PHILOSOPHY: Knowledge Essay week 1
Books to read
A J Ayer The Problem of Knowledge→ Chpt 1
E Gettier ‘is justified true belief knowledge?’ Analysis 1963- Michael; Huemer
Epistemology: Contemporary Readings 5 pages
R Nozick Philosophical Explanations chapter 3 sec 1,2, and pp280-8
A Goldman ‘what is justified belief? Alcoff’s epistemology: the big questions
pp89-109
A J Ayer- The Problem of Knowledge
Philosophy and knowledge:
i) The method of Philosophy
- Philosophical theories aren’t tested by observation- neutral with respect to
particular matters of fact.
- Philosophical questions like whether the material world is real or whether
objects continue to exist at times when they aren’t perceived are not backed
with scientific evidence →experiments
- Difference between analysis of the meaning of an expression and the use of
an expression→ knowledge
Knowledge→ the dictionary shows that the verb ‘to know’ is used with different
meanings→ we can speak of knowing as:
❖ in being familiar of a person/place, knowing
❖ Knowing something in sense of having experienced it → hunger/fear
❖ In being able to recognise/ distinguish → claiming to know an honest person
when you see one or know butter from margarine
You could be said to know shakespeare if you have read, remembered and quoted
his writings or know the subject of trigonometry if you have mastered it or know
how to drive having learnt and passed
, - Importantly are uses which the dictionary gives definition of ' ‘to be aware
or apprised of’ ‘to apprehend/ comprehend as fact or truth’ the sense or senses
in which knowledge is to know something or other is the case.
All of this = matter of lexicography- facts are known in a sense to anyone who
understands english language though not everyone who knows english language
would be competent to set them out.
Even if you can comprehend the dictionary meaning of knowledge - there still is
the question of what is knowledge?
- Someone may ask about whether the different cases in which we speak of
knowing have any one thing in common→ whether they are alike in implying
the presence of some special state of mind- he may maintain that there is- on
the subjective side- no difference between knowing and believing / that
knowing isa special sort of mental act.
- If he thinks that its correct to speak facts of knowing→ could ask into the
nature of their objects –. Are there any limitations to be set upon them? Or is
there anything unthinkable beyond the reach of human knowledge? Does
knowing make a difference to what is known? Is it necessary to distinguish
between the sort of things that can be known directly and those that can be only
known indirectly? And if so what are the relationships between them? Perhaps
its philosophically misleading to talk of knowing objects at all
- It could be possible that knowing some object comes down to knowing that
something is the case. → what is known in this sense may be true whereas
what is believed may be false.
- But it's also possible to believe what is in fact true without knowing it
- Is knowledge then to be distinguished by the fact that if one knows that
something is so, one cannot be mistaken? → if so does this mean that what
is known is necessarily true or in some other way indubitable? But if this is
so, it will lead into a conclusion that we commonly claim to know much more
than we actually do- perhaps even to the paradox that we do not know anything
at all- for it could be contended that there is no statement that is not in itself
susceptible to doubt.
- However there must be something wrong with an argument that would make
knowledge unattainable.
, ii) Common features of knowledge
- The things we call ‘games’ have in common= that they are games- however
it is not as straightforward as saying everything that shares the colour red
can be described to be red as their common feature.
- There is no such direct or simple resemblance between things we call games:
The Oxford Eng Dict says that games are: a diversion of the nature of s contest,
played according to a set of rules, and decided by superior skill, strength or good
fortune.
- WITTGENSTEIN → However not all games are diversions→ playing for fun -
games of patience aren't really contests, although they are deceived by skill
and luck, children’s games are not always played according to the rules,
and acting games don't need to be decided → WE CANNOT FIND ANYTHING
COMMON TO ALL GAMES - BUT ONLY A ‘COMPLICATED NETWORK OF
SIMILARITIES’ WHICH ‘OVERLAP AND CRISSCROSS’ IN SAME WAY AS
RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN PEOPLE BELONG TO THE SAME FAMILY → games
‘form a family’
- AYER’S CRITICISM→ believes that although its a good analogy→ wrong to
infer that games don’t have any one thing in common because by inferring
this wittgenstein takes the question whether things have something in
common to be different from the question whether there are resemblances
between them→ ‘surely the difference is only one of formulation’ (page 11,
chapter 1)
- If things resemble one another enough to find it useful to apply the same word to
them- we can say that they have something in common. Nor is it necessary
that what they have in common should be describable in different words
like with the case of ‘red’
- What wittgenstein’s argument brings is that the resemblance between the
things which the same word applies might be of different degrees.
