Table of Contents
Natural Law............................................................................................................................................1
Finnis’ Interpretation.........................................................................................................................1
Evaluation of Finnis........................................................................................................................1
Bix’s Interpretation............................................................................................................................2
Evaluation of Bix............................................................................................................................2
Positivism...............................................................................................................................................3
Austin’s Interpretation.......................................................................................................................3
Evaluation of Austin.......................................................................................................................3
Kelsen’s Interpretation......................................................................................................................4
Evaluation of Kelsen.......................................................................................................................5
Raz’s Interpretation...........................................................................................................................6
Evaluation of Raz...........................................................................................................................6
Hart’s Interpretation..........................................................................................................................7
Evaluation of Hart..........................................................................................................................7
Hart vs Fuller..........................................................................................................................................8
Evaluation of Fuller........................................................................................................................9
Interpretivism........................................................................................................................................9
Evaluation of Interpretivism........................................................................................................10
Legal Realism.......................................................................................................................................11
Evaluation of Legal Realism.........................................................................................................12
Critical Legal Studies............................................................................................................................12
Evaluation of Critical Legal Studies..............................................................................................13
Food for thought..................................................................................................................................14
1|Page
,Natural Law
Natural Law theory postulates that proper law can be derived from divine revelation, the
study of the natural world, or via proper reasoning. Contrary to the theory of Legal Positivism
advocated by H.L.A Hart, Natural Law Theory stands for the idea that law is intertwined with
morality – that moral standards are based off the intrinsic nature of humankind and the world
at large.
According to John Finnis, Natural Law primarily seeks to explore “the requirements of
practical reasonableness in relation to the good of human beings…[living] in a community
with one another.”1 With a heavy emphasis placed on morality, Natural Law reinforces the
connection between law and morality, and propounds that laws cannot be properly articulated
without a certain reference to morality. Furthermore, it is asserted that morality is
indispensable to upholding the existence of law. Viewed from another angle, laws which lack
a nexus with morality are ipso factor a perversion of the law. This idea is encapsulated in
Thomas Aquinas’ thesis in Summa Theologica, where he used the lexeme “lex injustia non
est lex” to disavow laws which are inherently immoral and unjust.
Finnis’ Interpretation
According to Finnis, the principles of Natural Law “justify the exercise of authority in
community”; and require for authority to be exercised under most circumstances in
accordance with the “Rule of Law”,2 which ascertains the overall legality of human
behaviour. Furthermore, Finnis argues that the law should ultimately be focused on giving
due regard to human rights, achieving justice, and promoting the common good. Very
pertinently, Finnis’ Three Propositions surmises (i) the existence of a fundamental set of
practical principles that guides human goals which ought to be pursued and realised; (ii) a
fundamental benchmark of practical reasonableness which differentiates the reasonableness
of acts; (iii) and a general set of moral standards. 3 Accordingly, practical reasonableness
refers to the human capacity for exercising reason and freedom, and it is through such
exercise that one is able to “grasp the requirements of practical reasonableness” and therefore
express or select one’s participation in the 7 basic goods – life, play, knowledge, aesthetic
experience, religion, friendship and practicable reasonableness.4
Evaluation of Finnis
However, Finnis’ propositions are premised on a highly erroneous assumption that there
exists an intrinsic homogeneity within the community. In particular, there is a failure to
recognise that entrenched in different societies are distinct and varying cultures and religions.
As such, individuals across different societies can be fundamentally different according to
their respective cultures and religions, be it in a physical or metaphysical manner. Therefore,
the fact that religious and cultural beliefs can differ amongst different society undermines the
1
J Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” at p. 351 and p. 281 (citing St German)
2
Ibid at p. 24
3
Ibid at ch. 2
4
M Discher, “Does Finnis Get Natural Rights for Everyone?” at p. 19
1|Page
, underlying assumption that Finnis’ propositions are based upon – that all individuals possess
commonalities that are intrinsic to every human being. Admittedly, that is not to say that
Finnis is completely wrong insofar as there can be universal commonalities amongst every
human being such as the physiological needs of food and shelter; however, it is arguably
presumptuous to extend Finnis’ proposition beyond such rudimentary commonalities.
