Summary Andrew Heywood: Global Politics (Chapter 11, Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament)

Heywood Chapter 11 – Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament

 development and use of nuclear weapons in 1945 marked a turning point in the history of warfare
 Does the bomb rule out war or is it a source of unending tension and insecurity?
 Does the bomb bring responsible statesmanship or expansionist ambition?
 great anxiety about nuclear proliferation
 ‘Nuclear club’ with 9 members
 increasing emphasis on the issues of arms control and disarmament
 destruction by a nuclear bomb: blast effect + thermal radiation + nuclear radiation
 WMD: CBW, or sometimes grouped as ABC or later CBRN
o massive collateral damage, indiscriminate destructive capability
o powerful deterrent effects
o moral side
 ‘unusable’ strategic and ‘usable’ tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons
 significance of the use of nuclear bomb against Japan
o enforcing speedy surrender, avoiding casualties of a potential invasion, also to prevent Soviets
o the USA demonstrating military strength aiming for hegemony
 backfires, only intensifies Soviets attempts -> ‘balance of terror’
o they link war with the potential extermination of mankind, powerful symbolic, philosophic
and existential impact
 security dilemma: weapons acquired for defensive purposes may be perceived by other states as
having, potentially or actually offensive. This, then, encourages them to strengthen their own
defensive military capacity, an action which, in turn, may be viewed by other states as offensive
o after all, international politics is characterized by fear and uncertainty
o the costs of inaction greatly outweigh the costs of action
 nuclear proliferation
o horizontal (more states or actors) or vertical (more accumulation)
 NPT (1968, extended indefinitely in 1995)
 developing first-strike and second-strike capabilities -> MAD
 approaches to ‘balance of power’
o realist: central role
 rough equilibrium between power blocs (only a power can be a check on a power)
 classical realists:
 voluntarism (implying faith in free will and personal commitment) assumes
that key decision-makers in foreign policy enjoy great (though not unlimited)
freedom of manoeuvre
 neorealists:
 determinism (implying that human actions are entirely conditioned by external
factors) suggests that the balance of power is essentially ‘imposed by events’ on
statesman who are constrained by the dynamics of the international system
o liberal: critical view
 balance of power legitimizes and entrenches power politics and international rivalry,
creating inherent instability and deepening distrust
 this mindset is more likely to cause war than prevent it
 instead of balance of power (private agreement) international organizations (public
agreements) could be a solution -> collective security

, o critical approaches:
 social constructivists: balance of power is dependant on perception, ideas, beliefs
 feminist theorists: it tends to intensify international conflict
 balance of power -> struggle for power
 postcolonial theorists:
 essentially European, Western game
 in the late 19th century
 after the Cold War START (1991) and START-II (1993)
 ‘post-Cold War’/’second nuclear age’
o Established nuclear powers continued to use nuclear strategies.
 START-III (1999) broke down due to tensions regarding the ABM Treaty
 new generation of weapons developed or planned (e.g. ‘mini-nukes’, missile shields)
 revival of disarmament around 2010 has not succeeded yet
o The incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons have increased.
 withdrawal of the US/Soviet nuclear umbrella which served as an extended deterrent
 India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran (quest only)
 discouraging intervention: Iraq (abandoned), DPRK (succeeded)
o Proliferation is easier, as nuclear weapons and nuclear technology are more available.
 in the ‘first nuclear age’ only few countries jumped the high technological threshold
 chaotic situation after the collapse of the USSR
 US trying to stop that
 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine returned the warheads to Russia by 1996
o Fears have heightened that nuclear weapons may get into the ‘wrong’ hands
 diminishing obstacles towards horizontal proliferation -> threat of nuclear terrorism
 ‘rogue states’, axis of evil (Bush, 2002): DPRK, Iran, Iraq + Cuba, Libya, Syria
o Some states with clear economic and technological potential to develop nuclear weapons have
demonstrated a consistent determination not to (AUS, CAN, GER, JAP, KOR)
o Others voluntarily abandoned and renounced nuclear programmes (BRA, ARG, RSA)
o Iraq and Libya also abandoned their nuclear programmes
 Do nuclear weapons promote peace and stability?
o YES:
 absence of nuclear war: have not been in use since 1945 and no conventional wars
between nuclear powers
 effective deterrence: success in a nuclear war became virtually unthinkable
 international stability: vertical proliferation has maintained the ‘balance of
power/terror’ and horizontal proliferation has been gradually slow
 nuclear statesmanship: the bomb inspires for responsibility and caution even with
tense conflicts (e.g. India-Pakistan)
o NO:
 fallibility of deterrent systems: the threat (of escalation) is always there,
miscalculations can happen, deterrence may fail
 danger of nuclear imbalances: There is no guarantee that vertical or horizontal
nuclear proliferation will preserve the balance of power (anno vs Japan was a case of
this)
 ‘usable’ tactical nuclear weapons -> Nuclear Utilization Target Selection (NUTS)
suggesting a limited nuclear exchange could occur
 irresponsible nuclear powers: nuclear weapons getting into the hands of dictatorial
regimes, terrorist organizations or other actors having fewer scruples about using them