspect only the intellectual capacities of those who assess the
possible outcomes. But in the cases of inadequate handling and irresponsible use we can
also rationally fear that other types of human weakness and immorality are involved.
The purely social and political dangers of genetic engineering include the possibility of
increased economic inequality accompanied by an increase in human suffering, and the
possibility of large-scale eugenic programmes and totalitarian control over human lives. The
risk in these cases is clearly moral rather than technical. If multinational corporations choose
There are many risks involved in genetic engineering. The release of genetically altered
organisms in the environment can increase human suffering, decrease animal welfare, and
lead to ecological disasters. The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and
industrial plants contributes to the risk of accidental release, especially if the handling and
storage are inadequate. The purely political dangers include intensified economic inequality,
the possibility of large-scale eugenic programs, and totalitarian control over human lives.
How should the acceptability of these risks be determined? We argue that the assessment
should be left to those who can be harmed by the decisions in question. Economic risks are
acceptable, if they are condoned by the corporations and governments who take them. The
risks imposed on laboratory personnel by the containment of dangerous materials ought to
be evaluated by the laboratory personnel themselves. All other risks are more or less
universal, and should therefore be assessed as democratically as possible. If risk-taking is
based on the choices of those who can be harmed by the consequences, then, even if the
undesired outcome is realized, the risk is acceptable, because it is embedded in their own
system of ethical and epistemic values.
Dangers in Genetic engineering:
Risk can be defined as the possibility or probability of harm — that is, of a loss, an injury, an
unwanted outcome or an undesired result. The main risks involved in genetic engineering
are the following.
The release of genetically altered organisms in the environment can increase human
suffering (when medical measures are concerned), decrease animal welfare (in experiments
or through the use of recombinant DNA-techniques in breeding), and lead to ecological
disasters. The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and industrial plants
involves two layers of risk. The first is the possibility of an accidental release in and by itself.
Whether or not this will cause any further damage, the escape of an altered organism into
the environment is normally seen as an undesired event. The second layer of risk becomes
visible in the case of accidental release, and it is the increased probability with which this
can produce harm. These are matters which have traditionally been dealt with by systematic
risk assessment.
A risk that lies between the 'scientifically controllable' dangers of release and containment,
and the more indirect political hazards of biotechnology, is the probability of the inadequate
handling and irresponsible use of genetically altered material, prompted by the economic
self-interest of research groups and industrial corporations. The difference between this type
of risk and the more calculated hazard is the following. In the case of balanced decision-
making we can reasonably suspect only the intellectual capacities of those who assess the
possible outcomes. But in the cases of inadequate handling and irresponsible use we can
also rationally fear that other types of human weakness and immorality are involved.
The purely social and political dangers of genetic engineering include the possibility of
increased economic inequality accompanied by an increase in human suffering, and the
possibility of large-scale eugenic programmes and totalitarian control over human lives. The
risk in these cases is clearly moral rather than technical. If multinational corporations choose