- Or they share a common factor the possession of which is necessary to their
being instances of knowledge - even though it is not sufficient
- Knowledge→ if knowledge were always knowledge that something is the case -
then the common factor might be found in the existence of a common relation to
truth→ for while truth can be believed or disbelieved. doubted or imagined- a
fact of ordinary usage that what is known in this sense cannot but be true
Books to read
A J Ayer The Problem of Knowledge→ Chpt 1
E Gettier ‘is justified true belief knowledge?’ Analysis 1963- Michael; Huemer
Epistemology: Contemporary Readings 5 pages
R Nozick Philosophical Explanations chapter 3 sec 1,2, and pp280-8
A Goldman ‘what is justified belief? Alcoff’s epistemology: the big questions
pp89-109
A J Ayer- The Problem of Knowledge
Philosophy and knowledge:
i) The method of Philosophy
- Philosophical theories aren’t tested by observation- neutral with respect to
particular matters of fact.
- Philosophical questions like whether the material world is real or whether
objects continue to exist at times when they aren’t perceived are not backed
with scientific evidence →experiments
- Difference between analysis of the meaning of an expression and the use of
an expression→ knowledge
Knowledge→ the dictionary shows that the verb ‘to know’ is used with different
meanings→ we can speak of knowing as:
❖ in being familiar of a person/place, knowing
❖ Knowing something in sense of having experienced it → hunger/fear
❖ In being able to recognise/ distinguish → claiming to know an honest person
when you see one or know butter from margarine
You could be said to know shakespeare if you have read, remembered and quoted
his writings or know the subject of trigonometry if you have mastered it or know
how to drive having learnt and passed
, - Importantly are uses which the dictionary gives definition of ' ‘to be aware
or apprised of’ ‘to apprehend/ comprehend as fact or truth’ the sense or senses
in which knowledge is to know something or other is the case.
All of this = matter of lexicography- facts are known in a sense to anyone who
understands english language though not everyone who knows english language
would be competent to set them out.
Even if you can comprehend the dictionary meaning of knowledge - there still is
the question of what is knowledge?
- Someone may ask about whether the different cases in which we speak of
knowing have any one thing in common→ whether they are alike in implying
the presence of some special state of mind- he may maintain that there is- on
the subjective side- no difference between knowing and believing / that
knowing isa special sort of mental act.
- If he thinks that its correct to speak facts of knowing→ could ask into the
nature of their objects –. Are there any limitations to be set upon them? Or is
there anything unthinkable beyond the reach of human knowledge? Does
knowing make a difference to what is known? Is it necessary to distinguish
between the sort of things that can be known directly and those that can be only
known indirectly? And if so what are the relationships between them? Perhaps
its philosophically misleading to talk of knowing objects at all
- It could be possible that knowing some object comes down to knowing that
something is the case. → what is known in this sense may be true whereas
what is believed may be false.
- But it's also possible to believe what is in fact true without knowing it
- Is knowledge then to be distinguished by the fact that if one knows that
something is so, one cannot be mistaken? → if so does this mean that what
is known is necessarily true or in some other way indubitable? But if this is
so, it will lead into a conclusion that we commonly claim to know much more
than we actually do- perhaps even to the paradox that we do not know anything
at all- for it could be contended that there is no statement that is not in itself
susceptible to doubt.
- However there must be something wrong with an argument that would make
knowledge unattainable.
, ii) Common features of knowledge
- The things we call ‘games’ have in common= that they are games- however
it is not as straightforward as saying everything that shares the colour red
can be described to be red as their common feature.
- There is no such direct or simple resemblance between things we call games:
The Oxford Eng Dict says that games are: a diversion of the nature of s contest,
played according to a set of rules, and decided by superior skill, strength or good
fortune.
- WITTGENSTEIN → However not all games are diversions→ playing for fun -
games of patience aren't really contests, although they are deceived by skill
and luck, children’s games are not always played according to the rules,
and acting games don't need to be decided → WE CANNOT FIND ANYTHING
COMMON TO ALL GAMES - BUT ONLY A ‘COMPLICATED NETWORK OF
SIMILARITIES’ WHICH ‘OVERLAP AND CRISSCROSS’ IN SAME WAY AS
RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN PEOPLE BELONG TO THE SAME FAMILY → games
‘form a family’
- AYER’S CRITICISM→ believes that although its a good analogy→ wrong to
infer that games don’t have any one thing in common because by inferring
this wittgenstein takes the question whether things have something in
common to be different from the question whether there are resemblances
between them→ ‘surely the difference is only one of formulation’ (page 11,
chapter 1)
- If things resemble one another enough to find it useful to apply the same word to
them- we can say that they have something in common. Nor is it necessary
that what they have in common should be describable in different words
like with the case of ‘red’
- What wittgenstein’s argument brings is that the resemblance between the
things which the same word applies might be of different degrees.
- Or they share a common factor the possession of which is necessary to their
being instances of knowledge - even though it is not sufficient
- Knowledge→ if knowledge were always knowledge that something is the case -
then the common factor might be found in the existence of a common relation to
truth→ for while truth can be believed or disbelieved. doubted or imagined- a
fact of ordinary usage that what is known in this sense cannot but be true
