Explain the economic achievements of the Nazis in Germany in the period 1939-45.
There are two distinct periods of the Nazi economy in the period of 1939 to 1945. The first is the
period of the economy during the Blitzkrieg of 1939 to 1941 and the second is the period of Total
War from 1942 until 1945.
While the German economy was being prepared for war in the mid-1940s, Hitler strengthened
Germany by taking over Austria and Czechoslovakia and gaining vital economic resources. From
Austria, Germany gained Hydro-electric power, iron ore, forestry and cattle and from Czechoslovakia
provided Skoda arm works. However, when Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 prompted
Britain and France to declare war, the small war Germany had anticipated turned into a major one
for which Germany was not prepared.
Hitler responded by ordering major economic mobilisation for war. He was determined to avoid the
problems faced in the First World War and to fight the war with an economy thoroughly prepared
for a major conflict. A series of war economy decrees were issued by Hitler in December 1939 which
outlined vast programmes for every possible aspect of war production. These plans suggested that
the Nazis went well beyond the demands of Blitzkrieg and a limited war. German military
expenditure doubled between 1939 and 1941. Food rationing in certain items was introduced from
the very start of the war and the German labour force was rapidly mobilised for war and by the
summer of 1941, 55 per cent of the workforce was involved in war related projects. However,
despite the intent of wholesale mobilisation the actual results in terms of armament remained
disappointingly low. Germany’s air-force had only increased from 8290 aircrafts in 1939 to 10,780 in
1941and the German’s armoured strength totalled only 3500 tanks. It appears that despite the Nazi
image of German order, the actual mobilisation of the German economy was marred by inefficiency
and poor-coordination. A host of different agencies all continued to function in their own way and
often in a fashion which put them at odds with each other. Although there was a Ministry of
Armaments, it existed alongside three other governmental ministries- Economics, Finance and
Labour. There were also a number of groups responsible for armaments: The Office of the Four Year
Plan, the SS bodies and the different branches of the armed forces. As a consequence, Germany’s
economic mobilisation for total war had not achieved the expected levels of armaments production.
Preparations for a new approach had begun in the autumn of 1941 however; it was the appointment
of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments in February 1942 that marked the real turning point.
Speer, who had previously been Hitler’s personal architect, used the authority of the Furher to cut
through the mass of interests and to implement his programme of ‘industrial self-responsibility’ in
order to provide mass production. Previous constraints and controls placed on businesses under
Nazi wishes were relaxed and a Central Planning Board was established in April 1942. This in turn
was supported by a number of committees, each one representing one vital sector of the economy.
Industrialist gained a considerable amount of freedom while Speer still maintained overall control of
the war economy. Industrialists and engineers were also encouraged by Speer to join his ministerial
team. He also, where possible, excluded military personnel from the production process. Speer
became a technocrat. He co-ordinated and rationalised the process of war production and
effectively exploited the potential of Germany’s resources and labour force. As a result of Speer’s
work, in his first 6 months in power ammunition production increased by 97 per cent, tank
There are two distinct periods of the Nazi economy in the period of 1939 to 1945. The first is the
period of the economy during the Blitzkrieg of 1939 to 1941 and the second is the period of Total
War from 1942 until 1945.
While the German economy was being prepared for war in the mid-1940s, Hitler strengthened
Germany by taking over Austria and Czechoslovakia and gaining vital economic resources. From
Austria, Germany gained Hydro-electric power, iron ore, forestry and cattle and from Czechoslovakia
provided Skoda arm works. However, when Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 prompted
Britain and France to declare war, the small war Germany had anticipated turned into a major one
for which Germany was not prepared.
Hitler responded by ordering major economic mobilisation for war. He was determined to avoid the
problems faced in the First World War and to fight the war with an economy thoroughly prepared
for a major conflict. A series of war economy decrees were issued by Hitler in December 1939 which
outlined vast programmes for every possible aspect of war production. These plans suggested that
the Nazis went well beyond the demands of Blitzkrieg and a limited war. German military
expenditure doubled between 1939 and 1941. Food rationing in certain items was introduced from
the very start of the war and the German labour force was rapidly mobilised for war and by the
summer of 1941, 55 per cent of the workforce was involved in war related projects. However,
despite the intent of wholesale mobilisation the actual results in terms of armament remained
disappointingly low. Germany’s air-force had only increased from 8290 aircrafts in 1939 to 10,780 in
1941and the German’s armoured strength totalled only 3500 tanks. It appears that despite the Nazi
image of German order, the actual mobilisation of the German economy was marred by inefficiency
and poor-coordination. A host of different agencies all continued to function in their own way and
often in a fashion which put them at odds with each other. Although there was a Ministry of
Armaments, it existed alongside three other governmental ministries- Economics, Finance and
Labour. There were also a number of groups responsible for armaments: The Office of the Four Year
Plan, the SS bodies and the different branches of the armed forces. As a consequence, Germany’s
economic mobilisation for total war had not achieved the expected levels of armaments production.
Preparations for a new approach had begun in the autumn of 1941 however; it was the appointment
of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments in February 1942 that marked the real turning point.
Speer, who had previously been Hitler’s personal architect, used the authority of the Furher to cut
through the mass of interests and to implement his programme of ‘industrial self-responsibility’ in
order to provide mass production. Previous constraints and controls placed on businesses under
Nazi wishes were relaxed and a Central Planning Board was established in April 1942. This in turn
was supported by a number of committees, each one representing one vital sector of the economy.
Industrialist gained a considerable amount of freedom while Speer still maintained overall control of
the war economy. Industrialists and engineers were also encouraged by Speer to join his ministerial
team. He also, where possible, excluded military personnel from the production process. Speer
became a technocrat. He co-ordinated and rationalised the process of war production and
effectively exploited the potential of Germany’s resources and labour force. As a result of Speer’s
work, in his first 6 months in power ammunition production increased by 97 per cent, tank
