Effective Emergency Planning Model in Disaster Management:
The Case of Hurricane Katrina (2005)
1
, Effective Emergency Planning Model in Disaster Management:
The Case of Hurricane Katrina (2005)
Introduction
Southern U.S. regions along the gulf coast saw one of the most severe natural disasters in August
2005, with winds reaching 120 mph and storms encircling populous areas. Urban areas experienced
flooding as a result of overflowing water. People stuck on balconies screamed out for aid. Despite
the fact that New Orleans was submerged to an extent of over 80%, military emergency personnel
did not reach the scene until five days after the catastrophe (Morris, Morris & Jones, 2007, p. 94).
Particularly after having previously gone through a terrible occurrence, the September 11 attacks,
the United States government received harsh criticism for their inept and inefficient emergency
response. Such unsuccessful reactions, it goes without saying, raise questions about the efficacy of
emergency response plans. In this respect, the research of Dynes (1994) on emergency planning is
interesting to delve into the response strategy or model applied during Hurricane Katrina. This
paper examines the response of Hurricane Katrina by applying the two emergency planning
models. The research question this paper attempts to answer, therefore is: How do the two emergency
models of Dynes (1994) explain the criticized response of Hurricane Katrina?
Emergency Planning Models
Dynes (1994) presents two emergency planning models: 1) dominant ‘military’ planning model and
2) community ‘problem-solving’ model. The military model consists of three interrelated elements:
chaos, command, and control (Triple C’s). Decision makers utilizing this model believe that
emergencies are caused by chaos, and that command & control is the only solution to eliminate
this chaos (p. 142). Having its roots in military analogies that perceive emergencies as ‘enemy
threats’, there is a strong belief in top-down organizational orientation, that only para-military
organizations have the capacity to perform effective responses, and a strong disbelief in the
involvement of individuals.
In this military model, an emergency period is triggered by chaos, when a period of
normalcy or pre-emergency period, is disrupted by irrational social behaviors such as panic (p. 144).
Such behaviors bring ‘significant disjuncture in social life’ which requires extraordinary measures.
These measures are brought by the triple C’s, beginning with command over chaos and controlling
the disjuncture to reestablish social life. Dynes argues that the military model is “inadequate based
on a knowledge of behavior in emergencies and the model is dysfunctional for planning” (1994, p.
141).
On the other hand, the problem-solving model may be recognized as a different model
but should not be understood as an entirely new set of concepts. Rather, it is developed from, but
directly opposed to the military model. In this bottom-up oriented model, emphasis is given to the
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The Case of Hurricane Katrina (2005)
1
, Effective Emergency Planning Model in Disaster Management:
The Case of Hurricane Katrina (2005)
Introduction
Southern U.S. regions along the gulf coast saw one of the most severe natural disasters in August
2005, with winds reaching 120 mph and storms encircling populous areas. Urban areas experienced
flooding as a result of overflowing water. People stuck on balconies screamed out for aid. Despite
the fact that New Orleans was submerged to an extent of over 80%, military emergency personnel
did not reach the scene until five days after the catastrophe (Morris, Morris & Jones, 2007, p. 94).
Particularly after having previously gone through a terrible occurrence, the September 11 attacks,
the United States government received harsh criticism for their inept and inefficient emergency
response. Such unsuccessful reactions, it goes without saying, raise questions about the efficacy of
emergency response plans. In this respect, the research of Dynes (1994) on emergency planning is
interesting to delve into the response strategy or model applied during Hurricane Katrina. This
paper examines the response of Hurricane Katrina by applying the two emergency planning
models. The research question this paper attempts to answer, therefore is: How do the two emergency
models of Dynes (1994) explain the criticized response of Hurricane Katrina?
Emergency Planning Models
Dynes (1994) presents two emergency planning models: 1) dominant ‘military’ planning model and
2) community ‘problem-solving’ model. The military model consists of three interrelated elements:
chaos, command, and control (Triple C’s). Decision makers utilizing this model believe that
emergencies are caused by chaos, and that command & control is the only solution to eliminate
this chaos (p. 142). Having its roots in military analogies that perceive emergencies as ‘enemy
threats’, there is a strong belief in top-down organizational orientation, that only para-military
organizations have the capacity to perform effective responses, and a strong disbelief in the
involvement of individuals.
In this military model, an emergency period is triggered by chaos, when a period of
normalcy or pre-emergency period, is disrupted by irrational social behaviors such as panic (p. 144).
Such behaviors bring ‘significant disjuncture in social life’ which requires extraordinary measures.
These measures are brought by the triple C’s, beginning with command over chaos and controlling
the disjuncture to reestablish social life. Dynes argues that the military model is “inadequate based
on a knowledge of behavior in emergencies and the model is dysfunctional for planning” (1994, p.
141).
On the other hand, the problem-solving model may be recognized as a different model
but should not be understood as an entirely new set of concepts. Rather, it is developed from, but
directly opposed to the military model. In this bottom-up oriented model, emphasis is given to the
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