CIVIL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOPICS IN CIVIL LAW
Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOPIC: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE (1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2002)
I
What is the status of the following marriages and why?
A. A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent.
B. A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice.
C. A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid.
D. A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong Kong before a notary public.
E. A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction. (1999)
ANSWERS:
A. The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective. Being
below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. The
consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its validity.
B. Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice,
because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisite –i.e., the marriage
license—and does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the
civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the party responsible therefore.
C. By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38, par.
(1), FC], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in this case, Spain—
does not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said Code which accords
validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x x x and valid there as such.
D. It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong Kong law, the
marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong Kong will be
invalid in the Philippines.
E. Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage but said
law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such authority.
However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to solemnize a marriage, it
would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside of
his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemnize this particular
marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), FC].
Red Notes in Civil Law
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C. The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article which
marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage between first cousins
is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in Spain where it
was celebrated.
D. If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to solemnize
marriage, then the marriage is valid.
E. The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority 113
even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is
valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage will,
, San Beda
College of Law
CIVIL LAW
nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere
irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his
court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article
7 of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to
solemnize marriages only within the court’s jurisdiction.
OTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C. By reason of Article 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos
wherever they are, the marriage is void.
E. The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage outside his
jurisdiction.
II
On Valentine’s Day, 1996, Elias and Fely, both single and 25 years of age, went to the city
hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. For a fee, the fixer
produced an ante-dated marriage license for them, issued by the Civil Registrar of a small remote
municipality. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall, and
the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then.
A. Is their marriage valid, void, or voidable?
B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was
spurious? Explain. (1996)
ANSWERS:
A. The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not adversely
affect the validity of the marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in fact issued by a
Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4, FC).
B. No, the answer would not be the same. The marriage would be void because of the absence
of a formal requisite. In such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the
solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and both of
them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. They cannot claim good faith in believing that
the solemnizing officer was authorized because the scope of the authority of the solemnizing
officer is a matter of law. If, however, one of the parties believed in good faith that the other was
a member of the sect, then the marriage is valid under Article 35(2), FC. In that case, the party in
San Beda College of
good faith is acting under a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.
TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998,
2000)
I
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio
and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of Riceland, with the title being placed jointly in their names.
Law
Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her
name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda
to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot, claiming them to be conjugal property of the
first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were co-owners of the Riceland; and
with respect to the house and lot, she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to
prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case?
(1998)
ANSWER:
114
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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Carol’s action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are
conjugal property in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that
her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148,
Family Code, despite the fact that the husband’s death took place prior to the effectivity of said
law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in
view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under Art. 148 of the FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Moreover, if one of
the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the
Riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the Riceland nor the exclusive
owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricio’s. And since his share accrues to the
conjugal partnership with carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda
(Art. 144, Civil Code).
II
In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975, Bob
inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two-room
bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800,000 while the
house, when finished cost P600,000. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his
mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same proportion:
A. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but
exclusive property of her deceased son.
B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? (1998)
ANSWERS:
A. Since Bob and Issa got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code
(Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of
the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil
Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil Code). In this
instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having acquired the
same by lucrative title (Art. 148, par. 2, Civil Code). However, the house constructed from his own
savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property and not
exclusive property in accordance with the principle of “reverse accession” provided for in Art. 158,
Civil Code.
B. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way
back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or after August 3,
1988 (effectivity of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted.
As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs
Red Notes in Civil Law
them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
A. Sofia, being her deceased son’s legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985,
986, and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but belong
to the hereditary estate of Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the improvement
(Art. 120, FC).
B. If Bob died before August 3, 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the
answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be
deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing it. The
husband’s estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal 113
partnership funds.
, San Beda
College of Law
CIVIL LAW
III
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to
marry each other. Since Tony’s salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped
working and merely “kept the house”. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a
plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot?
B. Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously
married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2000)
ANSWERS:
A. Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under
Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their
cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts , work or industry and shall
be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted
merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
B. Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to
the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of
one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate
contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his
exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house and
lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
IV
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not employed, stays
at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200,000 presently deposited in a bank. A house and lot
worth P500,000 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the P500,000 used
San Beda College of
by the common-law spouses to purchase the property, P200,000 had come from the sale of palay
harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000 from the rentals of a building belonging
to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500,000 had been part of the fruits received during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P100,000 being used by the common-law
spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them
your legal advice on the following:
A. How, under the law, should the bank deposit of P200,000, the house and lot valued at
P500,000 and the car worth P100,000 be allocated to them?
