This theory holds that mental states are nothing more than behavioural dispositions, for example, to
be in pain is the same as saying ‘ouch!’.
We may distinguish between two kinds of behaviourism:
Hard behaviourism claims that all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of
meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states.
The major strength of this approach is that it simplifies the world to the purely physical, so avoids all
problems about how to relate the physical and the mental. Moreover, this also doesn’t use any term
that we cannot properly define, which is in favour of it, as there is no need and value in talking using
words we cannot define.
However, we have an obvious objection against hard behaviourism, that we can have a mental state
but not display any behaviour.
That is why we find soft behaviourism, which claims that propositions about mental states are
propositions about behavioural ‘dispositions’, namely how something will or is likely to behave in
certain circumstances (e.g. a wine glass has the disposition of breaking when falling).
Ryle supports soft behaviourism through his argument against dualism:
if dualism were correct, mental concepts would be impossible to use.
That is because if dualism were true, and mental states such as pain only referred to a private and
non-physical mental state, how could we ever talk about them?
We cannot point to a mental state such as pain, we can only point at the behaviour.
Therefore, soft behaviourism seems to avoid this problem.
Moreover, to think that mental states are distinct from their associated behaviour is to make a category
mistake.
For example, suppose that an alien were to ask what the mental state of pain is. You can show the
alien people being tortured, children crying, etc. But then the alien asks: ‘but what is pain?’.
It looks like the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions
associated with pain. Therefore, it wouldn’t make sense to try to talk about mental states separately
from the associated disposition.
Therefore, soft behaviourism is the most viable approach.
However, behaviourism seems to rule out any asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of
other people’s mental states. Yet, there clearly is an asymmetry between the two. Therefore,
behaviourism fails.
In other words, when I feel pain there is no way I could be mistaken as to what I am feeling. But if I
see someone else scream, I might believe they’re in pain when they are just acting.
However, Ryle may respond that the apparent asymmetry is just an illusion as a result of having far
more evidence in the case of self-knowledge. We might argue that the asymmetry is just a matter of
degree of how detailed my knowledge of others is.
Nonetheless, there will always be a qualitative difference. Surely I will be unsure about the knowledge
of other’s mental states. Thus, we shall infer that behaviourism fails.
Therefore, it seems that the qualitative difference between self knowledge and knowledge about
others’ is insormuntable for behaviourism. Therefore, behaviourism fails to account for this difference.
A major issue to this theory is provided by Chalmers’ philosophical zombies (p-zombies) argument.
A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human,
but has no qualia (namely intrinsic, non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively
accessible; in other words, properties of the experience of objects - e.g. redness).
His argument goes as follows:
1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable
2. If p-zombies are conceivable, then p-zombies are metaphysically possible
3. If p-zombies are metaphysically possible, then qualia are non-physical
4. If qualia are non-physical, then property dualism is true
5. Therefore, property dualism is true
be in pain is the same as saying ‘ouch!’.
We may distinguish between two kinds of behaviourism:
Hard behaviourism claims that all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of
meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states.
The major strength of this approach is that it simplifies the world to the purely physical, so avoids all
problems about how to relate the physical and the mental. Moreover, this also doesn’t use any term
that we cannot properly define, which is in favour of it, as there is no need and value in talking using
words we cannot define.
However, we have an obvious objection against hard behaviourism, that we can have a mental state
but not display any behaviour.
That is why we find soft behaviourism, which claims that propositions about mental states are
propositions about behavioural ‘dispositions’, namely how something will or is likely to behave in
certain circumstances (e.g. a wine glass has the disposition of breaking when falling).
Ryle supports soft behaviourism through his argument against dualism:
if dualism were correct, mental concepts would be impossible to use.
That is because if dualism were true, and mental states such as pain only referred to a private and
non-physical mental state, how could we ever talk about them?
We cannot point to a mental state such as pain, we can only point at the behaviour.
Therefore, soft behaviourism seems to avoid this problem.
Moreover, to think that mental states are distinct from their associated behaviour is to make a category
mistake.
For example, suppose that an alien were to ask what the mental state of pain is. You can show the
alien people being tortured, children crying, etc. But then the alien asks: ‘but what is pain?’.
It looks like the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions
associated with pain. Therefore, it wouldn’t make sense to try to talk about mental states separately
from the associated disposition.
Therefore, soft behaviourism is the most viable approach.
However, behaviourism seems to rule out any asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of
other people’s mental states. Yet, there clearly is an asymmetry between the two. Therefore,
behaviourism fails.
In other words, when I feel pain there is no way I could be mistaken as to what I am feeling. But if I
see someone else scream, I might believe they’re in pain when they are just acting.
However, Ryle may respond that the apparent asymmetry is just an illusion as a result of having far
more evidence in the case of self-knowledge. We might argue that the asymmetry is just a matter of
degree of how detailed my knowledge of others is.
Nonetheless, there will always be a qualitative difference. Surely I will be unsure about the knowledge
of other’s mental states. Thus, we shall infer that behaviourism fails.
Therefore, it seems that the qualitative difference between self knowledge and knowledge about
others’ is insormuntable for behaviourism. Therefore, behaviourism fails to account for this difference.
A major issue to this theory is provided by Chalmers’ philosophical zombies (p-zombies) argument.
A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human,
but has no qualia (namely intrinsic, non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively
accessible; in other words, properties of the experience of objects - e.g. redness).
His argument goes as follows:
1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable
2. If p-zombies are conceivable, then p-zombies are metaphysically possible
3. If p-zombies are metaphysically possible, then qualia are non-physical
4. If qualia are non-physical, then property dualism is true
5. Therefore, property dualism is true
