Summary Inviting the leviathan external forces war and state building in afghanistan

Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state-building in Afghanistan Jan Angstrom* Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm This article examines the role of intervening forces in state-building efforts after state-collapse and civil wars. Based upon a case study from the 30 years of war in Afghanistan, it develops an explanation for failure of state-building attempts drawing upon bargaining theory, macrosociological state-building theory, and strategic thought. The explanation suggests that international state- building attempts condition and shapes a new strategic environment for the local actors. In doing so, the mode of state-building can create incentives for continuing the war or, carried out differently, create incentives for the parties to contribute in building a legitimate state from the rubble of the old state. Keywords: state-building; Afghanistan; war; international intervention; bargaining theory; utility of force War has often been thought to be intimately linked with the formation of states and the system of states. Charles Tilly and others have long argued that the formation of states in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth century happened in interaction with war. 1 Due to the costs of war, it became necessary to establish a centralised and well-functioning administration for extracting taxes. This process was made possible, and later reinforced, by the centralisation of the means for coercion. Eventually, only the state had the capabilities to wage war and war thus forced the multi-plurality of actors in late medieval Europe to copy one another and create the system of states. Today, however, the links between war and the formation of states seems less than clear-cut. Protracted wars in Central Asia, West as well as Central Africa have not generated strong states thus far. 2 Instead, Western armed forces have increasingly been engaged in internationally orchestrated and supported state-building efforts in the former Third World since the end of the Cold War. There are numerous examples of this type of intervention in failed states and, among others, Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo spring to mind. However, the success rate of such enterprises has not been entirely convincing. It seems that many cases, in David Lake’s words, in time come to be ‘regarded not only as ISSN print/ISSN online q 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/ *Email: Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2008, 374–396Downloaded by [University of Western Ontario] at 03:32 03 January 2016 failed states, but as state-building failures’. 3 At the same time, in some cases where international forces have been involved, perhaps most notably Cambodia, a functioning state seems to have been reconstituted. How should this variation be explained? Why does international state-building work in some cases and not in others? To what extent can international forces contribute to creating a functioning state after state-collapse and civil war? And how should international forces operate to successfully build states in the aftermath of civil war? The underlying assumption behind many interventions in civil wars today is that the intervening forces can do good. By intervening, it is thought, peace and stability will ensue, democracy can be established, cleptocracy will end, and the overall welfare of the population will rise. Intervening forces can, the argument goes, provide security in order for the conflicting parties to demobilise and disarm without fear of renewed attacks. By supervising ceasefires, making sure that the combating parties stick to agreements and in some cases even by seizing political control over the situation, they can start to rebuild a functioning state. And intervening forces can facilitate local state-building initiatives by providing order, stability, and sustain the initially weak indigenous state, while it recuperates and starts to work. Central to the current state-building paradigm is that the intervening forces will supervise and to some extent guarantee a swift election process and democratisation. In turn democracy, it is claimed, creates institutions that can overcome distrust, grievances, and allow for political participation. 4 However, the underlying logic of this policy agenda has been criticised. While some criticise the entire endeavour of trying to export a particular form of social order – the state – to areas, which have no experience and perhaps no infrastructure to operate as states; most critics focus on how state-building is implemented in their explanations of failure of international state-building. According to Roland Paris, the failure can be explained by an over-reliance upon liberal theory on behalf of the international community. Democracy and the market-economy are inherently competitive and in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, Paris argues, it is by no means sure that competition is something the participants can handle without resorting to renewed armed conflict. 5 Paris suggests that one must first build a strong state – create a Hobbesian Leviathan, ‘a power to keep men in awe’ – before democratisation can start. 6 Alexander Downes has pointed out some problems with the notion of external forces serving as a Leviathan. Most importantly, the local parties are aware of the fact that the international forces will be heading home at one point or another, which means that the basic security problem for the actors remains. Incentives are not to hand in any weapons and demobilise, but rather to hide the weapons and prepare for renewed conflict. The invited Leviathan, in other words, is merely an interlude before the coming war. 7 Some also suggest that the poor track record of international state-building is due to a lack of, or poorly implemented integration of economic, political, diplomatic, and military efforts. 8 Furthermore, some, most notably Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, have suggested that democratisation can lead to both internal and international war. 9 Finally, the Small Wars & Insurgencies 375Downloaded by [University of Western Ontario] at 03:32 03 January 2016 stakes involved and the purpose of the war have been used to explain why some areas remain beset by protracted civil war. 10 Other criticism can also be levelled at the liberal state-building paradigm. It does not take into account the strategic nature of state-building efforts. In effect, this means that the interactive part of state-building and legitimacy has been underdeveloped. Moreover, what seems to form the foundation of the current state- building practice is conflict theory or conflict resolution theory. This is all very well, of course, but what is needed is a theory of the state and a theory of legitimacy. In an important addition to the debate, which takes this criticism into account, David Lake has developed an alternative form of state-building – one drawing upon a relational understanding of legitimacy. Lake argues that the problem with the current liberal state-building paradigm is that it draws upon a flawed conception of legitimacy. It pre-supposes that legitimacy stems from the creation of institutions, after they are inaugurated, they are entrusted with creating order. Drawing upon a single case study, Somalia, Lake argues that an international state-building paradigm based upon relational legitimacy, namely a bargaining process between ruler and ruled, has a better chance of success. The relational concept of legitimacy pre-supposes that legitimacy is conditioned by the creation of order. In effect, this puts the traditional framework of state-building on its head. It is order that creates legitimacy, not the other way around. 11 Lake’s theory, however, is in need of further empirical testing. Moreover, it could be argued that Lake’s model needs further development regarding the parties’ strategic considerations when explaining, for example, why the parties opt to pursue strategies that diminish the value of what they strive for. And why they choose strategies that effectively prevent the disclosure of information that – if shared – would enable them to strike a more preferable bargain? Put in empirical terms, many regions of the world have best been described as conflict zones since the end of Cold War. In Central Asia, Central as well as Western Africa, there has been near continuous violence the past decades. For example, there has been war in Afghanistan for 30 years. Provided that wars are costly and risky undertakings, it is surprising that the actors have not managed to strike a bargain that could provide a durable peace. Only in the Afghan case, estimates show that nearly 50% of the indigenous population has become casualties – killed, wounded, or homeless – over the past three decades of war. 12 Why do non-state actors go to war and continue to fight war? Why are they unable to reach a bargain in which the parties would be better off than continuing the war and turmoil? And why do warlords, rebel factions, and incumbent regimes opt for strategies that undermine the asset they are trying to gain? In the state-building context, this does not only imply that wars will continue, but also critically for this article, so will state failure, despite the best intentions from intervening...