To conclude, the Natural Law theory advocated by Finnis provides some useful guidance
inasmuch as it establishes certain goals to be pursued and realised (through the 7 basic
goods), which can be used as an abstract conceptualisation of what the law is and how the
law should be. However, Finnis’ propositions are evidently impracticable given that it is
difficult to qualify with certitude the meanings that underpin the terms used within his
propositions. Moreover, implementing Finnis’ abstract propositions would be problematic
given that such an implementation arguably overlooks the social realities in this world – that
communities are hardly homogenous and individuals from different societies are
fundamentally different. Nonetheless, Finnis’ interpretation outlines some overarching
parameters through which societal good can be defined and henceforth pursued and realised.
Bix’s Interpretation
Contrary to the absolute position propounded by Aquinas and Augustine, Professor Brian Bix
submits that a more reasonable interpretation of lex injustia non est lex should be that “unjust
laws are not laws in the fullest sense.”5 Just like how an incompetent graduate doctor may be
seen as not a doctor, the implication of Bix’s interpretation would mean that unjust laws do
not carry the same moral force in contrast with laws that are consistent with “higher law” (ie,
morality); but they are nevertheless still considered as part of the law.
Evaluation of Bix
Observably, Bix’s interpretation endeavours to ameliorate the absoluteness of Aquinas’
proposition “lex injustia non est lex” by putting forth two distinct types of law –laws which
are consistent with “higher law”, and laws which are inconsistent with morality and public
good– without denying the existence of any law. Having said that, while Bix’s interpretation
seems to be more cogent and commonsensical than the traditional absolute position, it is still
very impracticable in view of the current realities that we face today.
Bix distinguishes laws based on their moral force. However, by arguing that unjust laws are
nonetheless still considered as laws, the end result is that enforcing and ensuring compliance
of unjust laws becomes highly problematic. Notwithstanding the immorality of a law, Bix’s
interpretation suggests that the mere fact that an unjust law does not carry the same moral
force as a just law does not render the law unenforceable – and the annals of history bear
witness to this idea, that unjust laws can still be enforceable as observed in Apartheid. That
being said, crucially, it was the very unjust nature of those laws which compelled the African
slaves led by revolutionaries like Nelson Mandela to refuse compliance with those unjust
laws and seek to abolish them.
5
B. Bix, “Jurisprudence: Theory and Context”, 6th Ed, 2012, at p. 90
2|Page
Natural Law............................................................................................................................................1
Finnis’ Interpretation.........................................................................................................................1
Evaluation of Finnis........................................................................................................................1
Bix’s Interpretation............................................................................................................................2
Evaluation of Bix............................................................................................................................2
Positivism...............................................................................................................................................3
Austin’s Interpretation.......................................................................................................................3
Evaluation of Austin.......................................................................................................................3
Kelsen’s Interpretation......................................................................................................................4
Evaluation of Kelsen.......................................................................................................................5
Raz’s Interpretation...........................................................................................................................6
Evaluation of Raz...........................................................................................................................6
Hart’s Interpretation..........................................................................................................................7
Evaluation of Hart..........................................................................................................................7
Hart vs Fuller..........................................................................................................................................8
Evaluation of Fuller........................................................................................................................9
Interpretivism........................................................................................................................................9
Evaluation of Interpretivism........................................................................................................10
Legal Realism.......................................................................................................................................11
Evaluation of Legal Realism.........................................................................................................12
Critical Legal Studies............................................................................................................................12
Evaluation of Critical Legal Studies..............................................................................................13
Food for thought..................................................................................................................................14
1|Page
,Natural Law
Natural Law theory postulates that proper law can be derived from divine revelation, the
study of the natural world, or via proper reasoning. Contrary to the theory of Legal Positivism
advocated by H.L.A Hart, Natural Law Theory stands for the idea that law is intertwined with
morality – that moral standards are based off the intrinsic nature of humankind and the world
at large.
According to John Finnis, Natural Law primarily seeks to explore “the requirements of
practical reasonableness in relation to the good of human beings…[living] in a community
with one another.”1 With a heavy emphasis placed on morality, Natural Law reinforces the
connection between law and morality, and propounds that laws cannot be properly articulated
without a certain reference to morality. Furthermore, it is asserted that morality is
indispensable to upholding the existence of law. Viewed from another angle, laws which lack
a nexus with morality are ipso factor a perversion of the law. This idea is encapsulated in
Thomas Aquinas’ thesis in Summa Theologica, where he used the lexeme “lex injustia non
est lex” to disavow laws which are inherently immoral and unjust.
