Summary An introduction to criminological theory

Part One The rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour The average citizen hardly needs to be persuaded of the view that crime will be more frequently committed if, other things being equal, crime becomes more profitable compared to other ways of spending one’s time. Accordingly, the average citizen thinks it obvious that one major reason why crime has gone up is that people have discovered it is easier to get away with it; by the same token, the average citizen thinks a good way to reduce crime is to make the consequences of crime to the would-be offender more costly (by making penalties swifter, more certain, or more severe), or to make the value of alternatives to crime more attractive (by increasing the availability and pay of legitimate jobs), or both ... These citizens may be surprised to learn that social scientists that study crime are deeply divided over the correctness of such views. (Wilson, 1975: 117) An Introduction to Criminological Theory 22 The first identifiable tradition of explaining crime and criminal behaviour to emerge in modern society is the rational actor model. It has its origins in a range of philosophical, political, economic and social ideas that were developed and articulated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which were fundamentally critical of the established order and its religious interpretations of the natural world. Two major sets of ideas provide the intellectual foundations of a major period of social change: social contract theories and utilitarianism. The essence of social contract theories is the notion that legitimate government is only possible with the voluntary agreement of free human beings who are able to exercise free will. It was the key writers in this tradition – Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and John-Jacques Rousseau – and their criticisms of the exercise of arbitrary powers by monarchs, established churches and aristocratic interests that created the preconditions for the specific attacks on pre-modern legal systems and practices which were later mounted by Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria and which provided the foundations of the rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1678) emphasised that it is the exercise of human free will that is the fundamental basis of a legitimate social contract. Compliance can be enforced by the fear of punishment, but only if entry into the contract and the promise to comply with it has been freely willed, given and subsequently broken. Hobbes held a rather negative view of humanity and proposed a need for social institutions – the origins of the very idea of modern criminal justice systems – to support social contracts and to enforce laws. He claimed that in a ‘state of nature’ – or without outside intervention in their lives – people would be engaged in a ‘war of all against all’ and life would tend to be ‘nasty, brutish and short’. He thus proposed that people should freely subject themselves to the power of an absolute ruler or institution – a ‘Leviathan’ – which, as the result of a political-social contract would be legitimately empowered to enforce the contracts that subjects make between themselves (Hobbes, 1968 originally 1651). John Locke (1632–1704) had a more complex conception of what people are like ‘in the state of nature’ and argued that there is a natural law that constitutes and protects essential rights of life, liberty and property: key assumptions that, subsequently, were to significantly shape the constitutional arrangements of the USA. Locke proposed that the Christian God has presented all people with common access to the ‘fruits of the earth’, but at the same time individual property rights can be legitimately created when labour is mixed with the fruits of the earth, for example by cultivating crops or extracting minerals. People nevertheless have a natural duty not to accumulate more land or goods than they can use and if this natural law is observed then a rough equality can be achieved in the distribution of natural resources. Unfortunately, this natural potential towards egalitarianism had been compromised by the development of a money economy that has made it possible for people to obtain control over more goods and land than they can use as individuals. Locke saw the transition from a state of nature to the development of a 23 Part One: The rational actor model political society as a response to desires, conflict and ethical uncertainty brought about by the growth of the use of money and the material inequalities that consequently arose. The expansion of political institutions is thus necessary to create a social contract to alleviate the problems of inequality generated by this distortion of natural law. For Locke, social contracts develop through three stages. First, people must agree unanimously to come together as a community, and to pool their natural powers, so as to act together to secure and uphold the natural rights of each other. Second, the members of this community must agree, by a majority vote, to set up legislative and other institutions. Third, the owners of property must agree, either personally or through political representatives, to whatever taxes that are imposed on them. Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ view that people should surrender themselves to the absolute rule of a Leviathan and argued that people gain their natural rights to life and liberty from the Christian God and hold them effectively in trust. These rights are not therefore theirs to transfer to the arbitrary power of another. Furthermore, he argued that government is established to protect rights to property and not to undermine them. It cannot therefore take or redistribute property without consent. It is not the task of human legislation to replace natural law and rights but to give them the precision, clarity and impartial enforceability that are unattainable in the state of nature. Although, Locke had a relatively optimistic view of human potential in the state of nature, he nevertheless observed the inevitable potential for conflict and corruption that occurs with the increasing complexity of human endeavour and the ‘invention’ of money. If natural rights are to be preserved, what is required is the consensual development of institutions to clarify, codify and maintain these rights to life, liberty and property. In short, these institutions should constrain all equally in the interests of social harmony (Locke, 1970 originally 1686). