Jessica Miners
The central criterion of the Cold War can be traced back to ideology. American foreign
policy became focused on economic gain and ideological expansion. As a result, the USSR
had a need for security and Stalin’s paranoia grew. This was exacerbated by America’s
attempt to hide the atomic bomb which suggests issues within the Grand Alliance. America’s
superior military and economic power led to a reluctance to compromise. Both sides
prioritised domestic security interests and consequently tensions mounted regarding the
Soviet sphere of influence and American domination in Japan. In short, America held an
atomic monopoly and was intent on dominating the global economy post-1945, a position
that threatened Soviet security.
The historian Alperovitz agrees that “the bomb was used not because there were no
alternatives, but precisely because American policy makers wished to avoid the political
consequences of these alternatives”1. Similarly, Williams argues that it was American “Dollar
Imperialism” - which is the use of economic aid for control – underpinned by extreme
ideological differences, that caused the most tension in the Cold War. This was emphasised
by the USSR’s weakened economy compared to America’s booming one. He says that
“Americans assumed a posture of moral and ideological superiority at an early date.” 2. Thus,
economic expansion was accelerated by their atomic monopoly and American superiority
contributed to the breakdown in international relations. Therefore, it is American ideology
that started the Cold War as it was this criterion which drove economic expansion, and
which caused Stalin to attempt to protect the Soviet state.
Gellately, the author of ‘Stalin’s Curse’, disagrees, and instead believes that it was Russian
hostility, and Stalin’s confrontational personality, that caused not only the Cold War but the
USA’s attitudes and actions throughout negotiations. He believed that Stalin’s “preference
was to continue the wartime alliance, to milk it for all it was worth, while at the same time
planting regimes to his liking wherever the Red Army went” 3. This argument is weakened by
failing to consider American expansion pre- and post-1945. The USSR’s need for ideological
expansion was caused by security issues rather than purposeful hostility. Stalin sought to
compromise with Roosevelt, however this became problematic after Yalta due to American
foreign policy. Therefore, blame should be placed on America rather than Russia.
Alperovitz blames America’s attitude being focused on atomic power rather than genuine
cooperation and compromise. This reflects historical debate at the time Alperovitz was
writing as being focused on criticism of American foreign policy, illustrating that the context
in which sources are written can influence the interpretation they present. On the first page
of Alperovitz’s book ‘Atomic Diplomacy’ he says that “the atomic bomb had a very
significant influence on American views of diplomacy towards the Soviet Union” 4. He
continues, “the weapon was inextricably bound up with President Harry S. Truman’s
1
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 158
2
Williams, W. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland and New York: World
Publishing Company, 1959) p. 84
3
Gellately, R. Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (Vintage, 2013) p.
23
4
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 1
1
The central criterion of the Cold War can be traced back to ideology. American foreign
policy became focused on economic gain and ideological expansion. As a result, the USSR
had a need for security and Stalin’s paranoia grew. This was exacerbated by America’s
attempt to hide the atomic bomb which suggests issues within the Grand Alliance. America’s
superior military and economic power led to a reluctance to compromise. Both sides
prioritised domestic security interests and consequently tensions mounted regarding the
Soviet sphere of influence and American domination in Japan. In short, America held an
atomic monopoly and was intent on dominating the global economy post-1945, a position
that threatened Soviet security.
The historian Alperovitz agrees that “the bomb was used not because there were no
alternatives, but precisely because American policy makers wished to avoid the political
consequences of these alternatives”1. Similarly, Williams argues that it was American “Dollar
Imperialism” - which is the use of economic aid for control – underpinned by extreme
ideological differences, that caused the most tension in the Cold War. This was emphasised
by the USSR’s weakened economy compared to America’s booming one. He says that
“Americans assumed a posture of moral and ideological superiority at an early date.” 2. Thus,
economic expansion was accelerated by their atomic monopoly and American superiority
contributed to the breakdown in international relations. Therefore, it is American ideology
that started the Cold War as it was this criterion which drove economic expansion, and
which caused Stalin to attempt to protect the Soviet state.
Gellately, the author of ‘Stalin’s Curse’, disagrees, and instead believes that it was Russian
hostility, and Stalin’s confrontational personality, that caused not only the Cold War but the
USA’s attitudes and actions throughout negotiations. He believed that Stalin’s “preference
was to continue the wartime alliance, to milk it for all it was worth, while at the same time
planting regimes to his liking wherever the Red Army went” 3. This argument is weakened by
failing to consider American expansion pre- and post-1945. The USSR’s need for ideological
expansion was caused by security issues rather than purposeful hostility. Stalin sought to
compromise with Roosevelt, however this became problematic after Yalta due to American
foreign policy. Therefore, blame should be placed on America rather than Russia.
Alperovitz blames America’s attitude being focused on atomic power rather than genuine
cooperation and compromise. This reflects historical debate at the time Alperovitz was
writing as being focused on criticism of American foreign policy, illustrating that the context
in which sources are written can influence the interpretation they present. On the first page
of Alperovitz’s book ‘Atomic Diplomacy’ he says that “the atomic bomb had a very
significant influence on American views of diplomacy towards the Soviet Union” 4. He
continues, “the weapon was inextricably bound up with President Harry S. Truman’s
1
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 158
2
Williams, W. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland and New York: World
Publishing Company, 1959) p. 84
3
Gellately, R. Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (Vintage, 2013) p.
23
4
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 1
1