Finnis’ Interpretation
According to Finnis, the principles of Natural Law “justify the exercise of authority in
community”; and require for authority to be exercised under most circumstances in
accordance with the “Rule of Law”,2 which ascertains the overall legality of human
behaviour. Furthermore, Finnis argues that the law should ultimately be focused on giving
due regard to human rights, achieving justice, and promoting the common good. Very
pertinently, Finnis’ Three Propositions surmises (i) the existence of a fundamental set of
practical principles that guides human goals which ought to be pursued and realised; (ii) a
fundamental benchmark of practical reasonableness which differentiates the reasonableness
of acts; (iii) and a general set of moral standards. 3 Accordingly, practical reasonableness
refers to the human capacity for exercising reason and freedom, and it is through such
exercise that one is able to “grasp the requirements of practical reasonableness” and therefore
express or select one’s participation in the 7 basic goods – life, play, knowledge, aesthetic
experience, religion, friendship and practicable reasonableness.4
Evaluation of Finnis
However, Finnis’ propositions are premised on a highly erroneous assumption that there
exists an intrinsic homogeneity within the community. In particular, there is a failure to
recognise that entrenched in different societies are distinct and varying cultures and religions.
As such, individuals across different societies can be fundamentally different according to
their respective cultures and religions, be it in a physical or metaphysical manner. Therefore,
the fact that religious and cultural beliefs can differ amongst different society undermines the
1
J Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” at p. 351 and p. 281 (citing St German)
2
Ibid at p. 24
3
Ibid at ch. 2
4
M Discher, “Does Finnis Get Natural Rights for Everyone?” at p. 19
1|Page
, underlying assumption that Finnis’ propositions are based upon – that all individuals possess
commonalities that are intrinsic to every human being. Admittedly, that is not to say that
Finnis is completely wrong insofar as there can be universal commonalities amongst every
human being such as the physiological needs of food and shelter; however, it is arguably
presumptuous to extend Finnis’ proposition beyond such rudimentary commonalities.
To conclude, the Natural Law theory advocated by Finnis provides some useful guidance
inasmuch as it establishes certain goals to be pursued and realised (through the 7 basic
goods), which can be used as an abstract conceptualisation of what the law is and how the
law should be. However, Finnis’ propositions are evidently impracticable given that it is
difficult to qualify with certitude the meanings that underpin the terms used within his
propositions. Moreover, implementing Finnis’ abstract propositions would be problematic
given that such an implementation arguably overlooks the social realities in this world – that
communities are hardly homogenous and individuals from different societies are
fundamentally different. Nonetheless, Finnis’ interpretation outlines some overarching
parameters through which societal good can be defined and henceforth pursued and realised.
Bix’s Interpretation
Contrary to the absolute position propounded by Aquinas and Augustine, Professor Brian Bix
submits that a more reasonable interpretation of lex injustia non est lex should be that “unjust
laws are not laws in the fullest sense.”5 Just like how an incompetent graduate doctor may be
seen as not a doctor, the implication of Bix’s interpretation would mean that unjust laws do
not carry the same moral force in contrast with laws that are consistent with “higher law” (ie,
morality); but they are nevertheless still considered as part of the law.
Evaluation of Bix
Observably, Bix’s interpretation endeavours to ameliorate the absoluteness of Aquinas’
proposition “lex injustia non est lex” by putting forth two distinct types of law –laws which
are consistent with “higher law”, and laws which are inconsistent with morality and public
good– without denying the existence of any law. Having said that, while Bix’s interpretation
seems to be more cogent and commonsensical than the traditional absolute position, it is still
very impracticable in view of the current realities that we face today.
Bix distinguishes laws based on their moral force. However, by arguing that unjust laws are
nonetheless still considered as laws, the end result is that enforcing and ensuring compliance
of unjust laws becomes highly problematic. Notwithstanding the immorality of a law, Bix’s
interpretation suggests that the mere fact that an unjust law does not carry the same moral
force as a just law does not render the law unenforceable – and the annals of history bear
witness to this idea, that unjust laws can still be enforceable as observed in Apartheid. That
being said, crucially, it was the very unjust nature of those laws which compelled the African
slaves led by revolutionaries like Nelson Mandela to refuse compliance with those unjust
laws and seek to abolish them.
5
B. Bix, “Jurisprudence: Theory and Context”, 6th Ed, 2012, at p. 90
2|Page