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was a severe critic of some of the major aspects of the emerging modern world arguing that the spread of scientific and literary activity was morally corrupting. He emphasised that human beings had evolved from an animal-like state of nature in which isolated, somewhat stupid individuals lived peacefully as ‘noble savages’. Rousseau (1964 originally 1762) originally claimed that humans were naturally free and equal, animated by the principles of self-preservation and pity. However, as humans came together into groups and societies, engaging in communal activities that gave rise to rules and regulations, the ‘natural man’ evolved into a competitive and selfish ‘social man’, capable of rational calculation and of intentionally inflicting harm on others. Rousseau thus had a pessimistic view of social change and was unconvinced that the human species was progressing. Civilisation was not a boon to humanity; it was ‘unnatural’ and would always be accompanied by costs that outweighed the benefits. With his later work, Rousseau (1978 originally 1775) appeared a little more optimistic about the future of humanity. He still asserted that at the beginning of history people were admirable, fundamentally equal, free individuals and that moral corruption and injustice arose as people came to develop more complex forms of society and become dependent on one another, thus risking An Introduction to Criminological Theory 24 exploitation and disappointment. He was however now prepared to propose political solutions to the moral corruption of society, arguing the necessity of establishing human laws that consider all individuals equally and give each a free vote on the enactment of legislation. Rousseau developed the concept of the general will, observing that in addition to individual self-interest, citizens have a collective interest in the well-being of the community. Indeed, he traced the foundations of the law and political society to this idea of the ‘general will’ – a citizen body, acting as a whole, and freely choosing to adopt laws that will apply equally to all citizens. Rousseau’s work presented a radical democratic challenge to the French monarchical ancien regime proposing that it was the ‘citizen body’ – not kings – that were ‘sovereign’ and government should represent their interests. It was only in this way that individuals could freely vote for, and obey, the law as an expression of the common good, without contradicting their own interests and needs. Rousseau considered that he had resolved the dilemma of human selfishness and collective interests posed by Hobbes. Moreover, he had done this without denying the potential existence of a positive and active form of civic freedom, based on self-sacrifice for a legitimate political community. Social contract theories provide an overwhelming critique of pre-modern forms of government and are highly relevant to the development of the rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour. First, there is the claim that human beings once lived in a state of ‘innocence’, ‘grace’ or ‘nature’. Second, there is the recognition that the emergence of humanity from its primitive state involved the application of reason – an appreciation of the meaning and consequences of actions – by responsible individuals. Third, the human ‘will’ is recognised as a psychological reality, a faculty of the individual that regulates and controls behaviour, and is generally free. Fourth, society has a ‘right’ to inflict punishment although this right has been transferred to the political state, and a system of punishments for forbidden acts, or a ‘code of criminal law’. Thus, human beings are viewed as ‘rational actors’, freely choosing to enter into contracts with others to perform interpersonal or civic duties. Laws can legitimately be used to ensure compliance if they have been properly approved by citizens who are party to the social contract. A further major intellectual contribution to the development of the rational actor model was the philosophical tradition termed utilitarianism. Essentially this assesses the rightness of acts, policies, decisions and choices by their tendency to promote the ‘happiness’ of those affected by them. The two most closely associated adherents and developers of the approach were the political philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) proposed that the actions of human beings are acceptable if they promote happiness, and they are unacceptable if they produce the opposite of happiness. This is the basis of morality. His most famous axiom is the call for society to produce ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. ‘Happiness’ is understood to be pleasure and unhappiness 25 Part One: The rational actor model is pain, or the absence of pleasure. The moral principle arising from this perspective is that if individuals use their reason to pursue their own pleasure then a state of positive social equilibrium will naturally emerge. For Bentham, pleasures and pains were to be assessed, or ‘weighed’, on the basis of their intensity, duration and proximity. Moreover, such a calculus was considered to be person-neutral – that is, capable of being applied to the different pleasures of different people. The extent of the pleasure – or the total number of people experiencing it – was also a part of the calculation of the rightness of the outcome of an act. The overall aim was to provide a calculation whereby the net balance of pleasure over pain could be determined as a measure of the rightness of an act or policy. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) generally accepted the position of Bentham including his emphasis on hedonism as the basic human trait that governs and motivates the actions of every individual. Mill nevertheless wanted to distinguish qualities – as well as quantities – of pleasures and this posed problems. For it is unclear whether a distinction between qualities of pleasures – whether one can be considered more worthwhile than another – can be sustained or measured. Mill emphasised, first, that pure self-interest was an inadequate basis for utilitarianism, and suggested that we should take as the real criterion of good, the social consequences of the act. Second, he proposed that some pleasures rank higher than others, with those of the intellect superior to those of the senses. Importantly, both social factors and the quality of the act were seen as important in seeking an explanation for human behaviour. Mill has proved to be a formidable and influential philosophical force but it is Bentham who has had the greatest impact on the development of the rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour. He essentially provided two central additions to social contract theory. First, there is his notion that the principal control over the unfettered exercise of free will is that of fear; especially the fear of pain. Second, there is the axiom that punishment is the main way of creating fear in order to influence the will and thus control behaviour. 27 2. Classical criminology