B. What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
Law
together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? (1997)
ANSWERS:
A. Art. 147 of the FC provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules of co-ownership.
114
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOPICS IN CIVIL LAW
Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOPIC: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE (1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2002)
I
What is the status of the following marriages and why?
A. A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent.
B. A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice.
C. A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid.
D. A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong Kong before a notary public.
E. A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction. (1999)
ANSWERS:
A. The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective. Being
below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. The
consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its validity.
B. Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice,
because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisite –i.e., the marriage
license—and does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the
civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the party responsible therefore.
C. By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38, par.
(1), FC], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in this case, Spain—
does not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said Code which accords
validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x x x and valid there as such.
D. It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong Kong law, the
marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong Kong will be
invalid in the Philippines.
E. Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage but said
law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such authority.
However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to solemnize a marriage, it
would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside of
his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemnize this particular
marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), FC].
Red Notes in Civil Law
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C. The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article which
marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage between first cousins
is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in Spain where it
was celebrated.
D. If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to solemnize
marriage, then the marriage is valid.
E. The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority 113
even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is
valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage will,
, San Beda
College of Law
CIVIL LAW
nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere
irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his
court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article
7 of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to
solemnize marriages only within the court’s jurisdiction.
OTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C. By reason of Article 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos
wherever they are, the marriage is void.
E. The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage outside his
jurisdiction.
II
On Valentine’s Day, 1996, Elias and Fely, both single and 25 years of age, went to the city
hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. For a fee, the fixer
produced an ante-dated marriage license for them, issued by the Civil Registrar of a small remote
municipality. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall, and
the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then.
A. Is their marriage valid, void, or voidable?
B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was
spurious? Explain. (1996)
ANSWERS:
A. The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not adversely
affect the validity of the marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in fact issued by a
Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4, FC).
B. No, the answer would not be the same. The marriage would be void because of the absence
of a formal requisite. In such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the
solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and both of
them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. They cannot claim good faith in believing that
the solemnizing officer was authorized because the scope of the authority of the solemnizing
officer is a matter of law. If, however, one of the parties believed in good faith that the other was
a member of the sect, then the marriage is valid under Article 35(2), FC. In that case, the party in
San Beda College of
good faith is acting under a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.
TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998,
2000)
I
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio
and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of Riceland, with the title being placed jointly in their names.
Law
Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her
name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda
to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot, claiming them to be conjugal property of the
first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were co-owners of the Riceland; and
with respect to the house and lot, she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to
prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case?
(1998)
ANSWER:
114
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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Carol’s action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are
conjugal property in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that
her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148,
Family Code, despite the fact that the husband’s death took place prior to the effectivity of said
law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in
view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under Art. 148 of the FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Moreover, if one of
the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the
Riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the Riceland nor the exclusive
owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricio’s. And since his share accrues to the
conjugal partnership with carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda
(Art. 144, Civil Code).
II
In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975, Bob
inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two-room
bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800,000 while the
house, when finished cost P600,000. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his
mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same proportion:
A. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but
exclusive property of her deceased son.
B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? (1998)
ANSWERS:
A. Since Bob and Issa got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code
(Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of
the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil
Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil Code). In this
instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having acquired the
same by lucrative title (Art. 148, par. 2, Civil Code). However, the house constructed from his own
savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property and not
exclusive property in accordance with the principle of “reverse accession” provided for in Art. 158,
Civil Code.
B. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way
back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or after August 3,
1988 (effectivity of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted.
As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs
Red Notes in Civil Law
them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
A. Sofia, being her deceased son’s legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985,
986, and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but belong
to the hereditary estate of Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the improvement
(Art. 120, FC).
B. If Bob died before August 3, 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the
answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be
deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing it. The
husband’s estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal 113
partnership funds.
, San Beda
College of Law
CIVIL LAW
III
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to
marry each other. Since Tony’s salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped
working and merely “kept the house”. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a
plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot?
B. Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously
married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2000)
ANSWERS:
A. Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under
Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their
cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts , work or industry and shall
be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted
merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
B. Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to
the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of
one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate
contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his
exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house and
lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
IV
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not employed, stays
at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200,000 presently deposited in a bank. A house and lot
worth P500,000 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the P500,000 used
San Beda College of
by the common-law spouses to purchase the property, P200,000 had come from the sale of palay
harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000 from the rentals of a building belonging
to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500,000 had been part of the fruits received during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P100,000 being used by the common-law
spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them
your legal advice on the following:
A. How, under the law, should the bank deposit of P200,000, the house and lot valued at
P500,000 and the car worth P100,000 be allocated to them?
B. What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
Law
together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? (1997)
ANSWERS:
A. Art. 147 of the FC provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules of co-ownership.
114
