The gift does not exist, all is egoism
Introduction
The argument that “[t]he gift does not exist, all is egoism”, as Professors Godbout and Caillé
opines reflects the spirit of the times, presupposes that that a transfer that is motivated by
egoism does not constitute a gift.1 Indeed, a dive into the annals of academic history will
reveal that the gift is commonly understood in terms of pure altruism. The view that “[g]ifts
are always gratuitous,” as pithily put by Charles Humphreys in his 1822 work entitled A
Compedium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky,2 is shared by many legislators,3 as
well as law and economics writers who almost exclusively operate on the assumption that the
sole motive of gift-giving is altruism. 4 However, this author questions whether the gift should
be conceptualized only in terms of a transfer motivated by pure altruism, because this view of
the gift does not accord well with our current social realities and gift-giving paradigm where
people often give things for different reasons5 and for more than one reason (there can be a
mix of both altruistic and egoistic reasons). In this regard, this author shall argue that the gift
should not be conceptualized as a transfer motivated by pure altruism, but rather as an
altruistic transfer (the difference between the two will be elaborated below). Further, this
author will argue that a transfer that is motivated by egoism may and should be considered as
a gift, provided that it is also motivated by altruism.
For the purposes of this essay, altruism shall refer to a “disinterested or selfless concern for
the well-being of others”6 or a “desire to benefit someone other than oneself for that person’s
sake”;7 and egoism shall refer to selfishness or the “desire to benefit oneself.”8
The conventional understanding of a gift
As mentioned above, the concept of a gift is commonly understood as a transfer motivated by
pure altruism. Based on this understanding, it follows that a transfer that is motivated by
egoism will not constitute a gift. In line with this understanding, Professor Rose offers a
helpful definition of the “quintessential gift,” which is “an unforced, one-sided transfer,
motivated by generosity and a spirit of selfless love without thought of reciprocity.”9
1
Godbout & Caillé, ‘The World of the Gift’ (Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen’s Press 1998) at 7.
2
at 215.
3
Hyland, ‘Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law’ (OUP 2009) at 135-136. In many common law jurisdictions, a
gift is constituted by a transaction without any valid legal consideration i.e. quid pro quo (see for example US,
UK, Canada, Singapore). Similarly in many civil law jurisdictions, one of the elements of a gift is a gratuitous
disposition (see for example Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia).
4
Posner, ‘Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises’ (1997) Wis L Rev 567 at
567-568.
5
See generally Schwartz, ‘The Social Psychology of the Gift’ (1967) 73 American Journal of Sociology.
6
Braun, ‘Testamentary Promises Between Selflessness and Self-interest’, in A-S Hulin and R Leckey (eds),
L'abnégation en droit civil (Editions Yvon Blais 2017) at 26, citing the Oxford English Dictionary.
7
Kraut, ‘Altruism’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 31 August 2020)
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism/> accessed 20 February 2023.
8
Ibid.
9
Rose, ‘Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts become Exchanges, and (More
Importantly) Vice Versa’ (1992) 44 Florida Law Review at 302.
Introduction
The argument that “[t]he gift does not exist, all is egoism”, as Professors Godbout and Caillé
opines reflects the spirit of the times, presupposes that that a transfer that is motivated by
egoism does not constitute a gift.1 Indeed, a dive into the annals of academic history will
reveal that the gift is commonly understood in terms of pure altruism. The view that “[g]ifts
are always gratuitous,” as pithily put by Charles Humphreys in his 1822 work entitled A
Compedium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky,2 is shared by many legislators,3 as
well as law and economics writers who almost exclusively operate on the assumption that the
sole motive of gift-giving is altruism. 4 However, this author questions whether the gift should
be conceptualized only in terms of a transfer motivated by pure altruism, because this view of
the gift does not accord well with our current social realities and gift-giving paradigm where
people often give things for different reasons5 and for more than one reason (there can be a
mix of both altruistic and egoistic reasons). In this regard, this author shall argue that the gift
should not be conceptualized as a transfer motivated by pure altruism, but rather as an
altruistic transfer (the difference between the two will be elaborated below). Further, this
author will argue that a transfer that is motivated by egoism may and should be considered as
a gift, provided that it is also motivated by altruism.
For the purposes of this essay, altruism shall refer to a “disinterested or selfless concern for
the well-being of others”6 or a “desire to benefit someone other than oneself for that person’s
sake”;7 and egoism shall refer to selfishness or the “desire to benefit oneself.”8
The conventional understanding of a gift
As mentioned above, the concept of a gift is commonly understood as a transfer motivated by
pure altruism. Based on this understanding, it follows that a transfer that is motivated by
egoism will not constitute a gift. In line with this understanding, Professor Rose offers a
helpful definition of the “quintessential gift,” which is “an unforced, one-sided transfer,
motivated by generosity and a spirit of selfless love without thought of reciprocity.”9
1
Godbout & Caillé, ‘The World of the Gift’ (Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen’s Press 1998) at 7.
2
at 215.
3
Hyland, ‘Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law’ (OUP 2009) at 135-136. In many common law jurisdictions, a
gift is constituted by a transaction without any valid legal consideration i.e. quid pro quo (see for example US,
UK, Canada, Singapore). Similarly in many civil law jurisdictions, one of the elements of a gift is a gratuitous
disposition (see for example Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia).
4
Posner, ‘Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises’ (1997) Wis L Rev 567 at
567-568.
5
See generally Schwartz, ‘The Social Psychology of the Gift’ (1967) 73 American Journal of Sociology.
6
Braun, ‘Testamentary Promises Between Selflessness and Self-interest’, in A-S Hulin and R Leckey (eds),
L'abnégation en droit civil (Editions Yvon Blais 2017) at 26, citing the Oxford English Dictionary.
7
Kraut, ‘Altruism’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 31 August 2020)
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism/> accessed 20 February 2023.
8
Ibid.
9
Rose, ‘Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts become Exchanges, and (More
Importantly) Vice Versa’ (1992) 44 Florida Law Review at 302.
